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ABSTRACT
ENVIRONMENTALLY RELATED URBANIZATION AND VIOLENCE POTENTIAL
Christina Bagaglio Slentz
Old Dominion University, 2021
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

In contrast to historical examples in which urban increase is accompanied by the pull
factors of wealth and development, post-industrialized sub-Saharan African urbanization
patterns are characterized by a lack of economic growth, confounding experts. Simultaneously,
African conflict scholars have observed a major geographical shift in African conflict onset,
moving out of rural regions and into urban centers. Recognizing the effects of increasing
climate variability and threatened agricultural livelihoods, this study hypothesizes perceived
economic advantage in cities induces human movement with potential for over-urbanization
dynamics that exacerbate civil unrest.
To investigate, a Panarchy theoretical framework of nested adaptive cycles is used to
construct a comprehensive multi-scalar model of environmental vulnerability, assessing topdown state-level factors as well as bottom-up sub-urban forces culminating at the municipal
scale. A sixteen year time-series regression analysis (2000-2015) integrates these influences,
confirming national composite measures of environmental vulnerability/adaptability and ruralurban demographic transformation correlate strongly with a state’s likelihood of urban political
violence. An out-of-sample validation comparing a geostatistical analysis of the model to
observed georeferenced urban violence suggests the model is robust. The resulting state

classifications of environmentally related urbanization and violence potential guide qualitative
analysis.
On this basis, identified patterns in governance, resources and human agency are
consolidated into a framework of urban environmental vulnerability, revealing regime
duration/consolidation, specifically at a threshold of fifteen years, and democratic polity reduce
the likelihood of urban violence. Importantly, the structures, processes and norms of
governance define the distribution of resource-driven national capacity—sharing resiliency at
all scales or conserving it for the sake of the state, with major implications for household
capacity and the likelihood of adaptive mobility. Additionally, democracies inherently
encourage competition and contestation processes critical to adaptation and reorganization
without dismantling the entire system; however, in “younger” democracies these dynamics
typically align with higher mobility and lower levels of urban violence reflecting “healthy”
function. Autocracies, on the other hand, stifle these processes and risk becoming too rigid,
achieving urban stability where governance is well-established, but limiting overall adaptability
to environmental impact and increasing vulnerability to crisis as revealed in destabilized
autocracies where urban violence is most extreme.
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CHAPTER I
LINES OF FLIGHT
“History’s greatest geographic adventures are lines of flight: the long marches by foot, horse, or
boat; the Hebrews in the desert, Genseric the Vandal crossing the Mediterranean, the nomads
across the steppes, the Great March of the Chinese—it’s always along a line of flight that we
create because there we are tracing the real and composing a plane of consistency, not simply
imagining or dreaming. Flee, but while fleeing, pick up a weapon.”
--Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet 1

Environmental migration is by no means a new phenomenon. Most are familiar with
the “Technicolor Dreamcoat” story of Joseph, the sympathetic youth of antiquity pushed, out of
competitive sibling rivalry, from his rural innocence into indentured servitude in the great
metropolis of the Egyptian Pharaohs. After an arduous journey from the outer slums, through
imprisonment, and finally to the inner sanctum of elite society as a favored servant, Joseph’s
skills (dream interpretation) win him local acceptance. He is then able to aid in his own nowpenitent family’s urban assimilation as severe drought has driven them from their homeland to
the big city, where---thanks to Joseph’s advice---years of built-up food stores are pulling people
from all over the region to a resilient zone of relative well-being. Thus, the migration path
pioneered by Joseph serves to direct and ease the movement of his brothers as they seek
means of adaptation to the environmental change of the day. The “rest of the story” of course
reveals a harsher follow-on reality as, over time and with increased numbers, Joseph’s
descendants are socially reduced from welcome guest worker status to ethnic enslavement,

1

Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, “Politics,” in The Cultural Studies Reader, ed. Simon During
(NY: Routledge, 2007), 179.
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surviving in slums and periodically subjected to infanticides until, as the story tells, Divine
Intervention enables their mass out-migration.
Today, as environmental change confronts an expanding geography with uncertain
projections of intensification, the complex political ecology of the world is once again in flux,
provoking concern for negative emerging patterns of habitat and livelihood loss, threat to
infrastructure and biodiversity, resource scarcity and group competition that could contribute
to environmentally related large-scale human movement. Already, post-industrialized subSaharan African urbanization patterns evidence something of a migration puzzle, characterized
by a lack of economic growth in stark contradiction to historical examples in which urban
increase is accompanied by the pull factors of wealth and development.2 What, then, explains
this movement to cities? Of significant concern, these urban areas have simultaneously
witnessed an increased proportion and frequency of conflict amidst conditions of high
population density, spatial (and consequently ethnic) inequalities and/or political exclusion as
well as poverty suggesting an “urbanization of marginalization” and violence escalating city
fragility.3 Transforming the nature of insecurity and regional sources of conflict onset, these
dynamics alongside a decline in large-scale civil war have shifted African violence trends out of
rural zones and into urban conflict hotspots.4 As environmental vulnerability represents “an
important determinant of rural-to-urban migration”5 with potential to fuel the flames of these

2

Sean Fox, “Urbanization as a Global Historical Process: Theory and Evidence from Sub-Saharan
Africa,” Population and Development Review 38(2) (2012): 285.
3
Clionadh Raleigh, “Urban Violence Patterns Across African States,” International Studies
Review 17 (2015): 90-91.
4
Raleigh, “Urban Violence Patterns Across African States,” 90.
5
Salvador Barrios, Luisito Bertinelli and Eric Strobl, “Climatic Change and Rural-Urban
Migration: the Case of sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Urban Economics 60 (2006): 359, 369.
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“hotspots,” the violence potential of environmentally related urbanization demands further
investigation.
The goal of this work is to investigate these dynamics of modern climate related
migration and explore the suggested propensity for insecurity. This assertion gained significant
support among security scholars (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Kaplan, 1994; Klare, 2002) shortly after
the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990 warned “the gravest effects
of climate change may be those on human migration,” a position progressively qualified and
quasi-rescinded by the IPCC over the past quarter century.6 Increasingly, experts---migration
scholars, in particular---have emphasized a more nuanced analysis, pointing to the complexity
of climate vulnerability and favoring migration as a valuable means of adaptation.7 Thus,
diverse expectations and approaches to the issue of climate migration have come to
characterize the budding fields of ecopolitics and environmental security studies (ESS).
Bridging competing theoretical narratives with Panarchy theory, a complex adaptive
systems framework, this dissertation joins migration, conflict and ecological models in an
intersubjective approach to test the hypothesis that environmental vulnerability–a composite
measure of environmental exposure vis-à-vis adaptive capacity—is playing a significant role in
rural-to-urban movement with serious implications for urban political violence and civil unrest
undermining national stability and resilience. The IPCC defines these key terms as follows:
1) Vulnerability - the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected

6

Clionadh Raleigh, Lisa Jordan and Idean Salehyan, “Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on
Migration and Conflict,” in Paper commissioned by the World Bank Group for the Social
Dimensions of Climate Change Workshop (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2008): 1.
7
Raleigh, Jordan and Salehyan, “Assessing the Impact…,” 3.
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2) Exposure - the presence of people; livelihoods; environmental services and
resources; infrastructure; or economic, social, or cultural assets in places that could
be adversely affected
3) Adaptive capacity - the combination of the strengths, attributes, and resources
available to an individual, community, society, or organization that can be used to
prepare for and undertake actions to reduce adverse impacts, moderate harm, or
exploit beneficial opportunities
4) Resilience - the ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb,
accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and
efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration, or
improvement of its essential basic structures and functions8
5) …and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), assessing how
disorder in states comes to be, provides the following definition:
6) Political violence - the use of force by a group with a political purpose or
motivation.9
Therefore, this hypothesis begins with the understanding that not all environmental
exposure triggers these patterns of behavior. Rather, environmental vulnerability, the result of
exposure in the absence of capacity to adapt, characterizes conditions that have potential for

8

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Glossary of Terms,” in: Managing the
Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: A Special Report
of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), edited by
Field, C.B., et al., 555-564 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA,
2012, 556, 559, 563, 564.
9
ACLED, “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, 2017 Version 8,” 6.
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giving rise to disruptive processes challenging social system resiliency. Consequently, this
investigation focuses heavily on this context of environmental vulnerability culminating at the
urban scale, identifying mechanisms and linkages between exposure and environmental
insecurity.
Using the example of sub-Saharan Africa, a region situated where climate change impact
is being felt most immediately and intensely, the quantitative portion of this research project
confirms this hypothesis. The 2000-2015 time-series environmentally related urbanization and
violence potential statistical regression model, “EUV,” finds both national environmental
vulnerability as well as increasing rural-urban demographic rates of change statistically
correlate to the likelihood of a state’s urban political violence fatality event frequency (relative
to urban population size), validated by an out-of-sample geostatistical analysis. Furthermore,
spatial distribution of EUV characteristics exposes the pivotal role of governance in relationship
to natural resource endowment, critically shaping local adaptive capacity, the subsequent
likelihood of urban violence, and overall shared national resiliency.
A more qualitative deep dive reveals a “tipping point” of fifteen years regime duration,
at which point consolidation of governing institutions sharply divides patterns of stability and
instability; moreover, democratic polity, on average, aligns with lower levels of urban violence
on either side of this divide. Additionally, country characteristics related to non-agrarian
resource endowments and rural livelihood interact with the structures and processes of
governance affecting which populations are likely to exhibit in-place resilience with little
disruption to the urban scale, which have capacity for adaptive movement challenging urban

6
stability, and which are likely to struggle in place lacking adaptive capacity and left vulnerable
to climate impact.
The culmination of these above- and below-scale forces, consolidated into a framework
of urban environmental vulnerability, reveals urban stability in mature, well-institutionalized
states endowed with substantial non-agrarian resources, slightly higher levels of urban violence
in young, agriculturally dependent democracies presenting higher levels of mobility, and the
highest levels of urban violence in young, poorly established autocracies demonstrating the
highest levels of rural-urban demographic transformation. In terms of the geospatial nature of
climate conflict onset, the findings of this research are limited to patterns of political violence;
however, observing the destabilization potential of such violence, it is worth noting a strong
tendency for preponderantly rural violence in autocratic leaning countries, mixed results in
democracies, and a clear preponderance of urban violence in poorly-institutionalized quasidemocratic anocracies.
To introduce the reader to environmental migration in the twenty-first century, the next
segment provides foundational context, broadly engaging the topic, a phenomenon of major
significance to the contemporary world as it relates closely to global climate change—forecast
to worsen in the coming decades due to “changes in the mean and/or the variability of
[climate] properties.”10 Importantly, global as well as local perspectives have produced diverse
historically and culturally influenced viewpoints on the threat of climate change, environmental
vulnerability and experiences of impact, subsequently shaping theoretical expectations of

10

IPCC, “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.” Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. Core
Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A. (Switzerland: IPCC, 2007): 30.
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environmental migrant behavior, sources of insecurity and analytical approaches. Opening a
small window onto key areas of distinction within these competing narratives, the third
segment anchors discussion of the epistemological extremes of environmental migration
security scholarship using two films that portray these dynamics. On this basis, the final
segment argues for a comprehensive methodological approach uniquely devised to account for
the complexity of this research project and tailored to the sub-Saharan Africa regional case of
human movement from rural to urban regions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of this
research in terms of broader implications and critical issues posed within the field of global
affairs.

ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION IN THE MODERN ERA
Although worldwide numbers of climate-induced migrants are generally difficult to
define due to the entanglement of factors that typically contribute to mobility, the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) argues, “…it is evident that gradual and sudden
environmental changes are already resulting in substantial population movements.”11 The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) special advisory group on
human mobility reports weather-related, sudden-onset disasters---expected to increase and
intensify in the coming decades---have on average displaced at least 22.5 million people
globally each year, with approximately 95 percent of displacement occurring in developing

11

International Organization for Migration (IOM), “A Complex Nexus,” Migration, Climate
Change and the Environment, http://128.199.179.223/iom/european-economic-area/complexnexus.
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countries.12 While catastrophic events have occurred three times as frequently in the past
three decades with serious consequences for local populace, gradual environmental change,
posed by forces such as drought, is much more likely to impact human movement and has
affected twice as many people as storms in these last thirty years.13 Moreover, internal climate
migration—movement between administrative units within country—has been observed at a
volume three times that of international migration, with the World Bank asserting, “Internal
climate migrants are rapidly becoming the human face of climate change,” a population
projected to reach as high as 143 million by 2050 under “pessimistic,” business-as-usual climate
change estimations for the regions of sub-Saharan Africa (86 million), Latin America (17 million)
and South Asia (40 million).14
Aside from changes in scale and scope as well as expectations for intensification,
modern environmental migration differs in important complex ways from historical examples.
Prior to the modern statist system of order, human mobility as means of environmental
adaptation was a fairly accepted process contributing to the system of human sustainability;
however, contemporary legal, security and labor structures serve as barriers to this former
fluidity. Historically imposed borders have also fostered sometimes-artificial rigidity and lessthan-appropriate social lines of demarcation inhibiting natural patterns of movement in the
modern world. Conversely, twenty-first century communications connectivity, economic

12

The Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility (Recommendations), “Human
Mobility in the Context of Climate Change UNFCCC – Paris COP-21” (November 2015): 9,
http://www.unhcr.org/565b21bd9.html.
13
IOM, “A Complex Nexus.”
14
Kanta Kumari Rigaud, et al., Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration.
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2018): xiv, xxi, 18.
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interdependence, high technology and mass rapid transit have culminated in global
deterritorialization that transcends time and distance, potentially transforming distant
problems into proximate dilemmas. With projections of climate exposure intensifying most
acutely in geographies with the least capacity to manage deteriorating conditions, those most
likely to experience environmental vulnerability face the most immediate challenge of
absorbing, mitigating and adapting to impacts—yet they have little to no control over the global
behaviors that contribute to climate change. Thus, the modern system of order impinges upon
traditional environmental change adaptive mechanisms, while modernity’s globalizing
structures not only exacerbate ecological stress and strain but also offer contagious pathways
for disruption to travel well beyond traditional distances.
The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
notes however, “The framing of climate change as a security issue has been controversial,”
pointing to competing narratives heavily influenced by “culturally embedded perceptions of
climate change” that steer attitudes toward risk, resilience and adaptive capacity.15 In
conjunction with inconclusive and competing empirical assessments as well as overly futuristic
predictive analyses, a lack of consensus in the environmental security discourse persists,
observable in scholarly debate, expert opinions and policy maker positions.16

15

Neil W. Adger, et al., “Human Security,” in: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. Field, et al. (UK and
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 760, 764.
16
Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ragnhild Nordås, “Conflicting Messages? The IPCC on Conflict and
Human Security, Political Geography 43 (2014): 82-83.
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A critical question that arises is, security for whom? Statist perspectives frame the
problem in more traditional terms of national security characterized by analysis concerning
borders, legality, civil opposition groups and physical dimensions of security. On the other
hand, migrant-centered analysis focuses upon individual levels of human insecurity,
summarized by the UN Commission on Human Security (2003), as that which ensures access to
“the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”17 Increasingly, environmental security
scholars recognize critical linkages between the greed and grievance born of insecurity and civil
unrest that give rise to conflict onset. The mutually constituting relationship between physical
security and human security therefore suggests multi-scalar analysis incorporating both into
final assessments provides an improved understanding and more comprehensive interpretation
of the dynamics at hand. To flesh out these competing frames of environmental migration
securitization, two heuristic films allow for a breakdown of climate migrant representation and
problems with deterministic oversimplification of environmental exposure, human movement
and violence, confirming a need for multi-scalar, intersubjective, complex analysis.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT, THE STATE AND CLIMATE MIGRANT REPRESENTATION
Cultural globalization scholar Arjun Appadurai identifies media and mass migration as
the two most important influences on contemporary human imagination, explaining the result
is a “space of contestation” in which the “ordinary world” is empowered to engage with and

17

United Nations Human Security Unit, “Human Security in Theory and Practice: An Overview
of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security” (NY:
United Nations, 2009): 5.

11
affect global social dynamics as never before experienced.18 The resulting “mythographies”
serve as “charters for new social projects.”19 In this way, IPCC assertions of “culturally
embedded perceptions of climate change” driving competing narratives can be understood as a
reflection of the media flows between local and global that blend individual and group
expectations with those of the international community and set pathways for (in)action.
Importantly, these drivers not only affect those assessing environmental migration from afar,
but also the perceptions of those on ground level, who, as Rafael Reuveny asserts, face a choice
complicated by degrees of climate change intensity and local (lack of) economic and/or
technological resilience capacity: “stay in place and do nothing, accepting the costs; stay in
place and mitigate changes; or leave affected areas.”20 For these agents, pre-existing migratory
pathways and communication between places of origin and destination etch out newly
imagined possibilities characterizing perceived risk, expectation, satisfaction and frustration
and, ultimately, carry important implications for social stability.
Two films drawing attention to environmental displacement illustrate these divergent
perspectives, identifying critical differences in expectations of human agency, conflict and the
appropriate referent object of securitization---the unit of analysis for whom/for which threat is
perceived to exist. The first, a 2010 documentary entitled Climate Refugees written and
directed by Irish-American Michael P. Nash,21 and the second, Sounds of Sand, a Belgian drama

18

Appadurai, Arjun, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1996): 3-5.
19
Appadurai, Modernity at Large, 6-8.
20
Rafael Reuveny, “Climate Change-induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” Political
Geography 26 (2007): 657.
21
Climate Refugees, Online (Hulu), directed by Michael P. Nash (2010; USA: LA Think Tank).

12
based upon the French novel Chamelle and directed by French filmmaker, Marion Hänsel,22
reveal important spaces of contestation and provide insight on the multidimensional
viewpoints influencing analysis and decision-making.
In the tradition of conventional international relations (IR) studies, Climate Refugees
offers a statist perspective on environmental migration, giving little attention to sub-national
conditions, histories and behaviors and readily linking expectations of resource scarcity and
forced human movement to conflict potential threatening the national security of destination
countries. This film is a predominantly Western, bi-partisan, political-star-studded
documentary featuring American and international officials from both defense and peacebuilding sectors. Immediately, the title confronts more recently agreed upon legal descriptors,
invoking the abandoned term “refugee.” “Environmental refugee” was most publicly
introduced by Essam El-Hinnawi in 1985 and initially embraced in the 1990 IPCC report; it was
later transformed to “ecological refugee” in the mid-1990s and briefly became “climate
refugee” in 2007, in attempt to narrow the description from general “environmental” scenarios
of displacement to those “who flee the direct effects of climate change.”23 While this may
seem to be a “hassle with terms,” “climate refugee”---rejected in favor of “environmental
migrant” or “climate migrant” in the fourth IPCC report (2007)---equates these scenarios to
those outlined by the Geneva Refugee Convention.24 The lead international migration

22

Sounds of Sand [Si le vent soulève les sables], Netcast (Netflix), directed by Marion
Hänsel (2006; Belgium: Man’s Films and ASAP Films).
23
Thomas Faist and Jeanette Schade, “The Climate-Migration Nexus: A Reorientation,” in
Disentangling Migration and Climate Change, Methodologies, Political Discourses and Human
Rights, ed. Thomas Faist and Jeanette Schade (Dordrecht, Germany: Springer, 2013): 5-6. (Also
citing Biermann and Boas, 2007: 8.)
24
Faist and Schade, “The Climate-Migration Nexus,” 6.
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authority, the IOM, defines environmental migrants to be “persons or groups of persons who,
for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their
lives or living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so,
either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory or abroad.”25 By
passing on use of the more inclusive descriptor, the filmmakers omit aspects of progressive
environmental change and migrant choice, eschewing elements of individual agency.
Out of presumable desire to raise alarm to the problem of climate change, Climate
Refugees focuses upon those most heavily impacted with expectations of powerlessness. UN
University Director Janos Bogardi, for example, is featured saying, “If we want to give a human
face to climate change, we have to visualize a very vulnerable individual facing a problem
he/she cannot solve alone.”26 Similarly, a UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme)
official observing climate change effects in Bangladesh, asks, “What will happen to these people
who will be displaced? Where will they go? India?” and pointing out the religious and historical
differences between the two countries laments, “Borders have meaning.”27
As complex attributes of individual agency and local resilience are un-factored into the
equation, estimated numbers of those impacted amount to a massive force structurally
determined to devolve into conflict and/or flight according to “neo-Malthusian” predictions of
violence amidst severe resource scarcity. One expert explains, “Climate change is about
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upheaval,” arguing, it is the “enemy or opposite of security.”28 As the film concludes, animated
map images display large red arrows launching from developing regions landing in Europe and
North America, signifying countries of resource abundance as the referent objects of security.
Finally, former Secretary of State John Kerry speaks to the problem once more in terms of
national security against the backdrop of the post-9/11 heavily damaged Pentagon, strongly
suggesting a link between climate migration and the global transference of terrorism. The film
closes with scenes of violent protest in developing states.
The second film, Sounds of Sand, is a fictitious work described as “a tale of exodus… a
parable about determination and eternity,” focusing on one family experiencing the effects of
environmental degradation and livelihood loss, making the collective decision to migrate with
some of their fellow villagers, eventually choosing their own path and barely surviving the
journey through a conflict-ridden land.29 Immediately, this perspective is reflective of a
migrant-centered analysis of climate-induced movement with expectations of both structure
and agency integrated into theoretical frameworks, in particular, as Bakewell argues, structures
possessing “emergent properties” with the “’generative capacity’ to modify the power of its
constituents in fundamental ways.”30
As described by migration scholars and revealed at the start of the movie, the decision
to migrate is often a family choice situated in the social context of “communal traditions, village
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practices, and national or even international trends.”31 Individual levels of rational choice,
human or “attitudinal” capital, and personal factors also enter into play, as shown by the film’s
main character, Rahne, who faces several difficult decisions along his way. 32 Although the
fictitious Rahne is in a position of great vulnerability, he realistically weighs his options
throughout the film, making careful choices to align with social networks when helpful and
relying upon his own knowledge and skills when to his advantage; he barters with his assets
(goats) when necessary and negotiates compromises without resort to violence. Despite
significant exposure to drought and overall social liminality once displaced, Rahne and his
fellow villagers do not follow prescribed patterns of behavior---while some families choose
movement, others cannot/do not, and while some they meet have chosen warfare and
violence, Rahne and his fellow villagers do not. Reflecting theories of migration scholarship,
character behaviors are not wholly pre-determined by structural forces, and the linear
predictability of outcomes is severely diminished. The predominant threat is not a question of
state-to-state armed conflict; rather, it is the threat of lost livelihood and geographic
marginalization.

Spaces of Contestation
The key areas of distinction highlighted by these films---aspects of agency, expectations
for conflict and violence, and the defined referent object of security---amount to differently
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perceived sites of causality characterizing environmental migration and potential for violence.
Such dissimilarity is indicative of the theoretical lens through which analysts have judged the
appropriate level of analysis to be. Climate Refugees, offering a more traditional perspective,
recognizes the state level as the crucial site at which devolution into violence is most likely
determined. Scholars cite, for example, “state weakness hypothesis” and “state exploitation
hypothesis” (Kahl 2006) as pathways to conflict based upon governmental failure to manage
resource crisis or governmental privileging particular sub-national parties amidst environmental
degradation in exchange for political support.33 Such an approach observes climate migration
in the context of the modern state system of order and is inclined to approach environmental
migration as a “problem” solved through policy, legality and state (border) security.
Importantly, this system has provided relative global stability for decades, if not centuries, and
the significance of national security as vital to development and well-being cannot be
overlooked nor dismissed. Moreover, theoretical positions that project instability amidst
conditions of resource competition are well founded and must be given significant attention.
The migrant-centered perspective at the heart of Sounds of Sand reflects a de-centered
view of traditional global social structures, narrowing the lens of analysis to individual and local
levels, drawing attention to the complex multitude of sub- as well as supra-national dynamics
involved. This critical method of deconstruction considers a wide range of intersubjective
factors to contextualize environmental migration within the international system of order as
well as customary systems of human sustainability, observing the intersecting sites of
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confrontation where individuals might struggle. As a result, this approach recognizes
environmental migration as a valid means of adaptation, born of an entanglement of structural
factors and human agency, and argues against overly deterministic expectations of movement
and violence.34 Skeptical of governmental (climate) migration policies that may privilege
national physical security at the cost of human security, this humanitarian-leaning school of
thought is resistant to “securitizing” environmental migration, defined as “the process through
which non-traditional security issues (such as climate change or migration) are discussed and
acted upon in terms of security and thereby drawn into the security domain.”35 This migrantcentered perspective is informed by theories of social networking and human capital, economic
and livelihood dimensions, indigenous knowledge and traditional means of adaptation to
climate variability, thereby recognizing the processes and patterns historically associated with
environmentally driven human mobility.
Increasingly, experts, taking aim at this global phenomenon, have moved from the
theoretical poles of alarmist neo-Malthusianism and wholly resistant anti-securitization to a
middle ground; yet some disconnect in the discourse remains influencing research approaches
toward one direction or the other. The next section looks ahead to the research design of this
dissertation, explaining how complex systems thinking allows for spanning these conceptual
divides—not only offering a transformative approach to the problem of environmental
migration and violence potential but also challenging traditional scholarship more broadly on
best approaches to key questions of contemporary global affairs.
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ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION, VIOLENCE AND THE COMPLEXITY OF “GLOBAL LIFE”
In 2007, the UN Security Council held its “first-ever debate on the impact of climate
change on security,” a meeting called by the UK despite doubts raised as to whether or not this
was the proper forum for discussion.36 Given the scientific predictions of climate change,
migration was projected to intensify, and ranging expectations for subsequent political
destabilization were shared by many of the fifty-plus delegates in attendance.37 That same
year, Gleditsch, Nordås and Salehyan published a seminal paper exploring the possible link
between “environment-induced” migration and conflict, arguing predictions to be “weakly
substantiated with evidence,” recognizing the importance of grievances under conditions of
relational resource scarcity but asserting “they are not sufficient explanations for conflict,” and
concluding while classic refugees carry potential to transfer conflict from sending to receiving
sites, at this point, environmental migrants “are not likely to contribute to organized violence”
due to expectations of gradual streams of movement typically void of political agenda.38 They
acknowledge, however, “a lack of consensus and systematic data on the effects of climate
change on migration and on the effect of climate-induced migration on conflict,” anticipating
increasing future disruption and demanding further research to facilitate international
cooperation and preparation.39
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This dissertation seeks to answer this call for further research, motivated in particular by
the now growing evidence of increased violence in sub-Saharan African cities, urbanizing at
astounding rates in the absence of an explanatory economic pull. Over a decade removed from
the 2007 international moment of securitization, collection of environmental change social
impact data is becoming increasingly sophisticated and systematized. The Notre Dame Global
Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN), one such example, serves as the backbone of environmental
vulnerability and adaptive capacity data for this research project, offering significant
contextualization drawing upon twelve adaptive capacity indicators, twelve sensitivity
indicators and twelve exposure indicators—all quantifying environmental vulnerability in the six
life-supporting sectors of health, food, ecosystems, habitat, water and infrastructure.40
Balanced against these factors are four social, one economic and four governance indicators
quantifying readiness for an overall assessment of adaptive capacity, a measure of vulnerability
vis-à-vis readiness.41
To account for theoretical divergence in the literature, a complexity-informed approach
is implemented, given that such methodology is credited with offering a “relational and
processual style of thinking, stressing organizational patterns, networked relationships and
historical context” especially helpful in “reorienting or refocusing debates” in world affairs.42
Shifting focus to these aspects moves thinkers away from their unique theoretical camps largely
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influenced by “where they sit” in the politics of international discourse and onto common
ground. This reorienting the debate not only reduces intellectual myopia funneling thinkers
into traditional IR-versus-humanitarian distinctions, but effectively de-centers analysis to what
Bousquet describes as a “postanthropocentric” approach, recognizing ecopolitical
interdependencies involving a range of sub- and supra-state factors, inclusive of both human
and natural systems.43 As a result, the contributions of multiple intersubjective analyses can be
incorporated into a more comprehensive assessment allowing for improved identification of
potentially destabilizing emergent patterns that threaten the generally functional processes of
what Emilian Kavalski calls “global life” in equilibrium.
The Panarchy model of hierarchical, nested adaptive cycles provides an ideal framework
by which the multi-scalar phenomena of environmentally related urbanization and violence
potential can be analyzed.44 Recognizing pertinent adaptive capacities at national,
metropolitan and sub-urban levels of analysis with critical linkages and cross-scale interactions
vitally connecting them, a Panarchy approach allows for the functioning of these nested cycles
and communication between them to be assessed, thus characterizing the overall sustainability
of the system. In each of these cycles, this conceptualization identifies two phases into which
key factors from the literature can be divided, the “remember” phase consists of factors that
encourage the stability of the overall system while the “revolt” phase represents external
and/or triggering phenomena.45 As a result, both traditional security as well as human
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(in)security concerns are brought together into one model, in which the mutually constituting
relationship shared by these forces can be fully assessed.
The methodological approach implemented in this research assigns generally national
level variables to characterize the REMEMBER phase—national ND-GAIN/environmental
vulnerability assessments, population density, cultural diversity/fractionalization, regime
durability and violence history, arguing the state level of governance contributes most
significantly to the stability of the overall system. REVOLT forces, on the other hand, challenge
systemic status quo featuring more localized variables related to emergent urban greed,
grievance and rebellion: average annual percent urban rate of change, urbanization growth
rate, urban water access, unemployment and urban cellular connectivity. Time-series, crosssectional statistical analysis of these influences as they relate to Armed Conflict Location &
Event Data (ACLED) urban political violence and civil unrest serves as the basis for geographic
systems information (GIS) weighted layer mapping to validate statistical model predictions and
spatially identify critical areas of concern. Qualitative analysis provides an additional check on
the modeling and allows for trend analysis identifying patterns in urban environmental
vulnerability. This approach will be discussed in greater detail in the third chapter.

THE BIG PICTURE
By interrogating the question of environmentally related urbanization and propensity
for violence, this research contributes to many key interest areas in the field of global affairs.
First of all, the comprehensive approach of this research project sheds significant light upon the
endogenous relationship and shared dynamics of state and sub-state system functionality,
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highlighting the importance of state capacity as a common good and the role of polity in
directing this capacity to lower echelons for the sake of overall national stability and resiliency.
Evidence of slightly higher levels of urban violence in young democratic states and particularly
in quasi-democracies or democratizing states contributes to theories of democracy,
democratization and violence likelihood. However, these lower levels of violence observed in
the democratic leaning countries suggest healthy within-system competition and contestation
as adaptation plays out, thereby recognizing some degree of violence as communicating growth
and development in a functioning society. More research is needed to flesh out this concept
and define parameters of “healthy” levels.
Examining bottom-up influences, this research also contributes to theories of resource
abundance and scarcity, revealing natural endowments as significant factors influencing the
likelihood of rural-to-urban human movement under conditions of environmental degradation.
Additionally, innovation and ingenuity demonstrated by individuals to adapt and overcome
scarcity through mobility or through the diversification of income sources also illuminates
conversations aimed at the importance of human agency in determinations of environmental
vulnerability and insecurity. Finally, this study contributes to scholarly analysis of greed and
grievance and civil unrest, chipping away at the entanglement of factors that give rise to, or
allow for the venting of sub-national sentiments of dissatisfaction, particularly amidst
intensifying forces of climate change. Additional research is required to examine the observed
fifteen-year regime duration “tipping point” that suggests state capacity to manage these
forces of rebellion.
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As Deleuze and Parnet assert in the quote introducing this chapter, “…it’s always along a
line of flight that we create,” signifying innovation and ingenuity as byproducts of stress and
strain.46 According to complex systems theory, disequilibrium is likely to occur when a
significantly destabilizing force---such as that posed by climate change---affects existing systems
thereby instigating adaptive adjustments to patterns of self-organization in an effort to find
new equilibria. In such scenarios new properties may emerge, feeding back into the
transformed systems. The processes of both human mobility and violence provide pathways
for such transformation; however, these behaviors and their outcomes are far from
predetermined. Rather, an entanglement of structural forces and human agency culminate
under certain conditions that sometimes lead to movement, sometimes lead to violence, and
oftentimes exhibit extensive endogeneity. Again, Deleuze and Parnet presciently advise, “Flee,
but while fleeing, pick up a weapon.”47 As this research reveals, violence often accompanies
periods of transition.
Thus, in the upheaval that migration and violence may conjure, a confrontation is
revealed, re-understanding violence as a critical process of communication signaling
transformation of inadequate structures. As a result, this work challenges traditional notions of
security, which emphasize physical stability of the state, to recognize the importance of greed
and grievance born of structural inequality and insecurity, an underlying threat capable of
tipping over from a general lack of well-being into a major source of destabilization. More
broadly, this positions the traditional modern political and economic systems of order, which
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have seemingly failed or neglected those in environmental jeopardy, increasingly at odds with
human sustainability and therefore security. Defining the success of the anthropocentric era
will likely demand significant change, lest security for all hang in the balance.
The next chapter continues with a thorough review of the literature exploring
environmental security studies, migration and urbanization studies as related to climate
migration and propensity for violence. A mixed methods approach to test this hypothesis is
discussed in the third chapter. The fourth chapter reviews the two steps of quantitative
analysis—statistical regression and GIS geostatistical analysis. The fifth chapter examines
qualitative trends revealed by the model projections as well as the actual urban violence
reported events, bringing forward the role of government institutional consolidation and polity
and examining resource endowments as they relate to rural livelihood vulnerability and
potential for adaptive mobility. The sixth chapter consolidates these key observations of
governance and resource endowment dynamics into a framework of urban environmental
vulnerability, discussing implications for mobility, the geography of political violence and
potential conflict onset, the likelihood of human insecurity intensification, and projections of
system function or devolution.

25

CHAPTER II
THE (NEW) NORMAL SCIENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY STUDIES
“In the decades to come, the city, not the state,
will decide stability and development.”1

In 1968, Garrett Hardin famously postulates that in a finite world, the acquisition of
energy necessary to bring forth the greatest good for the greatest number—what he
summarizes as the “population problem”—falls into a camp of “no technical solution,”
explaining, “I can win only by giving radical meaning to the word ‘win.’”2 As the dilemma of
climate change vis-à-vis global demand for development only intensifies Hardin’s conundrum,
scholars and experts have raced to disentangle the thorny intersections and complex feedback
loops of current eco-political dynamics, producing the budding contemporary cannon on the
environment and human impact. The progression of this literature, critically influenced by the
broader transformation of the study of “international relations” and subsequently nurtured
within the post-revolutionary “normal science” work of (now) global studies, sheds significant
light upon the question of environmental migration and violence potential. This chapter
describes the major contributions that have come to shape and define the parameters of this
research arena, critically identifying the game changers and complex processes involved.
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Expanding upon discussion from the introduction, this literature review reveals how
neo-Malthusian thinkers revitalize age-old awareness of resource scarcity and conflict tendency
in the contemporary context of anthropogenic climate change to identify the key factor of
environmental exposure as a significant human hazard likely to intensify and contribute to
possible violence in the twenty-first century. This review also presents the critical scholarship
of fellow security, humanitarian and migration scholars whose work rejects the
oversimplifications and deterministic expectations associated with much of the neo-Malthusian
camp, offering valuable criticism that, through a process of securitizing environmental
migration, crucially refines characterizations of environmental risk with complex
understandings of climate vulnerability and important migration-related socio-economic
factors. This theoretical camp is rooted largely in a non-statist, human security informed
approach to evaluating violence potential, broadening interpretations to include human agency
as well as structural aspects of insecurity that greatly enhance environmental security analysis.
Finally, the rich intersubjective contributions of the most recent environmental security
scholars, human geographers and related experts provide further insight, drawing attention to
the intensification of traditional adaptive rural-to-urban movement, the role of environmental
change in accelerating this historical tendency, and the entanglement of ecopolitical, cultural
and social factors that contribute to outcomes of insecurity or pathways to peace.
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NEO-MALTHUSIANISM, CLIMATE REFUGEES & THE TRADITIONAL SECURITY PARADIGM
“It is time to understand ‘the environment’ for what it is: the national-security issue of
the early twenty-first century,” writes Robert Kaplan.3 “The political and strategic impact of
surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air
pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and
Bangladesh---developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group
conflicts---will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately
emanate.”4
Strongly informed by a statist, structural mindset, Kaplan offers a more extreme “neoMalthusian” view, named for the 18-19th century political economist Thomas Malthus.5 This
security discourse emphasizes the mismatch between humanity and the environment, driven
by degradation and population pressures into the realm of military conflict and state economic
security concerns, and provoking violence over absolute resource scarcity, group competition
for resources and perceived relative resource deprivation (e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994;
Kaplan, 1994; Lee, 1997; Meyers, 1995, 1997; Klare, 2002). Barnett (2001) describes this
precursory phase of environmental security studies as largely reflective of traditional IR with
the nation-state positioned as the referent object of security.6 Coupled with the arguably
premature IPCC (1992) projection that the “gravest effects of climate change may be those on
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human migration as millions are displaced,”7 a continuous thread throughout the neoMalthusian narrative is an expectation of forced human movement as a threat to national
security and a “cause of future global insecurity” expressed in oftentimes-severe and
deterministic language.8
Although the neo-Malthusian school is often the subject of criticism for its
oversimplification of human-environment dynamics, these initial ecopolitical thinkers arguably
deserve credit for breaking with traditional IR (at least in part) to recognize the physical hazard
of environmental exposure---a non-state entity---as a serious threat and for subsequently
bringing the transnational topic of environmental security and potential human movement into
the mainstream.9 Jessica Tuchman Mathews’ “Redefining Security” is broadly credited with the
introduction of “environmental security” as a “topic of scholarly study.”10 Mathews (1989)
argues that similar to the expansion of national security conceptualizations to include
economics in the 1970s, another broadening is required to account for environmental impact,
particularly as a booming world population struggles toward healthy sustainable development
amidst expectations of climate change driven degradation and subsequently intensified
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resource competition.11 The observed nexus of environment and migration, explains Gemenne
(2011), provided a “human face of climate change” for those struggling to raise the alarm,
typically natural scientists and security scholars with whom NGO’s and interest groups sided,
promoting policy-based approaches to fill a perceived “protection gap” for those displaced.12 In
addition, Smil (1997) suggests, in the absence of mutually assured destruction, the global reach
and socio-economic devastation potential of climate change offered convenient similarity to
the threat of nuclear war and “a worry perhaps almost as good” for gaining post-Cold War
attention.13 As a result, the nascent field surged with enthusiastic, yet frequently
underdeveloped attempts to reformulate the study of security, oftentimes trading old threats
for new without fully taking into consideration the unique dynamics at hand, theoretically
constrained by persisting in “the privileging of national sovereignty in the face of global
problems.”14

Climate Refugees
Long secured by—and thus heavily invested in—the modern Westphalian system of
order, many world leaders and traditional security scholars bring an internationalist perspective

11

Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 68, No. 2 (Spring 1989):
162-177.
12
François Gemenne, “How They Became the Face of Climate Change. Research and Policy
Interactions in the Birth of the ‘Environmental Migration’ Concept,” in Migration and Climate
Change, edited by Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud, Paul De Guchteneire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011): 225, 235.
13
Vaclav Smil, “China’s Environment and Security: Simple Myths and Complex Realities,” SAIS
Review, 17.1 (1997): 107.
14
Simon Dalby. “Ecopolitical Discourse: ‘Environmental Security’ and Political Geography,”
Progress in Human Geography, 16, 4 (1992): 508, 511, 517.

30
to the climate change migration debate often framed by Western dominated cultural
expectations. Neo-Malthusian migration themes, for example, were greatly shaped by and
frequently re-produce the “environmental refugee” paradigm set forth in the 1985 United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) work presenting Essam El-Hinnawi’s formal definition
and operationalization of the concept, the semantics and politics of which are discussed in the
previous chapter.15 Briefly, El-Hinnawi defines environmental refugees as “people who have
been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked
environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence
and/or seriously affected the quality of their life.”16 He influentially argues there are three
main causes of this forced movement: 1) natural disaster or industrial catastrophe typically
producing temporary relocation; 2) direct and indirect original habitat disruption born of (manmade) development efforts forcing permanent displacement and resettlement; and 3)
“malnutrition, hardship, ill health and wasting diseases, starvation and famine that may result
from inadequate resources to maintain life” driving migration in an effort to improve quality of
life, most likely relocation to “nearby urban centres in search of other jobs” or international
migration.17
Importantly, this invocation of the legal term “refugee” not only situates this dilemma
predominantly at a state-to-state level of analysis; it also conveys an attitude toward human
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movement void of agency and determinist in behavioral expectations. Further problematizing
this predisposition, Bettini (2013) argues amidst grave, hypothetical language and a lack of
empirical evidence on the social impact of climate change, early ecological IPCC assessments
(pre-2007) entangled with capitalist (e.g. Stern Review, 2007), aid-oriented and radical political
views to produce an “apocalyptic narrative” of climate migration.18 The Christian Aid
organization, for instance, asserts that “unless urgent action is taken, [an emerging migration
crisis] threatens to dwarf even that faced by the war-ravaged world” of World War II, predicting
an additional one billion people displaced by 2050 on the basis of future climate estimates and
conjecture.19 This ontological distortion perceiving environmentally forced movement as an
abnormal and irreversible “rupture” fed into (and was mutually fed by) neo-Malthusian
characterizations of mass relocation as a threat to global stability.20 Thus, the perceived
helplessness of “climate refugees” was “de-individualized” and transformed into an ominous
projection of international destabilization despite significant moderation and empirical
clarification in later IPCC reporting.21
Neo-Malthusian writer Westing (1992) highlights another limitation of the “climate
refugee” outlook, arguing the circumstances of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are often
grimmer than “true” refugees who enjoy legally-defined access to international assistance,
citing the dilemma of Sudanese drought sufferers for whom the squalor of Khartoum shanty
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towns presents such difficulty that they reconsider the uncertainty of life in the southern
regions from which they fled.22 In line with Westing’s observation, the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) emphasizes most climate-related movement results in internal
displacement and argues that calls for environmental refugee status undermine the UN
Refugee Convention (1951/1967) governing traditional asylum seekers.23 Therefore, the
refugee narrative should be understood as influential and representative of early
environmental security scholar attitudes, yet long struggling and only marginally accepted on
many levels. Not only does this label wrongly confuse and constrict analysis in its effort to
expand identification and protection of a stressed population, it also obfuscates insecurity of
internal environmentally induced migrants, simplifies the dynamic of human mobility to an
automated, unidirectional movement and overlooks the role of non-environmental factors.
Furthermore, as neo-Malthusian critic Hartmann (2010) asserts, the mono-causal expectation
of the climate refugee viewpoint “naturalises the economic and political causes of
environmental degradation and masks the role of institutional responses to it.”24

Analyzing to the Max
A major challenge of early environmental security scholars as they departed the
strictures of traditional IR and began to navigate the unchartered waters of intersubjective
analysis was to discern and evaluate knowledge from other fields of study, writing their own
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scripts for incorporating multi-dimensional analysis into their work. Stressing the complexity of
conceptualizing socio-ecological systems (SES), human ecologist Alf Hornborg (2006) highlights
the problem of bridging the foundational divide between social and natural sciences, pointing
to the difficulty of understanding the “recursively connected” linkages between the social
“world system” and natural “Earth system,” and emphasizing the clear distinction traditionally
marking these research domains.25 Evidencing this struggle in the reformulation of security
studies, Astri Suhrke (1994) identifies two sub-groupings, the “maximalist” and “minimalist”
camps of environmental migration literature.26 While the “minimalists” with whom Suhrke
identifies embrace a migration studies approach, observing environmental exposure as one of
many variables at stake; the neo-Malthusian “maximalists,” on the other hand, enlarge the
significance of natural science degradation projections, eschewing other potential factors and
outcomes.27 Naturally, these monikers represent theoretical poles, with most scholars more
generally leaning in one direction or the other. An expanded discussion of the minimalist
perspective is featured in the next segment of this review.
The “population-consumption problem,” which embraces an exaggerated view of
ecological impact on human societies, especially exemplifies maximalist neo-Malthusian
privileging of natural science emphasis on degradation. Biologists Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1970,
1981, 1991, 2002) theorize this imbalance stems from a lack of technological and socio-political
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capacity—particularly, they contend, “in developing countries”—born of excessive population
size/growth and global patterns of consumption.28 This “shrinking pie” materialist perspective
on ecoviolence, as described by de Soysa (2002), observes scarcity as “a barrier against the
production of ingenuity and adaptation… creating conditions that trigger conflict.”29 Thus,
developing populations who face the threat of climate change are characterized as unable to
overcome (independently) environmental degradation and can be expected to devolve into
violence. Asserting an evolutionary “mismatch” between human technological advances and
human capacity to understand the implications of these capabilities—for example, the authors
point to lowered death rates and subsequent failure to curb population growth and
consumption—Ehrlich and Ehrlich (2002) argue the expected effects of climate change will
compound the negative impact of “the expansion of the human enterprise,” which has already
stressed fresh water supplies, “the epidemiological environment,” land use and marine
ecosystems.30 Significantly compelled by these and similarly drawn conclusions, Morrissey
(2012) explains many scholars of the maximalist view apply this logic to their work—to the
exclusion of all other factors—and attribute conflict and/or migration amidst circumstances of
environmental decline as a straightforward function of “carrying capacities,” interpreting the
problem as “not so much as an issue of land shortage but rather one of population ‘longage,’”
(citing Westing 1992: 206) or, in other words, population overgrowth.31
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Foundational “maximalists,” El-Hinnawi (1985), Jacobson (1988) and Myers (1993,
1995), for instance, all argue population overgrowth and environmental degradation combine
to create the deterministic migration driving factors of “diminished agricultural production,
reduced water availability and damage to physical infrastructure.”32 Myers, once described as
“the most prolific author in this genre,”33 spans the 1990s with a solidly “maximalist” approach,
extrapolating predictions of mass malnutrition, starvation and disease from scientifically
projected demographic pressures and expected global consumption increase,34 and concluding
“sizeable numbers” from multiple fragile regions will be forced to migrate.”35 Although not
without the noted shortcomings of neo-Malthusian theoretical myopia, the works of these
authors are largely connected to documented evidence of human displacement—for example,
Jacobson’s (1988) African Sahel drought-based estimate of 10 million currently existing
“environmental refugees,” on which much of the early neo-Malthusian literature rests.36
According to Morrissey (2012), however, a collection of follow-on “maximalists” (citing
Westing, 1992; Islam, 1992; Otunnu, 1992; Ramlogan, 1996; Döös, 1997; O’Lear, 1997)
uncritically regurgitate their numbers, repeat the theme of “carrying capacity” without scrutiny
and provide scant empirical support for their very predictive conclusions.37 This lackluster
scholarship, cautions Lonergan (1998), threatens entanglement with politically extreme anti-
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immigration preferences, inviting potential for racist generalizations or what he calls a
“greening of hate.”38

Departing Traditional IR
Few authors are more prominently associated with the scarcity and conflict literature
than Thomas Homer-Dixon, whose seminal work not only achieved tremendous popularity in
both academic and policy-making circles but also serves as something of a pivot point in the
development of environmental security studies. Homer-Dixon’s approach reflects a distinct
blend of both old and new security research paradigms, drawing criticism from both ends of the
analytical spectrum and thereby stimulating vital discourse solidifying expectations and
frameworks of the field.
Although Homer-Dixon is not categorized as a “minimalist,” his research evokes an
analytical complexity too frequently overlooked by his scholarly disciples and critics alike and
perhaps too readily situated within the more typical neo-Malthusian canon. This placement is
justified by his (1991) explicitly expressed statist bottom line—despite acknowledging a wide
range of environmentally-induced insecurity potential, Homer-Dixon proclaims his intent to
limit analysis to “acute national and international conflict... involving a substantial probability of
violence.”39 Additionally, in step with maximalist ecopolitical thinkers, he also observes an
“ingenuity gap” plaguing development and problematizing adaptive capacity in much of the
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world.40 He rejects, for example, notions of “techno-optimism,” dismissing “cornucopian”
theses of human ingenuity and adaptation as dependable constants, observing such
expectations as too linear and unable to account for the complex and legitimately independent,
exogenous force of environmental degradation and scarcity.41 Homer-Dixon (1991) takes great
care, however, to distinguish his thinking from “environmental determinism.”42 By contrast,
Homer-Dixon (2002) defines “ingenuity” with significantly greater complexity than the
maximalist “population-consumption problem” literature, explaining ingenuity involves more
than technological capacity and consists “more fundamentally, of ideas for better institutions
and social arrangements,” varying significantly and requiring distinct kinds of ingenuity to
satisfy a host of socio-economic and political needs.43
On this basis, assessing the security of the state and leaving little room for human
adaptation and problem solving, Homer-Dixon, like his fellow neo-Malthusians, identifies the
developing world as most likely to experience scarcity-driven violence; yet unlike traditional
broad-brush approaches, he critically contextualizes his assessments against the backdrop of
myriad sub- and supra-state social, political, economic, ecological and technological factors,
observing specific, empirically-based multi-dimensional and multi-directional pathways to
violence, which he concludes most likely to arise out of social grievances over unmitigated or
unresolved “reduced agricultural production, economic decline, population displacement, and

40

Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, The Ingenuity Gap: Facing the Economic, Environmental, and Other
Challenges of an Increasingly Complex and Unpredictable World (NY: Vintage Books, 2002).
41
Daniel Schwartz, Tom Deligiannis and Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “The Environment and Violent
Conflict: A Response to Gleditsch’s Critique and Some Suggestions for Future Research,”
Environmental Change and Security Project Report, Issue 6 (Summer 2000): 80-83.
42
Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold…, 103.
43
Homer-Dixon, The Ingenuity Gap, 2-3.

38
disruption of regular and legitimized social relations.”44 Contrary to over-simplified
approaches, Homer-Dixon clarifies that he does not hypothesize “tight or deterministic”
causality amongst the many variables of environmentally-induced conflict—“As antiMalthusians have argued for nearly two centuries, numerous intervening factors—physical,
technological, economic, and social—often merit great resilience, variability, and adaptability in
human-environmental systems.”45 With this in mind, Homer-Dixon and his “Toronto Group” of
scholars rely significantly upon the case study method to inform the data and loudly shun rigid
(neo)realist models as “largely inadequate for identifying and explaining the links between
environmental change and conflict,” explaining the paradigm lacks theoretical capacity to
incorporate “transboundary environmental problems” that stem from non-state sources and to
interpret effects that cannot be reduced to concepts related to “’state,’ ‘sovereignty,’
‘territory,’ ‘national interest,’ and ‘balance of power.’”46
A major critic of Homer-Dixon and, more broadly, this early phase of environmental
security scholarship, Nils Petter Gleditsch (1998)—long contributing pillar of the international
studies field—complains of a lack of clarity, oversimplification, vagueness, poorly described
causality, futuristic predictions and blurred levels of analysis characterizing the burgeoning
ecopolitical literature.47 De Soysa (2002) particularly criticizes the Toronto Group’s “process
tracing” case study method for its “no variance” research design.48 Richard A. Matthew (2002)
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laments the considerable pop culture attention and subsequent over-simplification generated
largely and, Matthew acknowledges somewhat unfairly, by Homer-Dixon’s fame, observing
that empirically weak reproductions of his scarcity-conflict thesis in particular gave rise to a
“narrowing and distortion” of environmental security studies.49 Distancing themselves from
the less rigorous neo-Malthusian research of the day and counter-criticizing Gleditsch for
expectations of systematic research that amount to “methodological straightjacket,” HomerDixon’s Toronto Group (2000) argues these critiques wrongly consider their focus to be on
absolute resource quantities as violence predictors while, in fact, the subject of their work is
resource supply relativity, the key to understanding the experience of scarcity felt---supply
relative to demand and supply relative to distribution---and the likelihood of violence in
response to these perceptions.50 Therefore, this case-study-based qualitative research
paradigm critically accounts for historical context, human/cultural perspectives, attitudes and
agency, in stark contrast to the security studies approach of traditional international relations.
Diehl and Gleditsch observe of these years, “A wide range of environmental concerns
were lumped under the rubric of environmental security,” lacking well-defined boundaries and
complicated by politicization and a preponderance of conceptual debate amidst a dearth of
empirical study.51 They argue too much emphasis on “conflict-generating” aspects combined
with failure to recognize possibilities for cooperation plagues the theoretical development of
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the literature.52 While this critique is fair on many levels, the amorphous nature of the early
environmental security scholarship is a reflection of the tension and confusion characterizing
post-Cold War security studies. The neo-Malthusians importantly take a partial step away from
the traditional paradigm recognizing the environment as anomalous to conventional
interpretations. Despite this contradiction to theory and the statist system on which modern
world order has generally hinged, these scholars opted to investigate and test the dynamics
they observed without well-formed parameters for research and clearly defined
understandings to guide their work. Thus, this literary period is characterized by disconnect in
the discourse and competing approaches.
The next section covers the rich debate on environmental security and opposition to
neo-Malthusian models, steering analysis away from traditional state-focused structural
approaches or materialist determinism and re-orienting the scarcity-conflict narrative through
a process of securitization to recognize the many dimensions of climate related movement and
insecurity. Largely benefitting from the expert knowledge of migration studies and the
conceptual development of human security, environmental security studies moves beyond
physical questions of “what threatens?” and begins to question the processes of “who, how
and to what degree humans are threatened?” As a result, environmental security scholarship
slowly transforms from a rather simplified statist approach to climate change as a “near-peer”
to the threat of mutually assured destruction53 into an increasingly complex analysis of humanenvironment vulnerability, born of a multitude of entangled ecopolitical factors and human
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agency.

ENVIRONMENTAL VULNERABILITY AND THE SECURITIZATION OF CLIMATE MIGRATION
Perhaps ironically, the essential contribution of the neo-Malthusian literature—
identification of environmental exposure as a potential source of insecurity—ultimately comes
to represent its most fundamental theoretical shortfall, the extreme privileging and
oversimplification of the exposure factor coupled with a de-individualization of those impacted,
producing an unsubstantiated model of environmental degradation equating exposure to
forced migration and significant social instability. As the fifth IPCC report suggests, views of
climate-induced migration are largely culturally embedded,54 offering some explanation for the
uni-dimensional analysis of these early environmental security thinkers, typically Westerninclined and of a national security mindset. The second segment of this literature review,
however, reveals competing contributions that confront the neo-Malthusian thesis, demanding
more evidence, challenging the demonization of climate migrants, and encouraging a more
multi-dimensional, intersubjective investigation. As a result, alternative perspectives that reindividualize those impacted by employing a migrant-centered approach move beyond the
parameters of traditional security studies, inviting a complex analysis centering on
environmental vulnerability at the nexus of climate-migration and violence potential.
Greg Bankhoff’s (2006) allegorical reflection on the cases of Hurricane Katrina and the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami deftly employs the familiar fable of “The Three Little Pigs” to
illustrate the critical influence of cultural perspective in defining and responding to
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environmental hazard, thereby revealing the significant shortcomings of approaches that fail to
understand environmental vulnerability fully.55 He offers the example of too simply translating
exposure to risk and blanketly preferring technological disaster preparedness solutions—
universally privileging the “developed world” brick-house approach of Pig #3—and argues nontechnical solutions, often driven by local proclivities, are subsequently overlooked or
undervalued.56 Assessments of “at risk” populations are thereby deficient. Revealing the
inaccuracy of dismissing cultural preference for indigenous knowledge and non-technical means
of adaptation in undeveloped and underdeveloped societies—simply concluding pig #1 too
“lazy” and pig #2 too “less lazy” to take on a more sophisticated approach—Bankhoff argues, in
earthquake prone locations a brick house could in fact exacerbate risk.57 Moreover,
overemphasizing physical features of hazards equally misses important socio-economic ground
truths that crucially vary the impact of environmental exposure felt, evidenced by the disparity
of Katrina’s impact falling clearly along socio-economic divides despite technologically
sophisticated disaster prevention region wide. The summation of this wider perspective is a
complex measure, characterized by “…the ways in which human systems place people at risk in
relation to each other and to their environment, a causal relationship that is best understood in
terms of an individual’s, household’s, community’s or society’s vulnerability.”58
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The nineteenth chapter of the fourth IPCC assessment report (2007), “Assessing Key
Vulnerabilities and the Risk from Climate Change,” defines vulnerability to climate change as
“the degree to which [geophysical, biological and socio-economic systems] are susceptible to,
and unable to cope with, adverse impacts,” explaining in this context an “impact” to be “a
specific change in a system caused by its exposure to climate change.”59 Thus, vulnerability is
strongly related to environmental exposure, per degrees of susceptibility and coping capacity.
Importantly, a major conclusion drawn by the IPCC in this chapter also contends adaptation,
noted as particularly achievable for market and social systems, can significantly ameliorate
impact, decreasing vulnerability.60 On a more challenging note, however, the report also
acknowledges that while scientific analysis can contribute a great deal toward assessing climate
vulnerabilities based upon measured impacts to biophysical and socio-economic systems,
“value judgments determined through sociopolitical processes,” are necessarily involved in the
identification of “key” vulnerabilities and preferences for policy response.61 As a result, the
unfolding literature is rife with this socio-political struggle to re-understand and redefine
security in the context of the environment, inviting significant scholarly contestation, politically
exacerbated by the uneven production of and disproportionately felt impact of climate change
and framed by the modern structures of international law and order.
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Disconnect in the Discourse
Alongside the neo-Malthusian writers, a range of related experts weigh in on the
question of environmentally related migration and violence potential as the literature develops,
refining analysis and honing collective interpretations of climate vulnerability as the
appropriate measure of environmental stress. The diverse origins of these competing theses
and the discourse by which they have come to inform contemporary ecopolitical analysis reveal
a multi-faceted picture of climate migration dynamics. This section presents three fundamental
attitudes that emerge to counter maximalist themes. The first grouping generally calls into
question, on multiple grounds, the oversimplified argument that environmental change can be
isolated as a causal factor forcing human migration and producing violence. The second is
heavily comprised of those who oppose the securitization of environmental migration, fearing
ulterior national motives and/or the militarization of international response to environmental
change and subsequent characterization/vilification of these migrants as threats to global
stability. Finally, the third perspective embraces a non-traditional security approach, eschewing
conventional IR theoretical limitations and engaging with the idea of environmental
degradation and climate-related movement simultaneously as a potential threat to states as
well as to migrants themselves while observing mobility as source of instability as well as a
possible means of climate adaptation. Informally, these camps might be categorized as the
“doubtful,” the “fearful” and the “unconventional.”
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The Doubtful
Suggesting “there is something rotten in the state of the art,” human geographer Calum
T. M. Nicholson (2014) summarizes many of the scholarly doubts cast upon the relationship
between climate change and migration, finding the arguments ridden with “banal statements”
regarding the complexity of these dynamics, “arbitrary claims” drawing broad conclusions
based upon specific cases, and “ontological contradiction” in light of tightly argued causal
reasoning on behalf of climate migration amidst its acknowledged complexity and
contingency.62 Seeking a framework to inform policy, Nicholson contends the shortcomings of
the literature stem from unanswered normative and ontological questions that cannot be
resolved due to an undefined epistemological coherence, concluding the concept of climate
migration amounts to “ideational construct rather than a self-evidently empirical reality”
leaving the door open to politicization, “intellectual bewitchment” and equivocal claims lacking
accountability.63 Nicholson argues too much emphasis has been placed upon the unviable path
of climate migration causality research, diverting scholarly attention away from the “rights
violations” suffered by migrants on the whole.64
Similarly doubtful, in the face of alarmist calls for recognition of environmental
“refugees,” migration scholar Richard Black (2001) famously asserts such a notion to be a
“myth,” concluding that, while the environment is an important part of the migration decisionmaking process, viewing the environment as a “primary cause of forced displacement is
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unhelpful and unsound intellectually, and unnecessary in practical terms.”65 Black critiques the
“evidence” of these early contributions, explaining too many typologies of environmental
refugees/migrants cloud identification efforts, multiple migration motivations are not taken
into consideration by the literature, and linkages between degradation and movement are
claimed without clear demonstration of how they connect.66 In the case of drought and
desertification, for example, Black’s early work questions the degree to which degradation is
actually occurring, remarking that if this contention is a myth, the idea of migration due to
change in the environment is certainly mythical, as well.67 He proffers the possibility that areas
plagued by drought and desertification have long experienced climate instability, historically
producing periods of “stress migration” that should be understood as “customary coping
strategy” and regional means of adaptation.68
Gemenne (2011) describes other scholars expressing skepticism in early climate
migration scholarship, noting Wood (2001), like Black, observes a complex relationship
between environmental causes and social factors too easily oversimplified and subsequently
fostering generalizations in lieu of “solid empirical research.”69 Representative of many
migration experts, Castles (2002) likewise argues that, with few extreme exceptions,
environmental change is not a sole cause of migration but rather entangles with multiple
factors.70 Scrutinizing assertions of climate-migration violence likelihood, Castles, Haas and
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Miller (2014) challenge broad maximalist lines of reasoning, questioning why conflict arises in
some places and timeframes while not in others?71

The Fearful
Fearing use of exaggerated climate change-induced migration claims to obscure legally
valid political and conflict refugee requirements, migration scholar Gaim Kibreab (1997) turns
the maximalist literature on its head and drives at the role of institutions, asserting
environmental change and human mobility should rather be understood as “the consequences
of war and insecurity rather than triggers for it;” he charges, the concept of climate-migration is
“increasingly used by states to justify restrictive refugee policies.”72 Kibreab invokes the Horn
of Africa as an example to illustrate local dynamics by which “escalating level of conflicts,
insecurity and the scorched-earth policies of the governments” overwhelm individual farmers
and pastoralists who have historically coped with and responded to “variable soil fertility and
low and erratic rainfall” with mobility as the “underpinning principle” of traditional resource
management.73
Analyzing climate migration discourse at macro and micro levels from 2000-2014, Ingrid
Boas (2015) confirms Kibreab’s fears, finding alarmist speech bolstering immigration and border
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policy at the Indian-Bangladeshi perimeter.74 Boas reveals the UK Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) as “amongst the key securitisers” using extreme language to prompt international
players to action in the face of “dire circumstances.”75 Boas also finds at a macro level that
India and other emerging countries find this language to be “pure rhetoric,” which they
interpret as the attempts of developed states to deflect accountability for their historically
significant contribution to climate change; she argues further that developing countries fear
these exaggerated migration security claims elevate the issue to the high politics of the UN
Security Council (UNSC), whereby, in the absence of developing state representation,
conversational emphasis on carbon emissions reductions might be replaced with blaming
developing states for global disorder.76
Dalby (1992) summarizes the concerns of two early environmental security scholars,
juxtaposing their fears: Gleick (1991), a national security minded analyst who fears neoMalthusian international consequences of failing to respond to climate change, and Deudney
(1991), who fears linking the environment to national security will result in a heavily military
response to predictions instead of addressing the ecological challenges at hand.77 Falling in line
with Deudney (1992) and citing an “aid-military complex” and US Defense Department global
stability strategies aimed at “the taming of ‘ungoverned spaces,’” Hartmann (2010) fears “this
beating of the climate conflict drums” blurs military and aid objectives, justifying military
expansion into the realm of development assistance, threatening increased armed
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interventions, and labeling those most vulnerable to climate change as threats.78 Similarly,
Castles, Haas and Miller (2014) point to a “hyper-securitization” of migration on the whole
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and worry that “demonizing the
migrant” exchanges a perception of enhanced state security at the cost of the security of
migrants framed as “cultural, socio-economic and [subversive] political” threats.79 Dalby
explains both Gleick with his statist interpretation as well as Deudney and those who fear for
the security of those most directly impacted by environmental hazards express legitimate
security concerns, although their fears reside on separate planes of security conceptualization,
delineated by “the question of which security should be linked to environment.”80
Thus, a major tension in the broader theoretical narrative of international relations is
revealed as producing similar disconnect in the maturing discourse of environmental security
studies. Increasingly, constructivist arguments challenging structuralist interpretations of
security confront traditionally defined levels of analysis and approach, stretching the scope of
IR, introducing ideational understanding of human interaction, interests and identities and
embracing intersubjective processes that come to define security issues.81 This period not only
represents a struggle to define environmental change as a legitimate threat to global stability,
as the neo-Malthusians set out to accomplish, but it also becomes a moment during which the
referent object of that security threat is debated, reflecting trends within the broader school of
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security studies, going beyond conventional questions of international outcomes and seeking to
understand the social dynamics that originate insecurity and instability to include dimensions of
human (in)security.82 Working within this period of transformation, the scholarship that follows
significantly addresses much of the valuable criticisms levied, moving away from predictive,
hypothetical conclusions and grounding arguments in evidence based approaches that solidify
the framework of environmental security research and help to reconcile competing narratives
with a more complex understanding of environmental vulnerability and its implications for
global stability.

The Unconventional
By way of this paradigm shift within the field of international relations, ecopolitical
analysts are liberated to inform their investigations with a migrant-centered view. Migration
analysis is not easily unpackaged and, as a result, draws upon a wide range of theoretical
understandings framing the entanglement of factors involved and recognizing environmental
migration as a historically long-practiced human adaptation strategy---neither inevitable in the
past nor in the contemporary context of twenty-first century climate change; rather, serving as
“one possible adaptation strategy out of many.”83 Faist and Schade (2013) explain
disentangling the factors involved in environmental movement is not only improbable but
theoretically inappropriate—they contend, “The social construction of human–environment
relationships, the social inequalities backing the unsustainable exploitation of natural and
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human resources, the efforts of persons affected to overcome such inequalities by geographical
mobility, and the role of institutions in sometimes overcoming but often reproducing existing
vulnerability and resource poverty have to be seen in conjunction.”84
In contrast to the maximalist approach, research inclined toward a migrant-centered
“minimalism” recognizes how common forms of environmental degradation are associated
with migration but critically contextualizes environmental exposure as a variable situated within
a complex amalgamation of factors that may or may not result in migration and arguably
cannot be easily quantified for the sake of straightforward linear assessments.85 Primarily
informed by migration scholarship, economic conditions (Hugo, 1991), income, risk and social
effects (Bilsborrow, 1991) and the role of policy (Kritz, 1990) are taken into consideration with
levels of analysis ranging from “the individual, the community or, conceivably, the entire
nation.”86 On this basis, Suhrke (1994), who describes herself as a “minimalist,”87 contradicts
most neo-Malthusian alarmist conclusions, finding environmental population flows are more
typically born of slow onset degradation---“deforestation, rising sea levels, desertification and
drought”---calling for sociological distinction from “refugee-like” scenarios and more accurately
deserving the moniker “environmental migrant” than “environmental refugee.”88
Similarly, Barnett (2001) prefaces his conclusions on environmental migration-conflict
likelihood by pointing to most recent migration patterns that indicate most human movement
is typically limited to domestic mobility or occurs between developing states with much of
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migration consisting of cyclical or seasonal behaviors, all of which are dependent upon a range
of factors such that “climate change will have uneven impacts on even proximate social and
ecological systems.”89 Barnett ultimately narrows the focus of analysis to identify identity
conflict in the less frequent case of large-scale migration as the most likely source of climateinduced conflicts, emphasizing the dynamics of climatic extremes and climate variability,
subsequent livelihood loss via agricultural degradation, loss of human life as adaptation and
resiliency structures fail and finally, the decision-making process to relocate.90 Characterizing
the rest of the story, Goldstone (2001), who cites historical examples of migration-induced
clashes of identity, explains that while “most environmental change leads to nonviolent conflict
that is resolved by negotiation,” rural decline and grievances can lead to the problem of
“overurbanization relative to incomes,” exacerbating population change tensions.91 Citing Etsy
et al. (1998: 15), Goldstone underscores the significance of this demographic mismatch,
summarizing the results of sub-Saharan African statistical analysis using data from 1955 to
1995: “…the risk of crises, other things equal, doubled in countries with above-average levels of
urbanization but below-average levels of GDP per capita.”92 Goldstone (2001) observes
similarly problematic demographic imbalances in cases of overeducated labor forces and
bulging youth populations, expressing particular concern for unemployed and dissatisfied youth
vulnerable to mobilization for “social or political conflicts.”93
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Matthew, Brklacich and McDonald (2003) of the Global Environmental Change and
Human Security (GECHS) Project build on Goldstone’s demographic analysis in their discussion
of gaps in the research cautioning “population explosion” and “youth bulge” concepts ought
not be left in oversimplified Malthusian terms, but rather demographics such as these matter in
a context of “inequities and globalization’s effect on how communities interact with their local
environments.”94 The authors stress yawning disparity evidenced by UN data suggests
economic globalization intensifies inequity and “may drive over-exploitation of environmental
resources by the rural poor.”95 In conjunction with the degrading effects of climate change, the
adaptive capacities of these localities are increasingly challenged. Recognizing much of the
literature is devoted to the idea that those impacted under such circumstances will relocate to
more abundant destinations crossing cultural and national boundaries and possibly provoking
violence, Matthew et al. (2003) acknowledge the difficulty of assessing human displacement
and call for increased research in this arena.96 Noting United Nations Population Division
(UNPD) statistical analysis determining over half the world’s population lives in urban centers
and projecting urban areas will absorb most of global population increase through 2030—2
billion of an expected 2.2 billion in growth—they argue research should focus on “the particular
set of problems associated with rapid urbanization, such as decreased access to fresh water,
lack of sanitation, new urban agriculture systems, and increased air pollution from rising
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transportation demands” with an understanding of human rural-urban interaction that
observes a “dynamic urban-rural continuum.”97
Bruce Frayne (2004) offers an excellent example of this urban-rural continuum in his
research of Windhoek, Namibia, revealing significant urban dependency on rural linkages to
family-provided vital food supplies, enabling pursuit of urban employment, strengthening the
social capital of the urban dwellers and decreasing their intra-urban vulnerabilities while
simultaneously fostering extended familial income diversity via expansion across the two
geographies.98 Contextualizing this positive case of environmental mobility, Tacoli (2002)
explains that wider economic crises have led to decreased agricultural product prices amidst
increased costs of agricultural inputs and consumer goods, challenging rural livelihood, while at
the same time, higher food prices in expensive urban centers challenge the possibility of
sustainable urban livelihood.99 As a result, she argues her analysis of Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania
shows “Multiactivity at the household or individual level helps decrease vulnerability,
…diversification as a cross-sectoral investment can be described as an accumulation strategy,”
and migrant networks and connections between producers and traders function as “social
assets,” which are “especially important, since they often mediate access to material assets.”100
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By re-individualizing analysis of environmental human mobility, minimalist minded
experts therefore develop a significantly more sophisticated and informative approach,
reorienting research away from generalized, predictive analysis guesstimating waves of Southto-North environmental refugees and increasingly directing scholars to take more nuanced
questions of sub-state and human insecurity into account. Lonergan’s 1998 attempt to assess
linkages between environmental degradation and population displacement, for instance, begins
by drawing upon neo-classical and structuralist migration theories largely regarding the
influence of migrant decision-making on population flows.101 He finds, “It must be recognized
that the degradation of the environment is socially and spatially constructed; only through a
structural understanding of the environment in the broader political and cultural context of a
region or country can one begin to understand the ‘role’ it plays as a factor in population
movement;” however, he also recognizes the importance of agency in determining where
people will move (most likely internal movement), how long they will stay and how successfully
they will “use their movement to recover,” allowing for the possibility of mobility as a positive
means of adaptation.102 This “structuration” theoretical bridge, as sociologist Giddens (1990)
proposes and Wendt (1992) promotes during this time of intellectual transformation,
importantly informs the scholarship that increasingly takes center stage in environmental
studies, acknowledging the undeniable significance of macro-level structures but also
recognizing the role of meso- and micro-level features that (dis)empower and influence agents,
constituting coping capacities and characterizing vulnerability.
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Acknowledging “objective constraints and facilitators to migration,” Hunter’s (2005)
review of the eco-migration literature, for example, also confirms environmental factors as
affecting mobility decision-making, observing the field as 1) situating “ecological-pushes” within
the context of “human capital and economic dimensions” (per arguments asserted by Da
Vanzo, 1981; Harris & Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976); 2) recognizing macro and micro linkages
that tend toward “nomadic” movement in order to preserve status quo, but shift to longer
distance relocation in cases of innovative response (citing Petersen, 1958, 1975); and 3)
observing the importance (according to Gardner, 1981) of values formation, rooted in “real,
place-related macro-level factors” as well as in perceptions and subsequent expectations.103 In
addition, key “non-economic aspects of residential satisfaction” characterize the “place utility”
of origins and destinations typically taken into consideration at individual and household levels
and measured against local social bonds until such “strain” reaches a “threshold of
dissatisfaction.”104 Hunter also points to explanations for why people may not choose to
migrate, citing Slovic (1987) and Cvetkovich & Earle (1992): 1) lack of awareness; 2) failure to
expect environmental hazard despite understanding its possibility; 3) underestimation or
surprise at loss or severity of loss; 4) optimism in coping capacity; 5) cultural acceptance of loss
as natural (fatalism); and finally, 5) sheer inability to move.105
While the “disconnect in the discourse” of environmental migration has yet to be
entirely reconciled—and likely will persist to some extent as scholarly debate continues to give
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rise to new unanswered questions—the unconventional thinkers who engaged critically with
early neo-Malthusian assertions, equipped with a migrant-centered perspective and attentive
to the criticisms of the “doubtful” and “fearful,” shed significant new light on the suggested
nexus of environmental change, migration and violence potential. Taking a constructivist
attitude, inclusive of agency as a key factor and open to well-balanced, intersubjective
contributions, these scholars meaningfully reshape expectations with their empirically based
findings. In lieu of strongly doubted, straightforward, monocausal assertions linking exposure
to movement to violence, they determine environmental vulnerability more accurately
captures the multidimensional dynamics at hand. Mindful of insecurity from state to
community to individual household levels, they observe varied responses to eco stress and
strain and subsequently reverse unidirectional expectations of movement, unveiling critical
areas of concern. As a result, the dominant narrative of state security as the referent objective
of environmental threat gives way to the critical question, “Security for whom?”

The Politics of Climate Change and the Process of Securitization
Although a discussion of climate change politics is generally beyond the scope of this
dissertation, this debate has powerfully influenced international discursive processes aimed at
characterizing and defining the nature of the environment as a potential threat and identifying
the object of this insecurity. Therefore, a brief theoretical examination of this entanglement is
merited. Arguably, the securitization of the environment, amidst the cacophony of diverse and
competing voices, supports critical theorist positions, which welcome such a broadening of the
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security agenda in the hope of challenging and transforming traditional security behaviors.106
In contrast, constructivist theories of the Copenhagen School express a general preference for
desecuritization, observing in typical securitization “moves” a “logic of security—associated
with secrecy, urgency and ‘panic politics’” that favor dominant (~Western) narratives, bias the
state and favor elitist emergent responses that suspend the “normal rules of the game.”107 This
section briefly highlights the securitization of the environment and the influential role of
climate change politics, contending significant “value judgments” are successfully determined
through these “sociopolitical processes” of securitization, helping to resolve epistemological
uncertainties and solidifying foundational definitions and frameworks that improve scholarly
investigation, generally eschew the militarization of the environment, and ultimately result in
what Trombetta (2008) describes as an “alternative security logic” of “prevention and
management.”108
Balzaq (2011) offers a rather lengthy but comprehensive definition of securitization as
“an assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image
repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing
actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings,
sensations, thoughts and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that
concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent
subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy
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must be undertaken immediately to block its development.”109 Jon Barnett (2001) describes
security as “an accentuated discourse on vulnerability,” but argues it is distinguished from more
general recognitions of vulnerability and risk on the basis of the importance attached to the
entity in question.110 Applying the Copenhagen School approach of Ole Wæver (1995) to the
topic of the environment, Barnett describes the process through which this debate ensues as
“discursively ‘securitising’ vulnerable referent objects, and defining particular risks,” critically
noting the socially constructed and political nature, dependent upon “who is to be secured, and
how environmental change threatens them,” and acknowledging that---during the initial, more
conventional phase of environmental security scholarship---“[t]he national referent dominates
security discourse.”111
Not only does the state-as-referent-object fit the traditional mold of security narratives,
significant incentive to motivate countries to climate action concurrently fostered/fosters sociopolitical constructions emphasizing threatening national security circumstances out of desire to
compel these key actors toward international cooperation—a much needed measure to combat
the global challenge effectively. The politicization of climate change, particularly in the United
States, is well documented as pitting cultural, social and economic influences on public opinion
against scientific calls for policy change and environmental reform (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2007;
Harrison and Sundstrom, 2010; Dessler and Parson, 2010; Daynes, Sussman, and West, 2016).
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As Nisbet and Myers (2007) point out, even twenty years after the American public was alerted
to the problem of “global warming,” “few Americans are confident that they fully grasp the
complexities of the issue, and on questions measuring actual knowledge about either the
science or the policy involved, the public scores very low.”112 Thus, earlier researchers
investigating the impact of environmental change faced an audience poorly educated on the
matter and less likely to support costly reforms. This dynamic may have motivated some
toward more severe language seeking to persuade and prompt action. Green issues,
particularly when in competition with self-interest, as in the case of anthropogenic
environmental change, rarely benefit from deep, normative commitment.113 Security issues, on
the other hand, are elevated to the realm of “high politics.”
Despite the distortion created by this politicization’s “thumbing” the scales in favor of
the state as referent object vis-a-vis the threat of environmental change, increasingly experts
dissented from this view. Moreover, many saw in this era of securitization the potential for
transforming traditional patterns and preserving ecopolitical dynamics from manipulative logics
of security that result in more harm than good. Matthew’s 2002 defense of the field argues
environment and security research provides a pathway for a “marginalized perspective” to be
brought into the mainstream, shedding light on the fact that “environmental change, resource
scarcity, and resource abundance have been linked to insecurity and violence through social
processes of greed and grievance for a very long time; that contemporary conflicts build on and
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are shaped by histories that might have to be understood in order for the conflict to be
resolved; and that societies of all types have usually proven resilient and innovative in the face
of environmental change.”114
Critically, Trombetta (2008) draws upon the social-constructivist perspective of
securitization theory, but contrasts with expectations of subsequently antagonistic logics of
emergency that seek to overturn “otherwise binding rules and governance by decrees.”115 She
argues when applied to environmental issues, empirical analysis reveals “few appeals to
environmental security have mobilized exceptional measures or inscribed enemies in any
context,” suggesting appeals to environmental security—and she contends more broadly other
non-traditional sectors—have rather produced alternative modalities and logics, eschewing the
“confrontational logic of national security model suggested by the School.”116 Such unfixed,
transformative securitization moves are observable, for example, in the establishment of a
common approach to ozone depletion as well as in the creation of the IPCC (1988) and the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992); Trombetta contends the post-Cold War
evolution of environmental securitization reveals a significant shift away from the familiar
features of national security and toward fundamental aspects of human security.117 This
“reflexive” securitization of the environment has therefore downplayed the role of the state
and challenged traditional, reactionary security practices while contributing to the formation of
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“new actors and instruments” fostering security responses to potentially destabilizing
vulnerabilities with “intervention and preventative measures.”118
One of the most visible moments in the securitization of the environment—to include
the issue of climate migration—the April 2007 UN Security Council (UNSC) first debate on
climate change, confirms Trombetta’s argument. While Scott (2008) characterizes the absence
of an agreed upon statement/”speech act” assessing climate change as a threat to global peace
and security as a failure to securitize,119 Balzaq’s sociological view of securitization explains how
this moment and other key follow-on events demonstrate a “strategic (pragmatic) process” of
securitization that need not be pre-meditated nor hinge philosophically upon a formal “speech
act”—which he likens to a marital “I do” moment of threat identification.120 A sociological
perspective recognizes securitizing performatives as “situated actions mediated by agents’
habitus” (dispositions), exhibits a discourse manifesting a “distinct kind of agency,” and finally,
emphasizes “the mutual constitution of securitzing actors and audience,” acknowledging a
participatory audience vice “a pure byproduct of a speech act event.”121
With over fifty speakers, the 2007 UNSC debate evidenced numerous securitizing
performatives, to include that of British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, then president of
the Council, arguing climate change was “not a matter of narrow national security—it was
about ‘our collective security;’” Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s projecting “climate change
could not only have serious environmental, social and economic implications, but implications

118

Trombetta, “Environmental Security and Climate Change…,” 593.
Shirley Scott, “Securitizing Climate Change: International Legal Implications and Obstacles,”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 21, Number 4 (December 2008): 603.
120
Balzaq, “A Theory of Securitization…,” 1.
121
Balzaq, “A Theory of Securitization…,” 2.
119

63
for peace and security, as well;” hesitancy from the “Group of 77” developing countries who
acknowledged socio-economic development concerns yet disapproved the issue’s moving from
General Assembly hands to the Council’s exclusive control; and the Pacific Islands Forum
assertion that in light of the Council’s charge to protect “human rights and the integrity and
security of States,” the body need not be involved in Climate Change Convention negotiations,
but did have a responsibility to “keep the issue of climate change under continuous review.”122
As theoretically described by Balzaq, these actions were contextualized by participant
dispositions, producing a range of threat characterizations, and constituted a subsequent
discourse arguably exhibiting agency, as a “reflexive” security logic via reaffirmed General
Assembly control and continued UNFCCC intervention and prevention mechanisms prevailed
over the highly politicized UK attempts to force the topic to the international security
agenda.123 As evidenced by Scott, the UK Foreign Secretary’s Special Representative for Climate
Change John Ashton had openly argued for what Copenhagen scholars would denote the “panic
politics” of securitization, publicly asserting such a move would “increase the political clout of
those arguing for urgent action,” would boost funding, facilitate international coalition building
and produce “the kind of influence over governmental decision-making that environment
ministers can only dream of.”124 Scott suggests a reasonable explanation for the failed UK
strategy is the broad rejection of the nation-state as referent object and a general recognition
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of human security as the appropriate level of concern, requiring resources and expertise
outside the typical purview of (inter)national security organizations.125
While Scott and others also argue a lack of agreement, particularly amongst the most
developed states, significantly contributed to the 2007 outcome, follow-on General Assembly,
Security Council and informal Arria-formula meetings on the topic continue to resist traditional
securitization patterns and, with the exception of the case of the Pacific Small Island States,
have increasingly abandoned arguments that put national security at center.126 These events
do, however, through a range of sociopolitical processes, amass “heuristic artefacts” and build
“a coherent network” of concerns about the vulnerability of those impacted by climate change,
predominantly at individual, small group and/or sub-national levels of analysis. In 2009, for
example, the General Assembly identifies “possible security implications” of climate change as
1) vulnerability, specifically food insecurity and human health; 2) development slow down or
reverse, exacerbating vulnerability and threatening destabilization; 3) coping and security
shortcomings leading to migration and/or resource competition at local levels with potential to
provoke domestic conflict with international repercussions; 4) statelessness (in the case of
small island states) threatened by sea level rise (SLR); and finally, 5) international conflict in
undefined international zones of valuable resources.127
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These and other “value judgments,” revealed for example in IPCC analysis and reporting
around this timeframe and forward, reflect the tide of environmental security scholarship
shifting drastically away from projections of mass migration-related international conflict to
complex, multi-dimensional recognition of economic, social and political factors intensified by
climate change and stressing population vulnerability and need for adaptive capacity.128
Evidencing the impact of this transformative process of environmental securitization, circa
2007, this change in mindset marks the literature with something of a conceptual turn, at which
environmental vulnerability, a multifaceted function of how environmental exposure is felt,
becomes increasingly defined as the critical factor in determining climate insecurity, replacing
maximalist expectations of exposure with a host of quantitative, qualitative and cultural factors
and features characterizing adaptive capacity. Minimalist-minded, migrant-centered
frameworks enter into climate-related human mobility research, re-individualizing scholarly
investigation informed by an influential amalgamation of both agency and structure.
As Dalby (1992) notes, “Security is a notoriously slippery term.”129 Working Group II,
assessing social impacts of climate change for the IPCC’s fifth report, defines human security as
a condition when “the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have the
freedom and capacity to live with dignity,” observing multiple influences on human security to
include markets forces, the state and civil society, poverty, discrimination and “extreme
national and technological disasters.”130 As Barnett and Adger (2007) caution, “…human
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security is a function of multiple processes operating across space, over time, and at multiple
scales. This makes researching the ways in which climate change may affect human security a
daunting task.”131 Yet, in Akiyode’s 2012 analysis of urbanization and human security, he
argues, “Human security and environmental security are interwoven and interconnected to the
extent that environmental security can be assumed to stem out of human security while also
human security could also be seen to come out of environmental security.”132 In this light,
those interested in the security implications of climate change cannot ignore the “vital core of
human lives” and structural forces that influence vulnerability and capacity to adapt.
Intellectually liberated by the significant paradigm shifts within both IR studies as well as
environmental security scholarship, experts therefore began the arduous task of investigating
more deeply the complex intersubjective dynamics of post-anthropocentric global affairs in the
context of environmental change, climate vulnerability and human mobility.

THE COMPLEX “NORMAL SCIENCE” OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY STUDIES (ESS)
In his famous structuring of the development of knowledge, Thomas Kuhn divides the
process of human learning into two categories: “scientific revolution,” which emerges from an
accumulation of paradigmatic contradictions to form a new communal understanding, and
“normal science,” the work done within a particular paradigm—both independently critical to
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the advancement of humanity as well as interdependent upon each other.133 This last section
of this literature review discusses the post-shift “normal science” of environmental security
scholarship, solidifying the field and directing future research. A paradigm, Kuhn explains,
provides a focus for fleshing out greater scientific understanding on the basis of a new
discovery, funnels scientists in their process of data selection and provides rules that direct
methodology and approach, narrowing focus and facilitating specialization, what Kuhn refers to
as the “mopping up” of that which the initial discovery did not reveal.134 Accordingly, this final
segment narrows down to the pertinent theories and hypotheses specific to the new normal
science of environmental security studies as related to climate migration and urban violence
potential, identifies and fleshes out key variables and dynamics relative to this research and
highlights emerging conventions for methodology and approach within the field.

Mopping Up: Theories, Hypotheses and Key Variables
This period of convergence in thinking begins with a careful, scholarly interrogation of a
highly complex process significantly characterized by human agency. The ecological complexity
of environmental degradation provides the causal foundation from which all other effects
emerge with overwhelming consensus now acknowledging the first critical variable to be the
condition of climate vulnerability. Brklacich, et al. (2010) argue vulnerability, as a “fundamental
characteristic of all human systems,” predates the effects of environmental impact yet is
particularly revealed vis-à-vis climate exposure and (in)capacity to cope, situated on a
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continuum in juxtaposition to human security.135 (See Figure 2.1.) Four broad groups of
contextual characteristics shape vulnerability: 1) “control of and access to assets;” 2)
“institutional factors;” 3) “distribution of rights and resources;” and finally, 4) “ecological and
geographical factors;” while (environmental) security, on the other hand, is defined by three
basic conditions, “1) options necessary to end, mitigate, or adapt to threats to their human,
environmental, and social rights; 2) the capacity and freedom to exercise these options; and 3)

Figure 2.1. Environmental Vulnerability.136
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the opportunity to actively participate in attaining these options.”137 Brklacich, et al. observe
“people and groups dynamically slide back and forth along the vulnerability-security
continuum” as a function of interacting exogenous eco-stressors and agency-driven capacity to
deal with and adapt to environmental impact.138
This structuration conceptualization recognizes a multiplicity of first order outcomes—
either in situ resilience, local intensification of human insecurity, OR adaptive human mobility,
to include short and long term movement. This range reflects the array of capacities and
difficult choices individuals face under conditions of resource degradation and scarcity,
challenging analysts with a strategic complexity as (competing) actors attempt to anticipate
what others will do.139 Earnest (2015) argues, as a result, such complex social systems “may
exhibit macrolevel stability even while actors constantly strategize against each other,”
demanding evaluation of “both actors and emergent structures” at multiple levels of analysis to
understand more fully the dynamics at hand.140 Thus, brewing levels of greed and grievance
become critical to projecting the second order effects of environmental vulnerability. Barnett
and Adger (2007) theorize that, in addition to undermining conditions of human security
directly, increasing environmental degradation also undermines the “capacity of states to
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provide the opportunities and services that help people,” which may in certain circumstances
increase the risk of violent conflict.141 Although human insecurity is felt at the individual level,
Barnett and Adger explain that a broader range of social factors determine community
expectations and environmental resilience to include, “poverty, the degree of support (or
conversely discrimination) communities receive from the state, their access to economic
opportunities, the effectiveness of decision making processes, and the extent of social cohesion
within and surrounding vulnerable groups.”142 Dissatisfaction coupled with “perceptions of
threat and danger” brought on by scarcity produces conditions “not unlike the security
dilemma” especially within populations of aggrieved young men within country groups, placing
leadership in a delicate position of “generating or mitigating these cycles of antipathy.”143
Implementing a geographic and information systems (GIS) approach at sub-national
levels of a global sample, Raleigh and Urdal (2007) use the Uppsala University’s Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO) armed conflict data set to consider the risk of such escalation to conflict
under conditions of land degradation, water scarcity and population pressure, asserting, “it is
clear that of all demographic and environmental stressors assumed to be correlated with
conflict, population density is the strongest and most consistent factor;” however, they caution
against assuming an environmental crisis relationship, as this finding is common in civil conflict
literature.144 Executing highly detailed analysis of variable interaction in a follow-on model
adding socio-economic factors, they expand upon this initial result, observing economic
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influence strongly tied to conflict potential, but also finding the impact of political institutions
as “pronounced,” exhibiting an “inverse U” curvilinear relationship with conflict—lower risk
found at the extremes of autocracy and democracy, and higher risk correlating with the political
instability of transforming or semi-democratic regimes.145 Perhaps unsurprisingly, changes in
autocratic regime constitute the highest correlation to civil conflict in this model, only second
to the continued strong impact of population density.146 Interestingly, while these socioeconomic factors add substantially to explanatory power, they do not account for the variance
in demographic and environmental factors, suggesting resource scarcity is not as dependent on
political and economic conditions as often argued.147
Raleigh and Urdal test this theory further by dividing their sample into high and lowincome subsets observing “water scarcity, population density and the interaction between
population growth and density are associated with armed conflict in poorer states;”
furthermore, the re-introduction of economic and political control variables to the model
remains consistent, again finding “the interaction between population growth and high levels of
water scarcity also significantly increases the risk of conflict.”148 While the authors somewhat
dispel this impact, contending incidents of coinciding major population growth and density
alongside highest levels of degradation and scarcity are “rare occurrences” (in their 1990-1995
global modeling), these factors increasingly mirror conditions in the rapidly urbanizing regions
of twenty-first century Africa in particular and under projected conditions of climate change are
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expected to intensify across an expanding geography, suggesting continued research is
prudent.149 This dynamic is reflective of what Raleigh and Urdal recognize as the culminating
process of ecological marginalization, a second-order effect in which “great land inequality and
population growth leads people to move into more ecologically fragile areas.”150 In the case of
rural-to-urban movement, they posit, such ecological marginalization, in addition to possible
ethnic clashes, “often puts a pressure on a state’s ability to provide vital services,” leading to
deprivation, grievance and potential for rebellion.151
Tacoli (2009) also recognizes water scarcity (rainfall decrease) as contributing to
movement; however, in the example of Burkina Faso, she reveals during drought,
predominantly rural-to-rural migration increased, while rural-to-urban movement and
international migration was more likely only after normal rainfall due to the higher cost
associated with urbanization and emigration.152 Other key influencers include migrants’
education, social networks, transportation options, gender norms, histories of political and
economic marginalization and development policies affecting livelihood strategies and
traditional mobility patterns.153 Tacoli argues the risk of conflict onset is highly complex, citing
the case of Darfur in which “conflict is the result of the combination of environmental pressures
and the breakdown of traditional social structures and well-established local mediation and
dispute resolution mechanisms.”154 She emphasizes, however, the role of slow-onset
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environmental change in stimulating grievance and undermining these systems, carrying
potential to shift traditional adaptive migratory routes and livelihood migration patterns in
ways that challenge old resilience models.155 Migration scholars Bardsley and Hugo (2010)
describe a “threshold of non-linear migration… as a point at which the impacts of climate
change are so severe or so frequent that the resilience of socio-ecological systems is breached,
or that existing in situ adaptation options either fail or are perceived as inadequate, so that
people make use of migration as an adaptation option in a manner that will fundamentally alter
the form.”156 Critically, such non-linear migration, “involving large numbers of people and/or
changes to current numbers following established patterns that are of an order of magnitude
greater in relation to current population movements,” may constitute a tipping point—albeit
highly contextual—at which increased threat to human security results.157
Examining actual movement patterns of environmentally affected populations using the
Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), Raleigh, Jordan and Salehyan (2008) identify chronic
drought as comparatively most likely to produce permanent relocation with 10% to 31% of
affected people in their global sample considering migration.158 Geographically, they find
impact is felt most intensely in East and West Africa, at 14% and 22% of these populations
suffering effects, respectively.159 Reporting little evidence of international migration, the
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authors observe most environmentally adaptive movement is internal, circular and influenced
by wealth, social capital and pre-established links.160 While rural-to-rural movement has been
historically more common as a practice of labor resilience during poor environmental
conditions, rural-to-urban mobility is increasingly used to minimize risk through family income
diversification particularly during extreme drought.161 Mapping “hotspots for environmental
stresses and migration” based on a model of high projected population growth, low income and
number of natural disasters experienced (drought, floods, wind storms), Raleigh et al. contend,
“Migration is only one of a variety of survival strategies pursued by families,” however, “sudden
onset disasters and prolonged chronic hazards lead to ‘distress migration,’” departing from the
more typical patterns of labor migration.162 “Social capital networks, relatives, histories of
migration and trade, shared political alliances, and ethnic identity or origin, all encourage and
direct post-disaster movement.”163 Because migrants are typically weak and marginalized,
Raleigh et al. argue conflict outcomes are unlikely; however, they concede “particular
demographic pressures” have potential to exacerbate tensions, citing the case of urbanization
that “exceeds employment growth and migrations that change the balance between and
among major ethnic groups.”164
Although Gleditsch, Nordås and Salehyan (2007) similarly conclude climate conflict
unlikely, they posit the most likely potential is found in the case of environmental migration
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when local conditions of insecurity have intensified beyond normal expectations destabilizing
places of origin and creating “disorderly mass flows” that drag the antagonisms to destinations
where the displaced “expand rebel social networks to receiving areas and may serve as
conduits for the spread of armed conflict.”165 They argue, such conditions alone are not
sufficient for the production of violence as demonstrated by the many cases in which
devolution does not occur and remind thinkers, “Immigrants can also add economic skills and
cultural vibrancy to their receiving areas.”166
Observing violent conflict in nineteen out of thirty-eight case studies of large-scale
environmental migration—sixteen of the nineteen being intrastate conflicts—Reuveny (2007)
concludes, “Environmental migration does not always lead to conflict, but when it does, the
conflict intensity can be very high,” and it is distinguished from more typical migration patterns
due to the scope and intensifying frequency of climate-related movement.167 Arguing less
developed countries (LDCs) face greater impact and generally lack capacity to mitigate effects
sufficiently, he observes in zones of high economic dependency on agriculture, high population
density and growth, and high income inequality (typically producing climate vulnerability), ecostressors “push” movement, and although not all will/will be able to relocate, many feel forced
to choose migration, stirring potential for conflict in receiving areas via four key “channels.”168
These interacting variables—resource competition, ethnic tension, political distrust and
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socioeconomic fault lines—increase likelihood of conflict when two or more combine,
particularly amidst conditions of “resident-migrant ethno-religious tension and competition
over resources” in less developed receiving areas similarly dependent on agriculture and limited
in capacity to absorb new arrivals.169

“Fragile Cities” and Environmentally Related Urbanization
Despite often-expressed scholarly concern for the impact of human movement to cities
in the face of climate change, relatively little in the literature brings these evidenced dynamics
together to assess the current effects of environmentally related urbanization. Numerous
studies, however, are finding increased violence in African cities in particular. For example,
Raleigh (2015), who observes increasing proportion and frequency of conflict in urban areas in
contrast to decreasing incidents in rural regions, recognizes an “urbanization of
marginalization” across African states presenting conditions of high population density, spatial
(and consequently ethnic) inequalities and/or political exclusion, and poverty—factors similar
to those determined by Reuveny (2007) as increasing likelihood of conflict in cases of
environmentally related migration.170 Raleigh finds significant support for the “Fragile City”
hypothesis, which argues, “Poor urban conditions incentivize opposition actions against a state
incapable of providing public goods and opportunities.”171 She identifies unemployment amidst
increasing urban population growth and, interestingly, democracy (positively) as key variables
producing urban conflict and political violence, respectively, while conversely, rule of law
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lessens violence in urban spaces.172 She explains the unique political angst within these cities is
influenced by “rural bias,” which characterizes many relatively newer African democracies
reversing old favoritisms of the colonial era; this behavior, however, feeds into urban political
dissatisfaction where the development of cohesive urban political identities is challenged by
ethnic clustering and tendencies to vote for incumbents based upon traditional cleavages vice
local urban needs.173
In addition to this increase in urban conflict, Fox (2012) observes in post-industrialized
Africa, rapid urbanization without economic growth, contradicting historical urbanization
examples elsewhere.174 He argues there is “nothing particularly unusual” about this rather
large-scale migration when urbanization is viewed as a “global historical process propelled by
technological and institutional changes that alleviated the [food] surplus and disease
constraints limiting urban population growth during the preindustrial era.”175 Linking both
technology and aid to the provision of non-agrarian acquisitioned food, Fox points to
population pressure caused by decreasing statewide mortality rates and increasing fertility as
drivers of this pattern in conjunction with the [expected?] benefits of African cities as centers of
colonial era-transferred technology, trade and sources of aid.176 Fox does not, however, take
into consideration the pull of this atypically sourced urban food surplus in a context of
environmental degradation and the added push of related rural loss of agrarian
livelihood/sustainability.
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Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl (2006), on the other hand, provide strong empirical
evidence revealing that decreasing rainfall (a proxy for climate change) from 1960-1990 has
been “an important determinant of rural-to-urban migration,” explaining some of the “very
different urbanization patterns that have taken place in sub-Saharan Africa compared to other
developing countries.”177 Recognizing environmental vulnerability as a function of agricultural
dependence, Barrios et al. voice concern that this trend suggests an unsustainable overurbanization dynamic in the face of projected precipitation decrease and the intensification of
urbanization.178 As urban specialist Robert Muggah (2014) identifies “rapid and unregulated
urbanization” as one of three macro level “interlocking structural factors” hastening urban
fragility alongside the forces of national/metropolitan governance and massive technological
advances in connectivity and digital empowerment,179 such underlying environmental impacts,
projected to worsen under the conditions of climate change, cannot be overlooked.
Further highlighting the intervening role played by agricultural dependence related to
environmental vulnerability, Henderson, Storeygard and Deichmann (2017) observe significant
within district movement to primary cities in response to moisture shocks specifically in the
cases where these urban centers feature the manufacture of tradable goods.180 Importantly,
the authors reveal these cities have benefited from economic growth as a result, pointing to
measurable increase in night lighting as evidence of total city development and improved
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capacity—“A one standard deviation rainfall increase reduces lights by 11%, and income by
approximately 3.5%.”181 Critically, only twenty to twenty-five percent of the sample is
comprised of these successful primary cities, meaning that the remaining seventy-five to eighty
percent of the population lacks a viable alternative in the face of decreased moisture; thus, the
authors acknowledge potential for positive development in the more industrialized zones of
sub-Saharan Africa but express serious concern for the severe lack of structural transformation
likely to occur in the majority of the region.182
While migration to cities beyond district borders was not incorporated into the
Henderson et al. (2017) sub-Saharan analysis, de Boer, Muggah and Patel (2016) examine 243
African cities as part of a total 2,100-international city sample, globally mapping factors of
urban fragility where populations amount to 250,000 or more and offering a valuable
characterization of the region’s urban landscape as a whole.183 They empirically determine
forty-four percent of African cities are “highly fragile” while fifty-one percent—almost the
entire remainder—are at a “medium” level of fragility.184 Relative to other regions, African
urban spaces are recognized as most fragile, with a city index average score of 2.48 on a 1-4
scale of urban fragility.185 The authors, who seek to re-conceptualize city fragility and
resilience, observe these characteristics on separate but related spectrums, neither of which
are irreversible or static in nature; rather, they argue fragility and resilience are “parallel and
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interconnected,” and “not antonyms” of each other.186 Broadly, they assert the analytical focus
of fragility centers on “real and relative legitimacy, authority and capacity of state institutions
to fulfill their core functions,” which involves “basic services provision and access,” to include
quality of life features such as public security, health and electricity in the face of accumulating
risks.187 Resilience, which is not yet mapped, is described as “closely aligned with risk reduction
and risk management frameworks designed to mitigate natural hazards and disasters” while
ameliorating conditions that threaten political dissatisfaction such as inequality, injustice,
insecurity, demographic pressures and the unavailability of basic services.188
The limits of African political institutions to perform these services are discussed by Fox
and Hoelscher (2012), whose cross country OLS regression analysis confirms, “weakly
institutionalized democracies are uniquely prone to social violence,” which the authors define
as “acts of violence between individuals or small groups of individuals.”189 Echoing the findings
of Raleigh and Urdal (2007) assessing climate and civil conflict potential, they observe an
inverse U relationship characterizing individual level violence (proxied by homicides) vis-à-vis
the polity spectrum and critically postulate a “historical transformation in the manifestation of
conflict” is shifting away from rural rebellion toward urban social violence amidst conditions of
scarce resources.190 Urdal and Hoelscher (2012) develop this notion further, introducing a new
dataset measuring “urban social disorder” based on reporting in the Keesing’s Record of World
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Events to account for events not typically found in traditional conflict datasets, “ranging from
nonviolent demonstrations and protests, riots, terrorist acts, and organized armed conflict.”191
Spanning the 1960-2009 time period and covering fifty-five Asian and sub-Saharan African
cities, their findings reflect the conclusions drawn by Fox and Hoelscher (2012), connecting
hybrid polities and poor economic growth rates to urban social disorder (USD) and supporting
the idea that conflict onset has significant potential to originate from within urban environs.192
Urdal and Hoelscher therefore call for future analysis to study how urban population growth
rates affect stability amidst climate change and its expected impact upon food prices, especially
taking the multi-ethnic nature of cities into consideration.193
Thus, the complex nexus of environmental vulnerability, urbanization and communal
fragility suggests an area critically ripe for research as both climate effects and urbanization
dynamics are expected to intensify. While Africa is projected to increase its urban population
from slightly more than one-third in 2010 to a full half of the continent by 2030,194 the already
historically low proportion of African GDP in manufacturing is in a current decline with a vast
majority of countries boasting a mere eight percent share of their national economies, meaning
successful urban absorption of excess labor as climate change drives a loss of agricultural yield
will strain (is straining) national and metropolitan resilience.195 The growing literature of
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environmental security studies largely supports arguments of an environmentally related
“urbanization of marginalization” and a geographical shift in the manifestation of conflict,
evidenced by rapidly expanding slum populations, rising levels of urban violence relative to
rural regions, a general lack of metropolitan economic growth, and increasing demographic
pressures. Solutions to foster resilience are expensive and/or difficult to plan, develop and
execute, demanding targeted responses to improve adaptive environmental capacity, lessening
the felt experience of environmental exposure in vulnerable sites most threatened by fragility.
Methods by which to identify these “hot spots” and sources of violence “triggers” have become
a major focus of the field and are discussed in the next section, revealing a range of analytical
strategies and scholarly approaches.

Methodological Expectations: Hot Spots and Tipping Points
Scheffran (2015) explains, when systems are unable to adapt, accelerating dynamics of
change can amass to a tipping point, at which a “qualitative switch of behavior” can result.196
He posits, “Conflict may be seen as a special form of social instability which emerges from
incompatible actions, values, behavioral rules, and priorities of agents who failed to reduce
their differences and tensions to tolerable levels;" he subsequently argues, “Climate change can
challenge the stability of natural and social systems in multiple ways.”197 Subscribing to this
position, the methodologies of many environmental security analysts are particularly mindful of
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the temporal aspects of key factors as they observe rates of change outpacing traditional
adaptive capacity and reaching critical thresholds that threaten community resilience. Marking
such tipping points and mapping the spatial likelihood of such ruptures is therefore a common
focus within the literature aimed at preempting conflict outbreak via targeted capacity building.
Assessing the effects of environmentally driven economic shocks on civil unrest in subSaharan Africa, Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2005), for example, find periods of rainfall
increase are statistically associated with less conflict, with current rainfall increase statistically
significant at the ≥1,000 battle death threshold, while lagged rainfall increase is even less
associated with violence, statistically significant for both ≥25 and ≥1,000 battle death
thresholds.198 The authors posit negative impacts to economic growth, on the other hand, over
time produce a relative drop in the opportunity costs of being a rebel soldier, thereby
increasing the incidence of civil conflict.199 Similarly, Hendrix and Glaser’s (2007) empirical
analysis of civil war onset in sub-Saharan Africa finds both long term trends as well as short
term triggers have significant impact on the likelihood of conflict onset, but short term triggers
exhibit the most significance and greatest consistency.200 Highlighting the importance of
temporal impact, they report “the lagged rainfall trigger” exhibits robust influence while the
“contemporaneous measure of rainfall trigger is not remotely significant under any
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specification.”201 They find “the impacts of interannual variability in rainfall are consistent
across countries with different ecological realities and natural resource endowments,” with a
quartile-to-quartile shift in increased rainfall decreasing likelihood of conflict onset by an
average of thirty-four percent.202
Exploring the effects of environmental impact over time using “continuous
droughtyears” and “sum of droughtyears” to aggregate data temporally and distinguish
sustained patterns from those of seasonal variations, Von Uexkell (2014) assesses the civil
conflict incidence of geographic grid cells of 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degrees from 1989-2008, defining
such violence as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both
where the use of armed force between the government and an internal opposition group
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.”203 Incorporating fixed effects as
well as both time and spatial lags to reduce influence of alternate sources of civil unrest, she
finds “sum of droughtyears,” defined as the number of drought years in a five year period, to be
robust and statistically significant.204 Where rain fed agriculture is exposed to drought,
sensitivity to civil conflict is particularly evidenced, not only in the case of persistently negative
events over time—“sum of droughtyears”—but also in terms of compounding impact,
operationalized as “continuous droughtyears” or the number of consecutive years of
drought.205 Von Uexkell finds conflict risk doubles in these areas of rain fed croplands where a
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lagged measure of three consecutive years of drought have occurred in contrast to no statistical
change in non-agrarian regions.206 The author clarifies that a qualitative look at the data
suggests preexisting conflict and/or tensions in these agricultural regions may actually serve as
the root cause of conflict amidst other socio-economic conditions, but drought impact brings
substantial fuel to the fire.207
Testing this hypothesized interaction between established vulnerabilities and relative
shocks to systems of communal stability, Ide (2015) implements a “fuzzy-set” qualitative
comparative approach to investigate violent escalation of conflict over scarce renewable
resources, exploring the triggering effects of resource appropriation and recent political change
upon two preexisting conditions of structural vulnerability—negative “othering” and high
power differences—observing in the twenty cases studied none of the four conditions as
“necessary.”208 He finds, however, three of these conditions to be “INUS,” “an insufficient but
necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient” for violent escalation.209
Negative “othering” and, in contrast to the study’s expectations, low power differences (versus
high) were longer term conditions most consistently observed, with recent political change
acting as a tipping point that launched communities into resource conflict.210 As Ide’s findings
contradict other findings within the literature, a key takeaway may be that it is not so much the
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variable of vulnerability itself that matters as much as the culmination of long-standing
problematic conditions and a spark of change that provokes a shift in human behavior.
Seter (2016) emphasizes temporal as well as spatial scales of empirical testing,
contending more development of operationalization approaches is needed.211 Contextualizing
the impact of climate variability, she argues sub-national spatial sites of vulnerability must be
taken into consideration to observe interaction between physical and social systems, the
mapping of which has become a dominant methodological approach in the literature.”212 In
addition to these quantitative geographical assessments, she explains qualitative evaluation of
local coping capacity must also inform climate security vulnerability studies, particularly as nonlinear and threshold effects are considered.213 Similarly, de Sherbinin (2014) promotes a more
complex approach--observing “outcome vulnerability” assessments, which combine
information on potential climate impacts on particular systems (such as agriculture and water)
with information on the capacity of society to cope and adapt to these impacts, are most in
keeping with the IPCC definition of vulnerability as a “function of exposure, sensitivity, and
coping capacity.”214 Considering the culmination of effects in both time and space, he adds
“the greatest impacts of climate change will not necessarily be the result of secular changes in
temperature and precipitation over decades, but rather will be the result of short-term
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variability and extremes, noting disasters and humanitarian crises, agriculture and food security
problem areas, and water resource hotspots.215
Scrutinizing the security consequences of climate change more narrowly than many in
the field, Busby, Smith and Krishnan (2014) focus their hotspot mapping efforts in Africa on
“situations where large numbers of people could be at risk of death as a result of exposure to
climate-related hazards, that may or may not escalate to conflict.”216 Working to identify places
of “perennial concern,” these authors depart from interest in emergent vulnerability or trigger
variables.217 Rather, their “3.0 version of the Climate Security Vulnerability Model” is a spatially
oriented analysis seeking to avoid “conceptual stretching” that reduces the meaning of security
beyond the frame of “mortality and potential large-scale loss of life.”218 Despite this high
threshold, the “CVSM 3.0” is not short on detail, incorporating extensive sub-national data on
household and community resilience to physical, demographic and political indicators into a
highly detailed composite vulnerability map layer.219 Comparison to the EM-DAT International
Disaster Database for validation, however, reveals limited explanatory power. Busby et al.
(2014) contend the mismatch between their model and the EM-DAT may be related to poor
geo-coding of the EM-DAT, which did not allow for analysis below the first administrative unit
of governance.220 Scholars might also question the appropriateness of the EM-DAT as a

215

de Sherbinin, “Climate Change Hotspots Mapping…,” 30.
Joshua Busby, Todd G. Smith and Nisha Krishnan, “Climate Security Vulnerability in Africa
Mapping 3.0,” Political Geography (2014): 52.
217
Busby, et al., “Climate Security Vulnerability…,” 53.
218
Busby, et al., “Climate Security Vulnerability…,” 53.
219
Busby, et al., “Climate Security Vulnerability…,” 54, 61.
220
Busby, et al., “Climate Security Vulnerability…,” 65.
216

88
measure too heavily emphasizing randomly occurring natural disasters and overlooking second
order effects with equally morbid consequences.
Offering another example of the challenge of model validation, the University of
Hamburg’s Research Group Climate Change and Security’s hotspot analysis (Ide et al., 2014)
also proposes a composite risk index of environmental vulnerability, but focuses on the
likelihood of conflict.221 The authors narrow the geographic scope of their research to Kenya
and Uganda and restrict their temporal analysis to the years, 1998-2008, adding a “general risk
of violent conflict onset” factor to climate exposure and climate vulnerability variables.222 To
create this risk of conflict variable, they draw upon civil war literature, testing the argument
that historical conditions linked to civil war onset explain future low- and high-intensity violence
potential—they regress all factors identified in two widely acknowledged meta-studies for 0.5
degree grid cells in the area of interest from 1998-2007 vis-à-vis geo-referenced conflict events
documented in 2008 (binary measure) per the Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset
(ACLED).223 On this basis, they select “a medium level of democracy, a large population, the
occurrence of a conflict event in the preceding year, and high economic growth (although with
some caution) as indicators for a high general risk of violent conflict onset.”224 Synthesis with
climate exposure and climate vulnerability variables results in twelve final indicators,
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characterizing the relative risk for the three key components of the composite risk index
(CRI).”225
While the theoretical work of Ide, et al. is highly sophisticated and well researched, the
results are mixed. The authors argue quantitative support for the CRI is demonstrated by
correlation analysis with four different conflict datasets—ACLED, a “violence against civilians”
sub-set of ACLED, the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) capturing social conflict events
below the threshold of civil war (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012) and the higher threshold of
violence oriented Uppsala Conflict Data Program-Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg &
Melander, 2013). Interestingly and perhaps unsurprisingly, the index correlates most highly
and with very high statistical significance with the ACLED dataset, the measure by which the
authors selected many of their “general risk of conflict” indicators—raising some concern for
circularity—however, this key category correlates to ACLED with the least magnitude, while
climate vulnerability offers the most explanatory power of the three components.226
By contrast, the qualitative analysis of Ide, et al. (2014) points to considerable
shortcomings. Field research in Loitoktok, Kenya reveals CRI model underestimations of local
capacity to overcome physical exposure (specifically, community health, education and
economic development) as well as overestimations of conflict onset risk, likely due to the high
number of very low-level human-wildlife conflict incidents.227 Field research in Southern
Turkana-Pokot North counties further exposes difficulty with translating this large-scale

225

Ide, et al., “On Exposure, Vulnerability and Violence: Spatial Distribution of Risk…,” 71.
(Citing Busby, Smith, White, & Strange, 2013; Rustad, Buhaug, Falch, & Gates, 2011.)
226
Ide, et al., “On Exposure, Vulnerability and Violence: Spatial Distribution of Risk…,” 74, 77.
227
Ide, et al., “On Exposure, Vulnerability and Violence: Spatial Distribution of Risk…,” 75.

90
quantification to social impact. Relying on international meteorological data, the CRI observes
low exposure, but local perceptions assert increasing drought.228 Relatedly, in support of
arguments emphasizing the felt impact of climate exposure to behavioral outcomes, intensely
violent livestock raids in the region evidence a much higher level of insecurity than projected by
the model, not only influenced by the exposure underestimation, but also possibly skewed by
the conflict risk factor’s inclusion of national level characteristics associated with low conflict
risk and the lack of intensity measurement offered by the simple binary conflict history metric
at local.229 The CRI finds better agreement with the third case study, which is conducted via
literature review vice field research, yet climate exposure once more fails to align with local
perceptions, and the conflict risk underestimates local violence.230 In all three cases, climate
vulnerability was representative of ground truth.231 The authors suggest their model is limited
in its capture of social cohesion, thinning their assessment of local resilience.232
The qualitative tribulations of the Ide et al. (2014) model bring forward some valuable
lessons. Despite the massive amount of fine grain historical data accumulated, quantitatively
assessed and mapped, day-to-day perceptions and social norms play a significant role in
dictating reactions to environmental change. Taking this cultural dynamic into consideration,
De Juan (2015) takes the long view of the Darfur case, mapping twenty years of variations in
vegetation and geographical water distribution and taking ethnic diversity patterns into account
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as populations move from resource constrained areas to areas of plenty.233 He argues, in
contexts of “substantial subnational variation in long-term environmental change, a minimum
degree of ethnic diversity and a strong local livelihoods-dependency on environmental
conditions,” climate induced movement “can change demographic constellations and increase
resource competition in areas of high in-migration.”234 His qualitative analysis reveals
compromised traditional systems of resource management beginning in the 1970s as local
governing agencies were stripped of authority and subsequent state-level regulators faltered
amidst drought and inter-ethnic resource struggles.235 One-sided treatment of these
interactions led to increased inter-ethnic polarization and fragmentation.236 De Juan’s empirical
work confirms human movement to areas of vegetation abundance where “the likelihood and
intensity of violence in the early phase of the civil war,” i.e., the onset phase, is positive and
statistically significant.237 He finds when all other variables are held at constant, a shift from
minimum to maximum vegetation (using the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index—NDVI)
correlates to an eighty percent increase in likelihood of violence (damaged or destroyed
villages) as documented by the Humanitarian Information Unit at the US State Department.238
While De Juan enjoys the benefit of well-documented hindsight and presents a singular case,
his work highlights the importance of environmental impact to social cohesion.
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Within the Paradigm of Environmental Security Studies
While the development of Environmental Security Studies is by no means
mature, this new security paradigm has taken considerable shape in recent years. Scholars
have characterized this field as highly complex—exhibiting both ecological as well as strategic
complexity, subject to post-anthropocentric earth system dynamics, deeply institutionalized
world system structures and the ever-unpredictable nature of individual agency.
Environmental vulnerability has emerged as the unequivocal focal point of the field, the agreed
upon yet still enigmatic pièce de résistance, the scholarly operationalization of which is yet in
need of further fleshing out. Agricultural dependence, water scarcity and land degradation
come to the fore as preeminent physical exposure concerns, and inequality-driven forces of
greed and grievance, political instability, population density and/or rapid growth are recognized
challenges to state capacity to withstand environmental hazards, threatening necessary social
cohesion and principled adherence to the rule of law undergirding community resilience.
Consensus has formed around expectations of methodology, which demand multi-scalar
spatial and temporal quantification and increasingly embrace additional qualitative research in
the interest of more accurately assessing the felt impact of environmental hazard. While
system changes are important, the field emphasizes, in particular, exponential change dynamics
that outpace traditional mechanisms of adaptation to the point of tipping normal behavior
patterns into chaotic non-linear response. Environmental security scholars focus largely upon
where and under what conditions such thresholds will most likely be reached, directing
attention toward fragile states and, increasingly, fragile cities where turbo-urbanization and
significant human vulnerability suggest high potential for destabilization.

93
MOVING FORWARD WITH ENVIRONMENTALLY RELATED URBANIZATION RESEARCH
Robert Muggah (2015) laments what criminologists observe as the “stickiness” of urban
violence, fueled by what he considers to be the “key” factor of such insecurity—turbourbanization; however, Muggah likewise evidences the “contagious” nature of positivity in
turnaround cities such as Rio de Janiero and, moreover, asserts violence prevention in “hot
spot” locations is achievable and sustainable via concentrated efforts aimed at boosting “social
cohesion and mobility.”239 As movement to cities is frequently observed as an increasingly
relied upon means of livelihood risk diversification amidst conditions of environmental
degradation, the critical question arises—will such environmentally related urbanization carry
potential for increased violence, rivalrous conflict onset or peaceful absorption and adaptation?
In the wake of neo-Malthusian scholars whose unconventional analysis of
environmental exposure successfully challenged statist expectations and theoretically departed
traditional IR, the transformative, intersubjective literature of ESS has evidenced significant
support for acknowledging the threat of violence under complex conditions of environmental
vulnerability as well as the potential for human movement in situations in which adaption in
place is not feasible. While mobility patterns that maintain historical form do not typically
produce violence, thresholds of non-linear migration are recognized as posing dynamics that
can threaten conflict onset, especially when contextualized by a host of key variables that
suggest a lack of community resilience. In addition, it is possible that antagonisms associated
with civil unrest might be dragged from places of origin to new destinations, inciting violence
there along fault lines of cultural cleavage. Increased social disorder and political violence in

239

Muggah, “Fixing Fragile Cities…”

94
the rapidly urbanizing zones of sub-Saharan Africa alongside poor economic growth are already
observed, contradicting previous periods of urbanization and confounding many scholars.
However, internal relocation to cities as a result of intensifying environmental degradation
offers a likely explanation for at least a portion of currently observed over-urbanization
dynamics.
Although the existential threats of thermonuclear war and climate change are not
interchangeable security dilemmas—as revealed particularly by the critical scholars who argue
against the deterministic de-individualization and oversimplification of neo-Malthusian “climate
refugee” rhetoric—both originate from deeply ingrained cultural preference for international
competition amongst the major world powers, the former for physical superiority, and the
latter for economic. Similarly, the solutions to both demand radical behavior change that
comes with a cost. Only through cooperation and trust will states be likely to enter into policy
agreements that aim to solve these problems. As Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”
illustrates, re-understanding what it means to “win” is vital to escaping the paradigm in which
no technical solution exists. The dynamics of climate change result in geographically disparate
zones of environmental vulnerability, while global economic forces have produced disparate
realms of resilience, with very little overlap between the two. Nonetheless, globalization
demands cooperation. Only through thorough investigation and identification of the most
critical sites of vulnerability and insecurity can international cooperation be brought to bear,
preemptively applying the right resources to facilitate local capacity and community resilience
necessary for peaceful adaptation.
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The next chapter will lay out the methodology by which this dissertation will tackle this
“hot spot” identification and qualitative assessment of environmental vulnerability and violence
potential connected to environmentally related urbanization.
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CHAPTER III
MODELLING ENVIRONMENTALLY RELATED URBANIZATION AND VIOLENCE
“When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched
to everything else in the universe."
--- John Muir 1

As the literature of Environmental Security Studies reveals, rapid urbanization is taking
place in sub-Saharan Africa in the absence of an explanatory economic pull factor, begging the
question, what is pulling or pushing humans in this atypical manner? Perhaps the more
important question is what are the consequences of such movement, particularly in light of
already observed increased violence in African cities? This chapter outlines the methodological
approach this dissertation has implemented to test the hypothesis that environmental
degradation and vulnerability are playing a significant role in “forcing” this movement, resulting
in unsustainable over-urbanization dynamics that are intensifying political unrest and urban
violence. A complexity informed research design joins migration, conflict and ecological
systems models to test this hypothesis and determine under what conditions violence might
emerge?
To integrate the complex multi-scalar, geographic and temporal influences involved and
capture fully the important roles of both state as well as individual behaviors, this project
implemented Panarchy theory as a conceptual framework consolidating models from the
literature. The schema of this concept are laid out in the first segment, offering rationale for
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this approach in line with emerging conventions of environmental security studies (ESS). A
discussion of the research sample, variable operationalization and data collection follows in the
second segment, addressing incorporation of a climate adaptation index, the Notre Dame
Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN), to provide richer context in characterizing local climate
vulnerability and resilience. In the third segment, the mixed methods process by which this
dissertation has tested its hypothesis is broken down, describing the time series cross-scale
regression analysis that serves as the basis for a geospatial analysis using weighted map
layering to integrate national and sub-national factors and subsequently identify zones of
environmentally related urbanization violence potential. A qualitative examination is discussed
as serving to check the results. Issues of trustworthiness, robustness and limitations of this
study will close the chapter.

PANARCHY: A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR COMPLEX MODELING
“The concept of Panarchy provides a framework that characterizes complex systems of
people and nature as dynamically organized and structured within and across scales of space
and time.”2 In keeping with the relatively young work of Environmental Security Studies (ESS),
such a theory proves helpful in its capacity to synthesize cross-scale linkages, as exemplified by
urbanizing human flows; discontinuities, represented by breaks in the distribution patterns of
meaningful socio-ecological characteristics such as human density, resource availability and
livelihood diversification; and cycles of renewal and collapse, typical of governing regimes in the
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face of socio-ecological disturbances. Because Panarchy takes a comprehensive approach to
studying complex adaptive cycles operating at discrete ranges of scale within social-ecological
systems (SESs), the theory distinctively highlights the role of bottom-up influences, such as
rural-to-urban migration, as they exert force across a range of related domains over time,
thereby engaging in a relational ontology that more fully informs our understanding of human
vulnerability behaviors vis-à-vis the pervasive and unstructured magnitude of environmental
impact. This section outlines the Panarchy concept as it relates to the methodology of this
research and the operationalization of environmentally related urbanization and violence
potential, explaining how this approach conforms to and adds to the developing literature.
C. S. Holling, foundational Panarchy scholar, defines a Panarchy as “a representation of a
hierarchy as a nested set of adaptive cycles,” arguing, “The functioning of those cycles and the
communication between them determines the sustainability of a system.”3 (See Figure 3.1.)
Foundational to the methodology of this study, social systems within these panarchical
hierarchies are understood to be cycling or “oscillating” between sustainability and crisis
moments activated by internal factors (e.g. human agency and power) and biophysical
disturbances thereby “causing non-linear, episodic change” in the form of adaptations and/or
transformations such as “legal reform or devolution of decision-making authority.”4 These
dynamics and outcomes constitute the core interest of this dissertation. While social ebbs and
flows of conflict and cooperation come as no surprise to security scholars, Panarchy theory
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departs from traditional expectations of hierarchical social structures characterized by topdown processes, recognizing, to the contrary, this societal oscillation as an adaptive cycle with

Figure 3.1. A Panarchy: Functional Cycling and Typical Communication Flows.

“potential to affect both smaller scales and larger scales” of a multi-scalar system.5
Determining the functionality of the system, Panarchy thinkers recognize adaptive cycling as
involving two broad phases of stability and instability over time, expressed by two intertwining
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loops.6 (See Figure 3.2.) The forward wave is understood as generally slow moving, comprised
of an initial growth/exploitation stage, the “r phase,” as well as an increasingly slower paced

Figure 3.2. Panarchy Theory’s Cycle of Stability and Instability. 7

conservation stage, the “k phase;” complimentarily, the second smaller wave in the cycle,
situated to the rear, is understood as moving rapidly and with significant variation, launched, so
to speak, by a release from conservational rigidity, symbolized by an “Ω” (omega), and
culminating in a reorganization phase, marked by an “a” (alpha).8 This heightened variation
comes with “novelty,” a key implication of panarchical dynamics, which sparks innovation
6
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through competition and experimentation and serves as a necessary source of adaptive
capacity and resilience both shaping and shaped by the system’s processes of reorganization
and renewal.9
Ideal resilience-based “adaptive governance” enables social systems to withstand
disturbance due to human and ecological impacts, ultimately maintaining system structure and
function amidst oscillation.10 This capacity becomes vital when “environmental governance
arrangements exhibit low resilience to potential disturbances”—in systemic terms, the “omega
moments” of release in the adaptive cycle, at which point stability/building rigidity of preexisting regime status quo gives way to disturbances, to include external and cross-scale
influences, a.k.a. the “communication” Holling recognizes between the nested sub-systems
cycling within a Panarchy.1112 The institutionalization of adaptive governance, efforts to
reorganize in a way that promotes resilience, is therefore quite complicated, “affected by a
myriad of constraints and opportunities originating at scales both above and below the
governance of a particular environmental issue or focal scale of a particular SES.”13
Two key influential pathways of multi-scalar interaction, categorized broadly as
“remember” and “revolt,” amount to connective processes particularly significant to the
sustainability of the overall Panarchy.14 These panarchical connections serve as the dynamic
trajectories by which the variables of environmental (in)security are understood to intersect at
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the municipal level of analysis in the operationalization of environmentally related urbanization
offered by this dissertation. (See Figure 3.3.) Generally stabilizing “remember” influences flow
down from above, facilitating renewal by drawing on the accumulated potential stored in a
larger, slower cycle, while “revolt” influences, on the other hand, cascade upwardly,

Figure 3.3. Adaptive Governance with “Remember” and “Revolt” Interactions.15
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propagating the kinetics of critical change from smaller, rapidly cycling lower echelons to larger,
slower moving cycles, provoking adaptation/transformation.16 These flows contribute greatly
to the healthy oscillation of the adaptive cycle, instigating necessary change, creative
destruction and innovative reorganization. “Stochastic events,” however, amidst serious
system vulnerability, can “overwhelm the sustaining properties of panarchies, destroying levels
and triggering destructive cascades” with potential to result in panarchical collapse.17
Thus, the complex modeling of Panarchy allows for the organization of a multi-scalar
entanglement of factors and the challenge of representing tipping points and triggering effects.
Exposure affecting land productivity, habitability and food/energy/water security, understood
by migration scholars as environmental drivers of human movement,18 can be woven into
bottom-up influential forces flowing from rural sites of impact to urban governing regimes.
Economic variables, such as employment opportunities, wages and prices as well as political
factors shaping equitable access to power, regime durability and trust in government
characterize levels of greed and grievance tension in the urban adaptive cycle. Dangerously
slowing and increasingly rigid “K” phases signify tipping points at which the likelihood of crossscale interactions producing “revolt” effects from below is greatly increased because, as Holling
notes, “the level is particularly vulnerable... Once triggered, the effect can cascade to still
higher, slower levels, particularly if those levels have also accumulated vulnerability and
rigidities.”19 Here, the language of Panarchy echoes and accommodates the literature of urban

16

Holling, “Understanding the Complexity…,” 397-398.
Holling, “Understanding the Complexity…,” 399.
18
Richard Black, et al., “The Effect of Environmental Change on Human Migration,” Global
Environmental Change 21S (2001): S5.
19
Holling, “Understanding the Complexity…,” 398.
17

104
studies and city fragility, with implications for national security and analysis balanced against
questions of conflict onset trends. Finally, national capacity to “remember” the historical
operating traditions of the overall system flows powerfully down through the cycles of
governance with statewide ability to influence resilience, adaptability and transformability
reminding lower levels of the “accumulated wisdom and experiences of maturity” in the highest
echelons, fostering status quo and stabilizing the adaptive cycle, lest the system should forget
and collapse.
With a theoretically appropriate, socio-ecological systems model as a guide to
understanding the dynamics at hand, this study was well equipped to begin operationalization
of its identified variables and testing of the hypothesis.

RESEARCH SAMPLE, OPERATIONALIZATION AND DATA ASSEMBLAGE
By targeting sub-Saharan Africa for analysis, this project offers the field of eco-politics a
peak into the future as this region is experiencing the effects of climate change most
immediately and intensely in relationship to the rest of the world. The sample used consisted
of forty-three sub-Saharan African countries, including Djibouti on account of its coinciding geopositioning, but excluding the sub-Saharan states of Cabo Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, São Tomé
and Príncipe, and Seychelles on account of the significant migratory differences associated with
the geography of small islands as well as the limited data available for them. (See Appendix A
for the complete list of included countries.) The time period covered by this study extends
from 2000 to 2015, resulting in the exclusion of South Sudan as its independence was only won
in July of 2011.
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The Dependent Variable: Urban Political Violence
Because this research question is ultimately concerned with rising insecurity in cities and
potential to trigger wider conflict onset, “urban political violence” was chosen as the dependent
variable for its capacity to quantify violence of a particular nature characterizing greed and
grievance/political dissatisfaction, social conditions associated with environmental vulnerability
and known to ignite civil unrest. To operationalize urban political violence, this study began by
replicating the geographic information systems (GIS) approach implemented by Raleigh’s
“Urban Violence Patterns Across African States,”20 using the Armed Conflict Location and Event
Data Project (ACLED) to obtain georeferenced political violence event data and spatially
identifying where these events fall into “urban” areas.21 As the United Nations argues the
definition of “urban” can vary geographically,22 this project also adopted Raleigh’s Africanoriented measure, by which “urban” is defined where 1,000 or more persons are located within
one square kilometer.23 Peer reviewed and fully documented gridded population raster maps
generated through the use of “census, survey, satellite, social media, cellphone and other
spatial datasets” by “World Pop” (formerly ‘AfriPop’) provided necessary density data for years
2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015.24 Linear interpolation was conducted to create rasters for the
intervening years, allowing for identification of political violence events within these urbandefined zones from 2000-2015.
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The ACLED definition of political violence is “the use of force by a group with a political
purpose or motivation,” and a “politically violent event” is defined as “a single altercation
where often force is used by one or more groups toward a political end.”25 This dataset has
recorded the dates, actors, types of violence, locations, and fatalities of all reported political
violence and protest events across Africa since 1997, deriving data from “a wide range of local,
regional and national sources.”26 Interested in marked shifts, at which point mere
dissatisfaction tips over into significant violence, this dissertation work on environmentally
related urbanization and violence potential limited inclusion of ACLED political violence events
to those involving at least one fatality. Using national urban population data27 and these
geospatially “urban” defined, fatal, political violence events, a country level variable summing
the number of “urban political violence events per million urban dwellers” was created for each
country-year.

The Independent Variables: REMEMBER and REVOLT
To operationalize the critical influential elements involved in environmentally related
urbanization and violence potential and to model their behaviors, this study began by
recognizing these independent variables as dynamically and categorically related to the two
influential pathways of “remember” and “revolt” and conceptually divided them accordingly.
Per Panarchy theoretical modeling, the REMEMBER grouping of variables quantifies the
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national level forces that are typically associated with creating environmental adaptability and
conditions of stability from above, flowing down into the municipal level of analysis. The
REVOLT group, on the other hand, quantifies disruptive internal factors of city fragility and
vulnerability as well as rural-to-urban human movement—a cross-scale interaction—impacting
municipal levels from below. All data is quantitatively descriptive at the country level unit of
analysis, which allows for valuable calculation of statistical interactions; however, substantively,
the REVOLT variables can be understood as having impact at the municipal level of analysis, an
aspect drawn upon in the mapping phase of quantitative analysis. Data selection and
quantification processes used for these REMEMBER and REVOLT influential variables follows:

REMEMBER Variables

• Environmental Adaptability/Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index28 (ND-GAIN):
Departing from other studies that focus solely upon singular aspects of environmental
exposure and do not account for agency, ingenuity and innovation, operationalization of
the environmental factor influencing migration and violence potential in this
dissertation focused upon environmental vulnerability and capacity utilizing the
comprehensive ND-GAIN composite adaptation index, which considers the six lifesupporting sectors of food, water, health, ecosystem service, human habitat and
infrastructure to determine vulnerability balanced against economic, governance and
social sector readiness to adapt. (See Figure 3.4.) As discussed in the previous chapter,
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the IPCC defines vulnerability as “the degree to which [systems] are susceptible to and
unable to cope with adverse impacts” caused by exposure, recognizing adaptation can
significantly mitigate vulnerability.29 “The ND-GAIN Country Index summarizes a
country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination
with its readiness to improve resilience.”30 Thus, in line with the IPCC, ND-GAIN focuses

Figure 3.4. ND-GAIN Composite Index Model.31

on overall environmental adaptability as a function of vulnerability and readiness, where
“readiness” is understood as the capacity to address and/or mitigate adverse
environmental impact. Using forty-five indicators to measure a country’s exposure,
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sensitivity and capacity to adapt to the negative effects of climate change, this approach
is more in line with arguments in the literature that promote complex “outcome
vulnerability” assessments, more accurately approximating qualitative human impact
than offered by raw climate exposure data.32

By using this ND-GAIN national level environmental adaptability measure, a holistic
representation of vulnerability and resilience characterizing each state was built into the
model, reflecting the degree to which upper levels of governance have the REMEMBER
capacity to reinforce stability across domains and scales. Therefore, the higher the
assessed measure of adaptability—where environmental vulnerability is better met with
resilience—the lower the expectations were of urban political violence. This
independent variable operationalization also captures the broad statewide impact,
characterizing environmental conditions across the country that might bring rural
individuals and families to choose relocation to the city, producing a bottom-up
influence within the Panarchy potentially disruptive to upper echelons.33
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• Population Density (DENS): Intuitively, the more people located in proximity to each
other, the more likely conflict between them is to arise, lending weight to expectations
of increased urban political violence in more dense locations. Panarchy theory also
supports this notion, explaining complex systems are compartmentalized by scales
generally defined by the breaks (discontinuities) in the distribution of key variables—in
this case, the distribution patterns of population.34 Within these scales, where selforganizing interactions and processes occur, “species assemblages”—to use ecological
terminology—are born of “experimentation,” producing a balanced distribution of
functional diversity in support of that discrete adaptive cycle.35 This dissertation
extends these panarchical dynamics to the social realm, recognizing “species
assemblages” as communal hierarchies of power that define socio-economic strata, i.e.,
distributions of “functional diversity.”

Therefore, as density increases, in particular through cross-scale disturbances to
patterns of human distribution, the process of “experimentation” to resolve and
reorganize novelties in the system, understood by naturalists as competition amongst
similarly sized species, translates to competition amongst similarly sized or empowered
groupings of people for functional roles. The denser the area, the more easily these
confrontations to system status quo occur. Annual rate of change of the percentage
urban, an independent variable previously discussed, and cultural fractionalization, an
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Allen, et al., “Panarchy: Theory and Application,” 3-4.
Allen, et al., “Panarchy: Theory and Application,” 4-5.
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independent variable quantifying group interaction to be discussed next, also share
influence contributing to these dynamics.

Data quantifying population density was obtained from the World Bank, defined as
“midyear population divided by land area in square kilometers… all residents regardless
of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not permanently settled in the
country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country
of origin. Land area is a country’s total area, excluding area under inland water bodies,
national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones.”36

• Diversity/Cultural Fractionalization (CFRAC): Undergirding concern for migrationinduced violence is the recognition that previously geographically distant groups will
come into contact with each other, threatening cultural tensions and/or group
competition as described in the above discussion. Defining or measuring such social
divides is complicated as numerous studies reveal (Alesina et. al., 2003; Fearon and
Laitin, 1999; Posner, 2004). Regarding ethnic groupings, Fearon (2003) argues it is
implicit in the idea that “members recognize the distinction and anticipate that
significant actions are or could be conditioned on it;” moreover, as conditions change,
shifting degrees of importance are placed upon these perceived differences.37
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The World Bank: Data, “Population Density (people per sq. km of land area) (Details),”
accessed https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST.
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Fearon, James D., “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” Journal of Economic Growth,
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Developing a by-country list using “radial categories” to form a “prototype ethnic
group,” Fearon consults a wide array of scholarly compilations, leaning heavily upon
Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999) to assess sub-Saharan Africa, and produces a global list of
822 ethnic groups larger than one percent of the national population in the 160
countries with over a half million people in 1990.38

To test to what extent the diversity of a country carries potential to disrupt functioning
social order, ethnic fractionalization, “defined as the probability that two individuals
selected at random from a country will be from different ethnic groups,” is most
commonly used; however, the structure of this fractionalization—highly fragmented,
bipolar, multipolar and balanced, dominant majority or dominant minority—is not
captured by this analysis.39 To account for this critical distinction, Fearon uses the
distance between tree branches of linguistic development to quantify group “cultural
resemblance,” creating a measure of “cultural fractionalization” based upon the
probability of two persons drawn at random from a country linguistically resembling
each other.40

Because this research is interested in potential cultural discord as formerly distant
groups may urbanize into contact with each other, Fearon’s improved measure of
cultural fractionalization was used to quantify this independent variable characterizing
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the diversity of a state. It was hypothesized that highly homogenous and highly
heterogeneous countries would experience less cultural conflict, but countries
exhibiting two to three similarly sized groupings would experience rivalrous behavior.
To account for this “inverse ‘U’” expected pattern, this variable was squared and
included in modeling to test for this relationship.

• Democracy (DEM): Two governance variables were used in this study, “Democracy” and
“Regime Durability,” both of which come from the Polity IV dataset.41 “Democracy” is
operationalized using “POLITY2,” a slightly revised version of the familiar “POLITY,” or
“Combined Polity Score” variable.42 The “Combined Polity Score” measure is computed
by subtracting the quantification of autocratic characteristics of a government (AUTOC)
from the quantification of its democratic characteristics (DEMOC), resulting in a scored
range representing a spectrum of governance with -10 being the extreme of autocratic
governance and +10 the extreme of fully institutionalized democracy.43 Polity2 simply
modifies assigned values for “foreign interruption,” “interregnum” and “transition” to
fall within the -10 to 10 score range for the purpose of facilitating use in time-series
analysis.44 This score was further manipulated, adding 10 to create positive values only
for this study’s “Democracy” independent variable.
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Center for Systemic Peace, “Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2018,” accessed
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
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The literature of ESS supports expectations of an “inverse ‘U’” behavior relating
democracy and environmental insecurity conditions aligned with the likelihood of
violence, substantively understood as reflective of national instability and weakened
governance during periods of democratic transition. As a result, the democracy variable
was also squared and included in modeling to test for non-linear behavior.

• Regime Durability (REGDUR): The second governance variable moves away from the
form of governance captured by the “Democracy” variable and focuses rather on the
question of governing stability as the key political feature shaping urban political
violence likelihood. Based on the Polity IV Dataset “DURABLE” variable, “Regime
Durability” provides a running measure of the longevity of the regime’s authority
pattern, calculated for each given year; that is, the number of years since the last
significant regime change, defined as a 3-point change in the POLITY score.45 “In
calculating the DURABLE value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is
established is coded as the baseline ‘year zero’ (value = 0) and each subsequent year
adds one to the value of the DURABLE variable consecutively until a new regime change
or transition period occurs.”46

Despite some relatedness between the “Democracy” and “Regime Durability” variable
origins, preliminary correlation analysis revealed a variance proportion between them of

45
46

Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, “Polity IV Project,” 17.
Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, “Polity IV Project,” 17.
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only 2.5%. The expectation for this variable’s relationship to urban political violence is
negative, arguing that the more durable a regime, the greater the REMEMBER capacity
to develop adaptive governance structures in response to environmental impact,
satisfying local populations and maintaining order.

• Violence History (VHIST): The “Violence History” variable, last in the REMEMBER
category of independent variables, operationalizes the proclivity of a nation to devolve
into conflict based upon its history of violence over the past twenty years. Thus, in this
case, the capacity of a country to “remember” is expected to correlate with increased
urban political violence.

Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO)
Armed Conflict Dataset,47 “Violence History” for a given year is calculated as the sum of
the previous twenty years of measured conflict intensity levels, where, in accordance
with UCDP/PRIO definitions, each identified conflict occurring that year is assigned a
“minor” conflict intensity value of “1” in cases of greater than or equal to 25 battle
deaths, or a “war” conflict intensity level of “2,” in cases of greater than or equal to
1,000 battle deaths.48 The UCDP definition of “armed conflict” is “a contested
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed
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force between two parties of which at least one is the government of a state, results in
at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.49 When conflicts occur between two
countries, the conflicts are counted for both, as both countries “remember” this history.
An example of this quantification is as follows: for the year 2000 in a given country, the
sum of all intensity levels for all conflicts from 1980 to 1999 are added up to produce
the final violence history measure. Therefore, if ten minor conflicts and three wars
occur during this twenty-year time period, the ten minor conflicts equate to 10 violence
intensity points, and the three wars equate to 6 violence history points, resulting in an
overall violence history measure of 16 points for the year 2000.

Control Variables

• Gross National Income per capita (GNI/c): Wealth has significant impact on a nation’s
capacity to adapt to environmental impact, as efforts to respond to change are typically
costly. The ND-GAIN program conveniently calculates adaptability both adjusted for
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) as well as unadjusted, allowing for the influence of
wealth to be observed separately from the other index factors. This research projected
opted for the GDP-unadjusted GAIN measure, not only to parse out the role played by
the wealth variable, but also to replace GDP with GNI, a measure more specific to the
wealth of the country’s citizens and businesses, vice GDP, which includes foreign
earnings that do not feed back into national capacity.
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GNI per capita (logged) is expected to correlate in opposition to urban political violence,
as governments are better equipped to launch adaptability strategies, and greater
individual wealth allows for improved personal/familial level management of
environmental impact, thus decreasing vulnerability. The World Bank Atlas method of
calculating GNI divided by midyear population is chosen to reduce the impact of
exchange rate fluctuations in cross-country comparison, where GNI is defined as “the
sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not
included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation
of employees and property income) from abroad.”50

• Population (POP): Also logged, population is used to control for country differences in
this regard. World Bank data last updated in November 2018 is used.51

REVOLT Variables

• Average Annual Rate of Change of the Percentage Urban52 (PERCENT URBAN): Central
to this research question is the idea that human movement is socially transformative
with potential to disrupt typical patterns of behavior. Expressed as a percent, the
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“Average Annual Rate of Change of the Percentage Urban” is defined as the “average
exponential rate of change of the percentage urban over a given period,” accounting
not only for rapidly accelerating human flows shifting into the cities and out of the rural
realms, but also urban increase.53 This measure was chosen to reflect the impact of a
shifting national demographic composition upon cities. The overall rural-urban
constitution of a country characterizes a range of social, political and economic
dynamics—e.g., tribal leadership, ethnic cleavages, human/social capital networks,
etc.—drastically transforming this composition and challenging state level capacity to
keep up with broad, sweeping multi-dimensional change with much of the effects
culminating in the urban centers.

The expectation going into the statistical analysis of this research was that “Average
Annual Rate of Change of the Percentage Urban” would correlate with urban political
violence, confirming this increasing rate of change not only degrades national stabilizing
REMEMBER influences but crucially disrupts urban systems and government ability to
satisfy growing urban population needs and concerns.

• Urban Growth (UGRO): Per the World Bank data source for this independent variable,
“Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical
offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the

53

United Nations Population Division: World Urbanization Prospects 2018, “Glossary of
Demographic Terms,”
https://population.un.org/wup/General/GlossaryDemographicTerms.aspx.

119
United Nations World Urbanization Prospects.”54 This factor correlates highly (.74) with
the “Average Annual Rate of Change of the Percentage Urban” variable, but focuses its
geographical scope to the municipal level of analysis, which is useful for isolating effects
specific to this realm. As projected for the “National Percentage Urban” factor, “Urban
Growth” was also expected to correlate with urban political violence based upon
destabilization potential due to 1) the added tension to system dynamics in the “K”
phase of oscillation posed by in-growth as well as 2) disturbance from lower levels
threatening an “Ω” (omega) moment as emergent urbanization patterns trigger
reorganization and renewal.

• Agricultural Dependence (AGDEP): National dependence upon agriculture as a primary
means of earned income contributes to the sensitivity a country may exhibit amidst
environmental exposure, in particular, in the rural regions where productivity is
dependent upon specific environmental conditions. Loss of agriculturally related
livelihood and perceived economic advantage in the cities was hypothesized as an
impetus for urbanization despite a lack of real economic growth in cities—with
projections of second order effects such as increased unemployment rates and
impoverishment complicating good municipal governance. Accordingly, expectations
were that agricultural dependence would correlate with urban political violence under
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conditions of environmental degradation as projected dynamics suggest disturbance to
urban system functionality.

To operationalize this independent variable, World Bank development indicator,
“Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP)” was chosen, defined as
agriculture corresponding to and including “forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as
cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector
after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs.”55

• Urban Water Access/“People using safely managed drinking water services, urban (%
of urban population)” (UWA): This World Development Indicator, defined as “the
percentage of people using drinking water from an improved source that is accessible
on premises, available when needed and free from faecal and priority chemical
contamination,” strongly characterizes the provision of public goods at the urban level
of governance.56 High correlation with World Bank data quantifying the percentage of
urban population living in slums (.74) justifies use of this independent variable as
something of a proxy, being that slum data for sub-Saharan Africa exhibits a high level of
“missingness” and cannot contribute well to regression analysis. Preliminary
expectations were that safely managed urban water services would correlate in
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opposition to urban political violence, as a lack of such public provision would be more
likely to stir political dissatisfaction and REVOLT. Initial statistical analysis revealed,
however, a non-linear relationship with the dependent variable, therefore, proper
specification of urban water access required inclusion of this variable squared to
account for this behavior.

• Unemployment (UNEMP): Again, sourced via the World Bank, this independent
REVOLT variable, tracked by the International Labour Organization, operationalizes the
influence of livelihood loss upon urban political violence.57 Although this data measures
the percentage of the total labor force unemployed, the impact of this hardship upon
social order is arguably felt most acutely in cities where dense populations are in closer
proximity as competition for employment occurs. Thus, as unemployment increases,
urban political violence was expected to increase.

• Connectivity (CONN): Finally, the capacity to organize is an important consideration
when assessing likelihood of political violence and unrest. For all the dissatisfaction a
population or group may possess, if communication is limited, organization into
revolutionary parties will be unlikely. Cell phone use provides the cheapest and easiest
means of communication in sub-Saharan Africa; therefore, this independent REVOLT
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factor, defined as “mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people),”58 offers
quantification of the connectivity necessary for organizing political protest and violent
urban demonstration. The greater the connectivity, the greater the ease of rebellious
organization and possible urban violence was expected.

DATA ANALYSIS METHOD
With REMEMBER and REVOLT dynamics of Environmentally Related Urbanization and
Violence Potential (EUV) operationalized and data assembled into a time-series cross-sectional
panel, data analysis was begun, executing three phases of investigation to interrogate the
causality dynamics of the model and test the hypothesis that environmental degradation and
vulnerability provide valuable explanation for sub-Saharan urbanization in the absence of
economic pull, resulting in destabilizing over-urbanization that intensifies political unrest and
urban violence.

Step One: EUV Regression Analysis
This initial quantitative phase implemented multiple regression analysis to determine
factor degrees of influence on “urban political violence.” Using “The R Project for Statistical
Computing” software, preliminary analysis called for a negative binomial approach, as the
dependent variable is operationalized based on count data, the distribution of which is over
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dispersed.59 “Z-scoring” was used to scale the independent variables, allowing for regression
results characterizing these dynamics from 2000-2015 to be more easily translated into
weighted map layers, to be constructed in the second methodological step.60 In all models run,
the “environmental adaptability” variable, GAIN, is revealed as exhibiting the greatest influence
while being highly statistically significant, with fellow REMEMBER variable, “population density”
consistently placing a somewhat distant second in the preferred negative binomial models.
REVOLT variables “national percent urban” and “urban growth” trade spaces with REMEMBER
variable “regime durability” at a tertiary range of influence, trailing in magnitude by only a small
margin, and all highly statistically significant. Greater in depth discussion of this quantitative
analysis follows in the fourth chapter.

Step Two: REMEMBER and REVOLT Weighted Mapping
Because these variables are recognized as dynamically related to the two influential
pathways of REMEMBER and REVOLT, conceptually understood as originating from above,
below and within the municipal level of governance, there is an important spatial quality to
these factors. The next step of this research, therefore, endeavored to map the effects of this
model using ArcGIS “overlays” representative of 2016 country data for each variable, weighted
in accordance with the magnitude of the EUV regression predictor coefficients.61 Weighted
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overlay analysis allows for the application of weights to several commonly scaled inputs and
combines them into a single raster, making it possible to create a geographical representation
of the total effect of the model organized into country level urban violence likelihood
classifications.62
Beginning with unscaled, integer data (per ArcGIS system requirements), 2016 map
layers in raster format for all linear variables were generated, then reclassified using “natural
breaks,” a.k.a, the “Jenks Method,” directing the division of the observations into 10 classes or
groupings. These breaks identify clusters of similar values and gaps that “maximize the
differences between classes.”63 Substantively, this natural breaking method is preferable,
grouping like countries together as opposed to classification by equal interval, which simply
orders the data, potentially grouping together more distinct countries at opposite margins of an
interval and assigning them the same new value. The weighting applied to these map layers as
they are consolidated into a singular visualization of the dynamics at hand was calculated based
on the percentage of influence each variable demonstrated according to the EUV regression
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coefficients.64 As these variables were scaled during the time series statistical analysis, the
coefficients are comparative. When assigning percentage of influence, therefore, all
coefficients are totaled, and the weight applied to each raster layer is equal to the variable
coefficient’s percentage of influence within that total. Within the REMEMBER map modeling,
all REMEMBER coefficients and controls are totaled, within the REVOLT map, REVOLT factor
coefficients are totaled, and controls are again included. The EUV map model includes all linear
variables and controls.
The first of these culminating rasters created was the REMEMBER map layer, a bycountry visualization of national level factors and urban violence potential, while a second, the
REVOLT map layer, reflects the overall urban characteristics within each country and likelihood
of violence. Finally, all factor layers were combined into one map to produce an overall
representation of the EUV model constructed on the basis of 2016 data. With these maps in
place, comparison to actual 2016 georeferenced urban political violence events offered an outof-sample validation of model robustness.

Step Three: Pick Up a Weapon?
The final phase of analysis takes a more qualitative approach, taking a closer look at
REMEMBER and REVOLT trends in governance, resources and human agency relative to
observed violence patterns in 2016 as well as projected urban violence potential according to
the EUV sixteen year time-series modelling. This step more fully contextualizes these
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panarchical forces culminating at the urban scale amidst conditions of environmental
degradation, organizes and structures new knowledge, and guides pathways forward for future
research.

METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
As this methodology chapter comes to a close, issues of trustworthiness, robustness and
limitations of this study deserve some discussion. First and foremost, this analysis was
conducted remotely and does not include a “boots on the ground” research experience. As a
result, the conclusions drawn are limited to broad data captures that may or may not include
some inherent flaws born of local, national and international collection capacities. A majority
of the data quantitatively analyzed is “country data,” even when descriptive of urban areas;
thus, modeling these factors with the aim of assessing municipal impact suggests a somewhat
fuzzy attempt to narrow analysis to sub-national levels. Moreover, the entanglement of these
factors is highly complex, and mathematical computations will not be fully able to disaggregate
overall impact as the timing and confluence of these forces also plays a significant role in
determining outcomes. Finally, theoretically keeping with migration scholarship, human
agency, particularly under conditions of insecurity and relative to questions of mobility and
violence, must be acknowledged as something of a wild card, perhaps impossible to
operationalize and factor into such remote study.
The budding fields of eco-politics and environmental security studies are still developing
with theoretical and methodological approaches still taking shape. This study, while limited to
some degree, offers a major starting point from which further analysis can be conducted.
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Borrowing from US Intelligence Community approaches to assessing areas of operation, this
project begins broadly at the national level, then adds layer by layer of finer grained detail to
develop an informed picture of the dynamics at play. Using a Panarchy framework, these
dynamics are given meaning and shape expectations while real world georeferenced event data
enable testing of this analytical architecture. Qualitative exploration of model successes and
identification of critical trends enhance understanding and offer nuance to quantitative
findings. Overall, determining at risk geographies and identifying key issues of concern, this
scholarly contribution guides future efforts, chipping away at the massive task of understanding
environmental change impacts to modern society and designing adaptive governance
structures to manage and mitigate this global transformation.
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CHAPTER IV
REMEMBER AND REVOLT
“Without geography, you’re nowhere.”
--Jimmy Buffet

It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words. The capacity to illustrate and assign
spatial meaning to multiple complex dynamics simultaneously is tremendously powerful as well
as insightful. The goal of this chapter is precisely that. After mathematically integrating the
multi-scalar forces identified as threatening urban stability under conditions of environmental
degradation and urbanization, the key determinants of this environmentally related
urbanization and violence potential time series regression model are geographically projected,
applying suggested variable influence to 2016 country data. The result, EUV 2016, is the
geostatistical generation of urban political violence likelihood classifications. This translation
enables a comparison of the EUV model’s REMEMBER and REVOLT influences, originating from
above, below and within the municipal level of governance. This modeling also allows for outof-sample validation of these predictions relative to geographically-referenced urban political
violence fatality events for the year 2016, a preview of which is offered in Figure 4.1.351 Results
endorse the plausibility of this temporospatial methodological approach, confirming the
statistical model’s strong predictive capacity, particularly when the influential pathways of
REMEMBER and REVOLT are combined into one comprehensive map model.
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Figure 4.1. EUV 2016 Projected Urban Political Violence Likelihood Classifications Versus
Observed 2016 Urban Political Violence Frequency Relative to Urban Population Size.

130
This chapter 1) reviews the statistical work aimed at investigating the panarchical
drivers of urban renewal and collapse in sub-Saharan Africa from 2000 to 2015; 2) discusses the
development and results of the environmentally related urbanization and violence potential
(EUV) regression model; and 3) presents the maps representative of REMEMBER and REVOLT
variable interaction, disaggregating the culminating effects of these panarchical forces to
expose above- and below-scale systemic sources of destabilization before 4) integrating these
predictive determinants and comparing them to observed urban political violence events of
2016.

DRIVERS OF RENEWAL AND COLLAPSE: EUV 2000-2015 TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
A brief description of statistical findings determined through preliminary analysis opens
this segment, followed by presentation of the refined EUV times series model, revealing the key
influential factors and discussing these noteworthy outcomes vis-à-vis a priori expectations. An
examination of the REMEMBER and REVOLT influences follows, highlighting the impact of
theoretically stabilizing REMEMBER forces flowing down from national to urban scales as well
as potentially destabilizing REVOLT forces threatening disruption from within and below scale.
The subsequent segment translates these statistical results into a weighted layer model for
geospatial analysis and assessment.

Estimations and Specifications
Descriptive statistical analysis of the dependent variable, urban political violence,
defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation, involving at least
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one fatality and geographically positioned where 1,000 or more persons are located within one
square kilometer, reveals a distribution pattern consistent with negative binomial regression
parameters. Four regression methods of estimation are implemented, verifying this conclusion,
shown in Table 4.1. The first is a pooling method, followed by implementation of fixed effects
modeling (between) to control for trend over time and allow for comparison country-tocountry. Preliminary analysis implementing Breusch-Pagan (BP) Lagrange Multiplier testing,
had revealed random effects in the pooling model and prompted a fixed effects approach,
followed by additional BP and Pesaran cross-sectional dependence testing, indicating
contemporaneous correlation in the fixed effects “within” modeling. Hausman testing and
“profile analysis by group” testing confirmed fixed effects “between” modeling as the preferred
generalized linear model; however, the resulting fit is very poor.
The third and fourth approaches, on the other hand, use maximum likelihood
estimation, acknowledging the count nature of the dependent variable.352 The Poisson model
includes a fixed effects “between” parameter, while two negative binomial estimations take
into account the over dispersed distribution of the dependent variable, characterized by a
variance of the sample significantly higher than the mean value. The resulting fit, reflected in
the adjusted R-squared values (~.60), is much improved, and these models are selected for
further analysis. A key revelation of this initial modeling is the curvilinear behavior of three
variables: urban water access (UWA), democracy (DEM) and cultural fractionalization (CFRAC).
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As a result, proper specification required the inclusion of the squares of these variables. In
regard to urban water access, the square of the variable is almost perfectly collinear with the

Table 4.1. EUV Statistical Regression Analysis.353

Independent variables are scaled via “z-scoring.”
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original as this variable represents a percentage value, and UWA appears less statistically
significant when both are included, as shown in Table 4.1. Left unsquared and included
singularly however, UWA is highly statistically significant, correlating positively with the
dependent variable, with almost no effect on the rest of the all-inclusive negative binomial
modeling. Thus, UWA significance is likely obscured by the collinearity of the variable when
properly specified. The signage of UWA and UWA-squared provides some substantive value, as
well, suggesting in the first three models that improved urban water access initially has a
negative effect on urban political violence, but the strength of this effect exponentially
diminishes as access to improved water sources increases. Interestingly, in the generalized
linear modeling, this oppositional signage becomes positive for both, demanding further
investigation in the qualitative stage of analysis to determine if this is a function of the high
collinearity between the UWA and UWA-squared variables or whether other factors are
influencing this dynamic.
The democracy variable and its squared variant, also highly collinear, do not appear to
be statistically significant even when modeled with a singular specification, suggesting a lack of
statistical significance. The directional behavior is inconsistent, failing to indicate the expected
inverse “U” pattern relationship between democracy and conflict typically found within the
literature. The specific nature of the violence variable—geographically restricted to urban
environments—may play a role in producing this less typical outcome. It may also be worth
noting that the generalized linear model estimations (Poisson and negative binomial) suggest
the likelihood of an ultimately negative relationship between democracy and fatal urban
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political violence. Further analysis, however, is required for developing a greater understanding
of this dynamic.
Finally, a priori expectations of cultural fractionalization again favored curvilinear
behavior in an inverse “U” pattern with respect to civil unrest, as a perfectly homogenous
society is associated with little violence while increasing diversity to a grouping of two or three
fairly balanced populations is generally recognized as the most problematic societal structure
followed by improving dynamics (violence reduction) as diversity and metropolitanism increase.
To the contrary, these mostly statistically significant regression results predominantly reveal
urban political violence initially decreasing as fractionalization increases with a tapering effect.
Further consideration and a careful revisit to the data confirm no state in sub-Saharan Africa is
perfectly homogenous, thus the starting data point is very likely a condition of the worst
possible scenario, two to three cultural groupings evenly empowered. From this point onward,
as diversity increases, the likelihood of violence declines, demonstrating agreement with the
literature.
Following review of these estimations and subsequent behavior of the variables, a
refined model of environmental urbanization and violence, eliminating the statistically
insignificant democracy and connectivity variables, is chosen as the focal point for the
remainder of quantitative analysis, shown in the sixth column of regressions in “Figure One.”
Re-designated “EUV” this model demonstrates an adjusted R-squared of .60 and offers the
soundest “chi-square goodness of fit” testing results.
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The EUV Model
The culmination of preliminary analysis concludes with the re-designation of “EUVRefined” as simply “EUV.” This model offers greatest statistical significance for the greatest
number of variables, lending strength to the mapping portion of quantitative analysis. To
control for trend over time, a “year” variable is included with significance revealed in 2005(.),
2006*, 2009*, 2010(.) and 2014* alongside controls for wealth and population size, both of
which are found to be positive and fairly statistically significant at a p-value of 0.10 or less. This
final product, born of literature review, data assembly and regression modeling, reveals five
REMEMBER and five REVOLT variables characterizing environmental dynamics, population
distribution, resources and governance:
FORCES OF REMEMBER

FORCES OF REVOLT

Adaptability (GAIN)

National Percent Urban Rate of Change

Density

Urban Growth Rate

Cultural Fractionalization

Unemployment

Regime Durability

Agricultural Dependence

Violence History

Urban Water Access

Environmental Vulnerability/Adaptability
Of all these factors, the Global Adaptation Index (GAIN) is the most influential by a
substantial margin and is highly significant. (See Figure 4.2 for GAIN time series average values
by country.) Unlike assessments that label environmental vulnerability simply in terms of
impoverishment and raw exposure values, this composite variable reflects the complexity at
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hand and the importance of integrating “climate vulnerability,” understood in terms of
exposure, sensitivity and capacity of life-supporting sectors, with “readiness” to address
environmental impact, derived of economic opportunity, governance and social structures, for
a fully contextualized measure of environmental adaptability. This quantitative phase of
research also strongly confirms the value of the Global Adaptation Index’s holistic approach
through preliminary testing of “climate vulnerability” values without the balancing metrics of
“readiness.” These calculations find, in contrast to the robust performance of the composite
GAIN adaptability variable (climate vulnerability + readiness), climate vulnerability alone
exhibits comparatively little influence and lacks statistical significance.1 This suggests, the
integration of “climate vulnerability” with “readiness” is crucial to the strength of the
adaptability variable, providing a more accurate reflection of the felt or experienced
environmental impact at local levels.
Interestingly, though intended to inform “strategic operational and reputational
decisions regarding supply chains, capital projects, policy changes and community
engagements,” the results of this study suggest the GAIN assessment tool may offer a wider
range of application.2 Arguably, this intended focus—with an eye on “favorable investment
conditions” and “the ease of doing business”3—critically contributes to the variable’s broader
capture of human factors and may shed light on important societal features more typically

1

Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, “Country Index.”
Chen, et al., “ND-GAIN: Country Index Technical Report…,” 2.
3
Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, “Methodology: Sectors,” https://gain.nd.edu/ourwork/country-index/methodology/sectors/.
2
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overlooked by security scholars. These characteristics, such as business culture, adherence to
legal norms, levels of education and innovation tendencies, help frame the influential

Figure 4.2. Global Adaptation Index (GAIN) Environmental Adaptability, 2000-2015.

possibilities of human agency within the dynamics of environmentally related urbanization and
violence potential. Overall, the standout performance of national adaptability relative to other
variables within the model emphasizes the importance of stabilizing REMEMBER influences,
flowing downward from the national to urban scale in the panarchical cycle of adaptation.
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Population Distribution
After the environmental adaptability composite variable, the three variables
characterizing population distribution dynamics in the EUV model, national percent urban,
density and urban growth, demonstrate the most influence. In accordance with the original
hypothesis, national percent urban, reflecting a countrywide shift from rural to urban, is
consistently the second most influential factor in EUV modeling, correlating positively with the
likelihood of urban political violence and confirming expectations that such demographic
disruption presents a destabilizing effect at the urban scale with potential for civil unrest.
Population density follows national percent urban in magnitude, also correlating positively with
the likelihood of urban violence and endorsing findings within the literature that observe
population pressure increasing political dissatisfaction and unrest within cities.4 Departing from
this pattern, urban growth annual rate of change, the least influential of the three, correlates
negatively with the dependent urban violence variable. Collectively, these results offer a
picture of human movement and ecological marginalization, supporting the application of
Panarchy theory to distribution patterns of human population and the argument that density
increase leading to cross-scale disturbances is likely to produce competition and challenge good
governance.
Recognizing the distinction between these urban change-related variables is very
important to understanding this interaction. To review, national percent urban rate of change

4

Raleigh and Urdal, “Climate Change, Environmental Degradation…,” 686-689.
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reflects the wider shifting population landscape, accounting for urban population increase as a
percentage of the total population and effectively revealing rural decrease. Urban growth rate

Figure 4.3. National Percent Urban and Urban Growth Annual Rates of Change, 2016.

of change, on the other hand, simply measures year-to-year urban increase regardless of
source. The maps in Figure 4.3, reveal these differences for 2016. Niger, for example,
demonstrates a percent urban rate of change of only 0.42%, but an urban growth rate of 4.12%,
meaning very little movement to cities is changing the rural-versus-urban landscape although
there is significant growth in the urban centers. By contrast, Namibia exhibits a relatively high
urban percent rate of change at 2.1% and a slightly lower urban growth rate at 4.08%,
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suggesting human movement to cities is a significant component of urbanization in this state.
Thus, urban growth functions somewhat akin to a control when included alongside the national
percent urban as a portion of the changing demographic composition from rural to urban
reflects the growth taking place within cities while another portion accounts for human
movement. As a result, when percent urban increases from twenty to twenty-five percent, for
example, that five percent increase reflects the loss in rural population as well as the sheer
increase in urban sectors. While urban growth accounts for this urban increase, it does not
measure the rural loss reflected by national urban percent. What remains, therefore, is largely
a function of migration.
As urban growth negatively correlates with a likelihood of urban political violence while
national percent urban correlates positively, the human mobility component of this
demographic change is exposed as a likely contributor toward urban political dissatisfaction and
civil unrest. (See condensed EUV model results below in Table 4.2.) This deduction poses a
subtle but key distinction in urbanization patterns as they relate to violence potential. In this
modeling, growth alone does not align with fatal civil unrest in cities, but likelihood of such
violence does rise alongside an increasing shift in rural-to-urban national demographics. A
likely explanation deserving further investigation at a qualitative level is that embedded second
order effects of this cross-scale movement often related to conflict onset, such as dismantled
social networks and norms, the loss of traditional mediation practices and reignited historical
rivalries, are triggered by this transformation of human geography.5 The resulting emphasis on

5

In reference to Ceclia Tacoli, “Crisis or Adaptation? Migration and Climate Change in a Context
of High Mobility,” Environment & Urbanization, Vol 21(2) (2009): 516-518.
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cross-scale disturbance suggested by this pairing of human distribution variables adds to and
further supports earlier postulated panarchical theories of human density as increasing
proclivity for cross-scale interactions and subsequent group competition that challenge urban
systematic adaptive capacity, especially under conditions of resource scarcity.

Table 4.2. EUV Model Results.
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Resources
The statistical behavior of the EUV resource-oriented variables, agricultural dependence
and unemployment, largely aligns with the suggested dynamics of the model’s population
distribution factors. As the agricultural dependence variable returns a positive, statistically
significant influence, initial expectations find validation in support of the argument that
agriculturally based economies, facing environmental degradation and ensuing livelihood loss in
rural realms, will likely experience increase in tension and violence potential in urban areas.
Although the agricultural dependence variable produces one of the comparatively lesser
impacts within the model, this outcome implies some environmentally related push to cities in
search of urban work and endorses the originally posed hypothesis that this push provides
partial explanation for sub-Saharan urbanization in the absence of real economic growth—it is
not prosperity in cities but rather rural decline creating an economic differential and fostering
perceptions of urban opportunity. Another possibility is that rural competition for resources
under conditions of increasing climate vulnerability where agricultural dependence is high may
stimulate group rivalries that are either dragged to city centers via human movement or incite
reflective urban antagonisms amongst these populations from afar.
The social complexities of this environmentally related, multi-scalar geographic
transformation alongside projected circumstances of competition for urban resources and
functional roles are likely to have a destabilizing effect, particularly when conditions of preexisting unemployment are being exacerbated. EUV modeling generally reveals
“unemployment” as a more influential and consistently significant variable than agricultural
dependence. This regression result confirms a priori expectations that the effects of this
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statewide measure would converge national sentiments of political dissatisfaction and civil
unrest at the urban scale in line with both environmental security studies and urban violence
literature. Similarly, what is interesting about the EUV model is that the overall statistical
performance of these country-level forces culminates in a picture of environmentally related
dynamics that intensify pressure at the urban scale. The already-discussed curvilinear urban
water access resource variable, presenting an exponentially declining negative influence and/or
an overall positive influence on urban political violence, endorses this image of a resource draw
to cities aligning with increased tension. While environmental impact is merely one of
numerous influences contributing to the problem of unemployment, anticipated intensification
of environmental degradation suggests livelihood loss is likely to escalate, funneling increased
pressure to the urban scale and giving further rise to communal grievance.

Governance
The capacity to address social grievance through provision of public goods is vital to
good governance and social stability. As discussed earlier, EUV modeling reveals democracy,
either specified alone or with the inclusion of this variable squared, lacks statistical significance
and directional consistency, requiring a qualitative approach for further exploration of this
relationship with urban violence. Regime durability, on the other hand, proves to be a more
useful quantitative predictor, assessing the role of stable governance in limiting the likelihood
of urban political violence. In fact, regime durability is revealed as one of the most influential
and statistically significant factors in the EUV model. Figure 4.4 portrays a geographical
comparison of 2016 democracy and regime durability measures with little to no alignment.
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This finding suggests, at a minimum, that the longevity of a regime’s authority pattern,
i.e., stability of governance, is more likely to influence urban political violence than the degree
of democracy characterizing the government. This outcome may reflect the likelihood of
autocratic suppression of political demonstration, which not only reduces political violence
potential but also silences challenges/challengers to dictatorial leadership—thus, its longevity.
This finding may also point to the challenge faced by democratic governments, seeking to invest
in long-term aims of developing environmental capacity but finding little popular support

Figure 4.4. A Comparison of Democracy and Regime Durability, by Country, 2016.
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relative to immediate needs/wants of the population. Nevertheless, regime durability shifts the
traditional focus away from assessments of the democratization process and turns attention to
national political stability, which may serve a valuable purpose in identifying likely conflict onset
related to the EUV model, but should be embraced with a careful awareness of the variable’s
failure to capture other shortfalls of governance.
Finally, violence history demonstrates some statistically significant effect upon
governing capacity to maintain order as well. Although the least influential and offering the
least significance of the linear variables, the historical tendency of a nation to resort to armed
violence correlates positively with the likelihood of urban political violence, suggesting a
cultural acceptance or habitual practice might shape potential for urban devolution toward
unrest and possible conflict onset.

REMEMBER, REVOLT or All of the Above?
Because the statistical approach implemented in the EUV model uses a negative
binomial estimation, the variable coefficients relate to the log count of the dependent variable,
urban political violence. The main purpose for determining variable influence, however, is to
generate a geospatial representation of these dynamics based upon the comparative influence
the factors exert within the model. Scaling these variables allows for direct comparison of their
coefficient impact. Therefore, these values translate to the proper weighting to be used in the
spatial modeling, enabling a georeferenced assessment. Thus, the magnitude of REMEMBER
variable influence upon the model in absolute terms amounts to the sum total of adaptability,
density, regime durability and violence history. The non-linear behavior of the democracy and
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cultural fractionalization variables prevents the inclusion of these factors in this stage of
analysis. The magnitude of REVOLT variable influence—again totaling absolute values—is the
sum total of national percent urban, urban growth, unemployment and agricultural
dependence. Control variables, the log of GNI per capita and the log of population are also
factored into the overall total magnitude of the model coefficients. Therefore, based upon the
statistical regression results presented in this chapter, REMEMBER forces equate to about 51%
of the EUV model influence while REVOLT forces amount to roughly 41%. Drawing upon these
determinations of the 2000-2015 time series regression, the next segment presents the second
phase of quantitative examination, implementing a weighted overlay approach to distribute
REMEMBER and REVOLT influences spatially on the basis of 2016 country data. This
geostatistical step allows for an out-of-sample validation of EUV projections using
georeferenced, observed 2016 urban political violence data to scrutinize the model’s capacity.

EUV MAPPING: REMEMBER AND REVOLT, 2016
As described in detail in the methodology chapter, the EUV 2016 weighted overlay
analysis applies “weights,” or percentages of influence, to raster map layers representative of
2016 country data and combines these weighted variable layers into a single map.6 Because
rasters are reclassified to a common scale and oriented in terms of increase/decrease according
to the time series statistically determined factor directionality, the resulting overlay image
projects a unified, increasing scale of likelihood for urban political violence potential divided
into threat classes. Figure 4.5 reveals three primary geostatistical projections. REMEMBER

6

ArcGIS for Desktop, “An Overview of the Overlay Tools.”
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2016 depicts the degree to which state level factors drive environmentally related urbanization
dynamics that challenge national adaptability and “good” urban governance. REVOLT 2016, on
the other hand, projects urban political violence likelihood based upon disruptive conditions
from below and within the urban scale. Finally, a comparative panel that includes integrated
EUV modeling and observed 2016 sites of urban political violence, reveals the EUV 2016 overlay
as highly predictive and more accurate than a singular level of analysis approach. This segment
will briefly discuss main takeaways from the disaggregated mapping, in particular as they relate
to overall key findings, and then focus upon model agreement with the 2016 georeferenced
ACELD data.
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Figure 4.5. Disaggregated REMEMBER and REVOLT Forces of the EUV Model.7

7

Calculations for Sudan are based on Sudan data through 2011, then break off South Sudan
following independence. Missing data for South Sudan hinders capacity to assess this state on
its own.
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Notably, the REMEMBER and REVOLT models produce six and five threat classes,
respectively, indicating there is greater variation in sub-Saharan state level urban political
violence factors than in the sub-national. Interestingly, integrating these forces into the EUV
2016 model, results in only four classes—least likely, less likely, more likely and most likely—
pointing to REMEMBER/REVOLT imbalances that even out in overall panarchical assessment of
urban (political) violence likelihood, heretofore simply described as “urban violence.” (See
Appendix D for a by-country breakdown of REMEMBER and REVOLT assessments, urban
violence relative to urban population size and urban event lethality.) A marked difference in
the spatial distribution of 2016 REMEMBER and REVOLT estimations particularly characterizes
the southern and central geographies of the continent. This disparity calls attention to
problematic sub-national tendencies at urban scale that are less easily observed in the more
developed, strong southern states. While national capacity seems to manage these forces in
most cases, South Africa stands out as a highly developed African country struggling with a
moderate degree of urban violence. Assessment imbalances in the central region, on the other
hand, reflect especially weak national capacities vis-à-vis the model-identified drivers of urban
unrest, suggesting the substantial urban violence in these states (e.g., Uganda, the DRC and
Burundi) is likely spillover violence born of countrywide conflict. With the exception of Niger,
states along the edge of the Sahel and Western Africa demonstrate fairly balanced
national/sub-national forces of urban violence likelihood.
The dark red dots added to the maps in the lower panel of Figure 4.5 and more easily
viewed in Figure 4.6, represent the ACLED-based georeferenced event locations where at least
one urban political violence event involving at least one fatality occurred in 2016, per the
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methodology outlined in the third chapter. This panel, therefore, reveals how geographically
widespread urban violence is in each country juxtaposed to 2016 scalar projections. Multiple
events should be understood as happening at many of these sites, however, as 1,286 urban
fatality georeferenced events are recorded in the 2016 EUV analysis. Turquoise circles situated
at center on each country are therefore added in Figure 4.6 to reflect the national measure of
observed 2016 urban political violence events per million urban dwellers—the dependent
variable of the original EUV statistical regression analysis. This proportional feature depicts
these events as quantified relative to national urban population size, thus enabling a better
state-to-state comparison and, by drawing attention to urban trouble zones, enhancing this
visual test of the weighted overlay model’s validity. Implementing this relative measure to
assess the geospatial modeling results, alignment between ACLED-based observed 2016 urban
violence and EUV 2016 predicted urban violence visually demonstrates fairly strong agreement.
More importantly, quantitative analysis summarized in Table 4.3 reveals the average
value of observed 2016 urban violence relative to urban population size aligns with the model’s
geostatistically derived threat projections, increasing as predicted likelihood of urban violence
increases. The range of observed urban violence values for each class, however, expands as
violence likelihood projections intensify, indicating increasing model fuzziness as violence
proclivity increases. Delving deeper into the country data, investigating the average number of
urban fatalities involved per urban political violence event, 2016 observations again trend with
EUV predicted urban violence likelihood. This measure of urban violence sheds light on the
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Figure 4.6. EUV 2016 with Urban Political Violence Fatality Event Sites. 8

8

Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed
Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research 47(5) (2010): 651-660.
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Table 4.3. EUV Map Predicted Likelihood and ACLED-Based Violence Data.9 10
EUV-BEST
PREDICTED
LIKELIHOOD
CLASS
LEAST (5)

CLASS AVERAGE
Urban Political Violence
Events/million urban
dwellers
0.85

CLASS RANGE
Urban Political Violence
Events/million urban
dwellers
0 – 2.49

CLASS AVERAGE
Urban Fatalities/
urban violence
event (lethality)
1.03

LESS (17)

0.92

0 – 3.40

2.59

MORE (14)

1.70

0 – 5.73

2.86

MOST (5)

33.90

3.53 – 116.07

4.43

lethality characterizing these events while this trend suggests increased lethality often
accompanies more frequent violence and bears further investigation.
Although EUV 2016 map modeling is restricted to the assessment of one year, thereby
providing a temporal snapshot of dynamics projected by the statistical results of a sixteen-year
study, the agreement between the ArcGIS generated EUV 2016 violence potential classes and
observed georeferenced ACLED urban political violence data confirms overall model validity.
This coherency lends further credit to the robustness of EUV time series statistical analysis. A
more qualitative evaluation of the relationship between model projections and observed 2016
data, however, points to areas ripe for learning and worthy of further investigation.

9

Raleigh, et al., “Introducing ACLED…” 651-660.
Not included in mapping model are Eritrea and Somali. Somalia 2016 urban fatalities account
for ~36% of all sub-Saharan 2016 urban fatalities. Eritrea, on the other hand, accounts for 0.2%.
10
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CHAPTER V
PICK UP A WEAPON?
“There can be no peace without understanding.”
--Senegalese Proverb

Two major observations emerge from analysis of the EUV geostatistical model
projections and the ACLED reported georeferenced 2016 urban violence data identifying trends
in governance, resources and human agency that shape (in)capacity for adaptation and
influence likelihood of destabilization. The first reveals unexpected patterns of democracy visà-vis the map model’s geostatistically derived urban violence likelihood classifications,
suggesting a potential dark side to strong national level capacity associated with the
“stabilizing” forces of REMEMBER and the vulnerability of young democracies amidst EUV
conditions at the urban scale. The second trend, related to the often disruptive sub-national
REVOLT factors, recognizes the interplay of sub-Saharan African livelihood-mobilityvulnerability dynamics, bringing to light two key typologies that reduce the likelihood of
environmentally related urbanization and frame expectations of adaptive movement and
environmental vulnerability. These observations expand on the quantitative statistical and
geospatial modeling of this research, contextualizing the panarchical EUV forces culminating at
the urban scale and identifying key trends that serve to organize and structure future analysis.
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THE POTENTIAL DARK SIDE OF REMEMBER AND VULNERABILITY OF DEMOCRACY
The regime durability variable and measures of “preponderant” urban violence highlight
interesting patterns of governance contextualizing urban violence under conditions of
environmentally related urbanization. In spite of the fact that the democracy variable achieves
no statistical significance in regression modeling, as shown in the previous chapter, and is
therefore excluded from the weighted layer map modeling, noteworthy trends emerge
characterizing the polity of these sub-Saharan states once organized into their 2016 urban
violence threat classes with striking implications for municipal level stability.
Overall, they suggest high regime stability resulting in less lethal and less frequent urban
violence is often accompanied by autocratic governance although examples of highly stable,
institutionalized democracies with low levels of urban violence are to be found as well.
Institutionalized or “strong” but younger democracies, where regime longevity is less than
fifteen years, demonstrate greater model likelihood of experiencing urban violence, confirmed
by generally higher levels of observed urban violence lethality and frequency. Finally,
uninstitutionalized or “weak” democracies consistently demonstrate a preponderance of
political violence situated at the urban scale relative to total countrywide measures of violence.
Broadly, these findings indicate REMEMBER variable regime stability plays a significant role in
securing urban centers but often comes at the price of democracy while transition to, as well as
the maintenance of stable, institutionalized democratic governance intensifies vulnerability,
particularly in urban realms.
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The Struggle for Stability and Security
As observed by the Center for Systemic Peace, “Societal conflict and factionalism often
undermine democratic experiments: some regimes may be unable to fully institutionalize
reforms due to serious disagreements among social groups or key political elites; some may
harden their institutions in response to political crises or due to the personal ambitions of
opportunistic leaders; and others may simply lose control of the political dynamics that enable,
or disable, effective governance.”1 In the sub-Saharan struggle for stability and security, these
dynamics are easily recognized. As mentioned, the class of states assessed as least and less
likely to experience urban violence seem to benefit from the stability of high regime
durability—defined here as fifteen years or more without a three point polity change—but this
longevity more often than not aligns with oppressive governance, suggesting a potential dark
side to these REMEMBER forces and demanding a closer look. (See Figure 5.1.)
With the exceptions of Malawi and Ghana, all countries demonstrating high regime
durability are assessed as least and less likely to experience urban violence. Critically, these
same states also reflect well institutionalized governance but are sharply divided by polity.
Nine states in these urban threat classes—Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Mauritania, Swaziland
(Eswatini), Togo, Angola, The Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and The Gambia—lean heavily
autocratic, with democracy variable scores ranging from five to eight, while six— Botswana,
Namibia, Senegal, Zambia, Benin and South Africa—are considered “strong” democracies,

1

Monty Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, “Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State
Fragility,” Center for Systemic Peace (July 2014): 22,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/GlobalReport2014.pdf.
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Figure 5.1. Sub-Saharan Polity Characteristics and Regime Durability, 2016.

scoring sixteen polity points or more.2 As these “least and less likely” states have been shown
to experience generally less frequent and less lethal urban violence, this polarized pattern of
well institutionalized governance endorses oft held perceptions of these ideal types as
“comparably stable and effective in maintaining social order.”3 Supporting such a view, for

2

EUV democracy scores are on a scale of 0-20, based on the Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity
IV’s “Polity2” score plus 10, as described in the methodology chapter,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. Thus, polity scores from 0-5 are considered
fully institutionalized autocracies, from 6-10 are autocratic leaning or weak autocratic
anocracies, from 11-15 weak or uninstitutionalized democracies, and from 16-20 strong
democracies.
3
Marshall and Cole, “Global Report 2014…,” 20,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/GlobalReport2014.pdf.
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example, Botswana, a strong democracy with a regime longevity of fifty years, and Swaziland
(Eswatini), a strong autocracy (absolute monarchy) with a regime longevity of forty-three years,
both experience zero urban violence events in 2016. In fact, with the exception of a singular
urban political violence fatality in Botswana in 2008, these stable states are recorded as
experiencing no urban (political) violence for the entire sixteen year time series study. Experts
caution, however, that “in real terms” these ideal types of strong governance rarely translate to
such straightforward conclusions.4 As revealed/confirmed by the framework of this analysis,
stability and civility at urban scale involves a blend of high regime longevity as well as
democratic polity of governance and strong institutionalization of governing structures.
First of all, challenging notions that disregard the value of democratic polity, “solid”
democracies—well institutionalized governments with high regime durability—experience, on
average, not only a slightly lower observed frequency of urban violence (~0.5 events) than the
“solidly” autocratic states (~0.8 events) but also fewer fatalities per urban violence event, just
under one fatality per event versus approximately two and a half.5 This finding suggests that all
things being equal in terms of regime durability, strong democratic polity generally lessens
urban violence frequency and reduces event lethality.
Secondly, equally well institutionalized or “strong” democracies that lack high regime
durability are shown to experience considerably higher levels of urban violence frequency than
democracies with fifteen years or more longevity. These nine younger but “strong”

4

Marshall and Cole, “Global Report 2014…,” 20,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/GlobalReport2014.pdf.
5
“Solid democracies” include high regime durability states, Malawi and Ghana of the EUV 2016
class more likely to experience urban violence event frequency, while “solid autocracies”
excludes autocratic leaning Mauritania of the “less likely” class due to lower regime durability.
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democracies—Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Kenya,
Nigeria and Central African Republic—average a little over four urban violence events in 2016, a
sizeable jump, indicating democratic polity is less impactful in the absence of government
longevity at a threshold of fifteen years.6 All falling into the more and most likely classes of
urban violence potential, these younger but well institutionalized democracies do, however,
prove significantly less violent than the similarly young but autocratic states, which average
over twenty-eight urban violence events for the year—Uganda, the DRC, Sudan, Ethiopia and
Burundi. Even without Burundi’s outlying total of just over 116 urban violence events per
million urban dwellers, the remaining young autocracies average a little over six and a half
events relative to their urban population sizes in 2016. Therefore, amidst conditions of
environmental vulnerability and escalating urbanization, when regime durability is lower,
“strong” democracies, on the whole, are shown to demonstrate greater stability and security at
the urban scale.
Derived of this analysis, a major contribution of this EUV 2016 geostatistical analysis is
the identification of this fifteen year threshold of regime durability as a key marker of
institutional consolidation at which point urban violence event frequency and lethality
substantially decrease. An unexpected product of the weighted overlay mapping, this
threshold aligns with EUV 2016 model likelihood demarcation between the less likely and more
likely classifications, partitioning the sample where the influence of well institutionalized or

6

Freedom House, “Freedom in the World,” https://freedomhouse.org/country/central-africanrepublic/freedom-world/2018. (CAR is assessed with a 6-point Polity IV Polity2 increase in 2016,
which lasts through the most recent assessment (2018). Freedom House, however, describes
the state as “not free” and assesses governance as a 10/100 in 2017 and 2020. Without the
CAR, young but strong democracies in sub-Saharan Africa average ~1.5 events in 2016.
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“strong” democratic polity fails to compensate for regime longevity. Moreover, well
institutionalized or “strong” autocracies falling below this threshold demonstrate some of the
highest levels of urban violence frequency and lethality in the sample. This finding diminishes
arguments in support of authoritarian regime empowerment for the sake of maintaining social
order—the probability of regime overthrow may appear low, but the consequences of
autocratic regime disruption carry a high likelihood of grave impact. As a result, justification of
such extreme national level regime empowerment finds little merit. Rather, attention turns to
the less easily detected violence of human insecurity and political oppression. This suggested
threshold offers a valuable assessment tool in the analysis of environmental impact and
urbanization and should be further examined.

The Vulnerability of Democracy and Preponderant Urban Violence
EUV 2016 projects all nine younger, but well institutionalized democracies in subSaharan Africa as more likely or most likely to experience urban violence. Seven of these nine
fall into the more likely class, where geostatistical modeling results in a noteworthy
convergence of high levels of democracy, averaging fifteen polity points on the twenty point
scale. By comparison, the other EUV 2016 classes are only sporadically populated by “strong”
democracies, the least likely, less likely and most likely classes each averaging between eleven
and eleven and a half polity points. Only Uganda and the DRC (both low regime durability)
exhibit autocratic leaning scores in this predominantly younger, democratic leaning more likely
class of fourteen, while Malawi and Ghana stand out as highly durable, and the remaining two
states, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, are exceptional for being “weak” or uninstitutionalized
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democracies. As noted previously, this more likely class on the whole also demonstrates a
significant uptick in observed urban violence, evidenced not only by greater individual state
event frequency and lethality but also by a comparably larger majority of states in the class
experiencing urban violence events. This behavior, observed here at the urban scale, falls in
line with expectations of young and weak democracies found in the literature, which contend
that democracy is “difficult to initiate and nearly impossible to sustain in poor countries”
especially in the wake of post-independence patterns of “personalistic” and often “dynastic”
leadership.7 Furthermore, this robust alignment with EUV model projections suggests young
democracies are particularly at risk under conditions framing environmental vulnerability and
rapid urbanization.
Of particular note are these sub-Saharan cases of uninstitutionalized or “weak”
democracy, also described as democratic anocracies, governments caught in a middling ground
of institutional development. Per 2016 ACLED reporting, these young, poorly institutionalized
quasi-democracies stand out for consistently demonstrating “preponderant” urban violence,
defined here as a supermajority greater than fifty-five percent of total political violence.8 (See
Figure 5.2.) As these six states are otherwise relatively stable with fewer than twenty violence
events total in the year, this preponderance of urban violence in the weak democracies of sub-
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Saharan Africa—Gabon (75% urban), Guinea (67%), Côte d’Ivoire (56%), Chad (64%), Tanzania
(58%) and Zimbabwe (100%)—distinguishes this behavior from wider patterns of national

Figure 5.2. Urban Versus Total Political Violence Events, 2016.9

violence, contributing to the more specific goal of this study, the investigation of urban conflict
onset. (See Appendix E Violence Summary for event totals, urban percentages of total violence
and urban violence frequency relative to urban population size figures by country.)

9
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Understandably, multiple sources of violence exist and may coincide, and conflicts of urban
origin may have already expanded to national scale prior to this data capture, but these
examples direct scholarly attention to this violence as it appears to be emerging in cities. The
fact that only Djibouti, a small state with a heavy presence of US military forces, escapes this
young, weak democracy trend of preponderant urban violence highlights the value of
identifying and assessing this highly consistent pattern relative to the dynamics of
environmentally related urbanization and violence potential.
Overall, weak democracies exhibit struggle with adaptive governance, challenging
flexibility and resilience amidst conditions sensitive to mounting greed and grievance. Group
competition, meant to find resolution within democratic structures, is rather met with “a mix of
democratic and autocratic features;” for example, freely elected legislatures possess little-to-no
control over powerful heads of state, or superficial political competition marred by repressive
practices diminishes or excludes certain groups.10 As evidenced by ACLED reporting, while
Islamic militancy and terror attacks do contribute toward some of the 2016 urban violence in
these weak democracies, even more so, their records reflect the challenges born of inadequate
institutionalization and illiberal democracy: elections violence, heightened political
dissatisfaction with mismanagement and corruption, civil rights abuses, political repression,
chieftaincy and party rivalries, police violence against civilians and vigilantism.11 As
municipalities physically house the institutions of governance, political protest and
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demonstration naturally coalesce in these urban realms. 2016 fatal urban violence events in
these states also include farmer-pastoralist clashes and livestock theft.

Quasi Democracy in Tanzania
With the fourth fastest national percent urban rate of change and the third fastest
urban growth rate in 2016 sub-Saharan Africa, Tanzania offers a poignant case of a young, weak
democracy facing massive demographic transformation in addition to substantial
environmental impact.12 13 Environmental degradation in Tanzania jeopardizes rural livelihoods
with increasing aridity and heat waves14 while simultaneously threatening the unplanned
settlements of the urban coast with intensifying floods and erosion.15 Although average in
terms of environmental adaptability relative to other sub-Saharan states, this struggling
democracy is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world and has demonstrated a
dangerous decline in assessed environmental capacity or “readiness” since 2006—largely the
result of governmental woes characterized specifically by a major plummet in regulatory quality
and wavering adherence to the rule of law since the regime change brought about with the
election of President John Magufuli in 2015.16 In contrast with initially optimistic expectations,
Tanzania’s increasingly illiberal governance is damaging national economic capacity,
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undermining “the ease of doing business” and subsequently threatening foreign direct
investment and private sector development.17
With the majority of Tanzania’s poor living in rural realms, eighty percent of which rely
on natural resources for livelihood, a key challenge is the implementation of sustainable
resource management policies as poor agrarians are often forced into unsustainable
overexploitation to survive; USAID observes, however, “weak institutional capacity at central
and local levels” hampers such development of sound policies capable of addressing this
desperate situation.18 As the state owns all land, controlling use through lease to individuals
and private companies, presidentially appointed regional and district commissioners possess
significant political and economic power in the exercise of their administrative authority,
increasingly observed as “especially repressive when overseeing opposition-oriented areas,” to
include seeking removal of elected municipal leaders and obstructing the activities of critical
NGO’s and human rights advocates.19 In the case of Maasai pastoralists in northern Tanzania,
for example, traditional pasture land, reclassified in the Land Act of 1999 as “unoccupied or
unused,” has been offered up for private large-scale commercial farming and foreign corporate
use.20 This significant reduction in access to land alongside the environmental impact of
intermittent drought periods and El Niño-related flooding eroding the soil, has forced atypical
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rural mobility as well as temporary and permanent migration to urban centers in search of
livelihood diversification, particularly for young men.21 Upon arrival to cities, however,
adaptation strategies are often restricted to work as watchmen or hairdressing with many rural
migrants unaware of contract and employment laws designed to protect laborers.22
While these younger, weak democracies characteristically marked with preponderant
urban violence fall into no specific urban violence potential classification per EUV modeling, for
the most part, they all demonstrate lower levels of total violence. These particularly urban
spikes of violent behavior therefore highlight problematic conditions keen to produce acute
vulnerability at the municipal scale even in relatively stable countries. As a result, in
conjunction with EUV dynamics of increased urban violence likelihood, these poorly
institutionalized democracies and democratizing states should recognize a culmination of
destabilizing forces putting urban sites at risk.
All in all, the REMEMBER trends revealed by this segment call attention to unifying state
level characteristics of these countries (both specified and potentially omitted) that shed
greater light on urban vulnerability, revealing key markers and tipping points at which these
characteristics become more or less problematic. States marked by strong institutions,
preferably democratic in polity, are less vulnerable to urban violence; however, a fifteen year
threshold of consolidation is key to ensuring less likelihood of destabilization regardless of
polity. Finally, unconsolidated quasi democracies—although less violent on the whole—are
more likely to experience violence emerging in urban centers. Despite democracy’s exclusion
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from the EUV 2016 spatial model, this finer grained analysis reveals a clear relationship
between polity and urban violence, albeit non-linear and complex. Further qualitative research
is required to parse out these influences and more specifically determine their relationships to
urban tensions in a context of environmental impact.

LIVELIHOOD-MOBILITY-VULNERABILITY: WHO MOVES, WHO STAYS, WHO ADAPTS?
Recalling the structuration that shapes environmental vulnerability and influences
human agency along the pathways of adaptative response, the second major observation of
this research project identifies two noteworthy national profiles or “typologies” that generally
reduce urbanization intensity, confirming migration scholarship and countering monolithic
expectations of movement. As an array of capacities and difficult choices characterize
circumstances under conditions of resource degradation, a range of outcomes are possible: 1)
thrive in place due to high resiliency and/or capacity to adapt; 2) demonstrate capacity to adapt
through human movement; and finally, 3) struggle to thrive in place, lacking resiliency and/or
the capacity to adapt.23 Broadly, the “Resource Endowed (RE)” group typifies the capacity to
thrive in place, thanks to non-agrarian livelihood opportunities found in natural resource rents
and related service sector employment. The “Resource Sensitive (RS)” group, on the other
hand, exhibits high agricultural dependence and subsequently high sensitivity to environmental
exposure against the backdrop of low income/capacity, demonstrating in situ struggle.
As evidenced by 2016 political violence data, these typologies emphasize the critical
value of diverse natural resources, which align strongly with lower levels of urban violence and

23

Brklacich, et al., “Human Security, Vulnerability, and Global Environmental Change…,” 36-37.

168
(more generally) national violence. These country profiles also inform qualitative expectations
of environmental insecurity, directing attention to less visible zones of increased potential for
environmentally related human insecurity. As experts observe, “Most parts of the world
already experience some forms of environmental migration. Yet, environmental change may
also be associated with decreased migration: one of the greatest challenges will in fact be the
inability of the most vulnerable people to migrate.”24
As both the Resource Endowed group and the Resource Sensitive demonstrate
significantly lower levels of municipal scale violence in 2016 than the more rapidly urbanizing
states of sub-Saharan Africa, examination of this nexus may serve to inform development of
national resilience strategies. Conversely, in light of the risk of environmentally related human
insecurity in the states where conditions limit mobility, this exploration opens up to the value
of adaptative movement when necessary. To unpackage these dynamics, this segment outlines
these sedentary inclined typologies, balances these states against the observed violence events
of 2016, and discusses the environmental security implications that flow out of these influential
sub-national REVOLT factors.

Endowments and Sensitivities
The distinction between agriculturally dependent countries, in which a sizable portion of
GDP is derived of agriculture, and those less dependent upon agriculture brings to the fore a
powerful relationship at the intersection of resources, livelihood and urbanization potential
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under conditions of environmental impact, highlighting the role of natural resource
endowments and/or sensitivities in urban stability as well as overall national environmental
resiliency. While a “livelihood” is defined as comprising “the capabilities, assets (stores,
resources, claims and access) and activities required for a means of living,” a sustainable
livelihood reflects the capacity to “cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or
enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the
next generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global
levels and in the short and long term.’’25 Livelihood sustainability therefore factors critically
into assessments of environmental vulnerability and expectations of adaptive capacity. The
REVOLT 2016 weighted layer (echoed by EUV 2016) points to two particular blends of EUV
variable dynamics related to livelihood sustainability, household vulnerability and the likelihood
of adaptive mobility with strong implications for urban violence potential amidst conditions of
environmental degradation.
The first, recognizing resource sensitivity, follows the general pattern demonstrated by
Niger, unexpectedly projected as the least likely sub-Saharan state to experience urban violence
by REVOLT 2016. Although Niger’s relatively high 3.4 urban violence events per million urban
dwellers in 2016 challenge the model’s benign assessment of environmentally related
urbanization violence potential, closer examination reveals ten of the eleven observed events
were cases of radical Islamist attack and amounted to only 31% of total national violence,
framing these events more likely as rural-based violence spilling over into cities as opposed to
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urban-originating destabilization. Through the lens of environmentally related urbanization,
the example of Niger presents a confluence of especially 1) low income, 2) low unemployment
and 3) above average agricultural dependence, suggesting high levels of subsistence farming, as
well as 4) well below average increase in the national percent urban rate, likely reflecting little
capacity to move and disrupt the urban status quo. This largely sedentary, agrarian-based
Resource Sensitive (RS) blend also characterizes The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone and, to a lesser extent, Benin, the Central African Republic, Chad and Togo.
The second variable blend follows the example of Equatorial Guinea, the REVOLT 2016
state projected as the second least likely to experience urban violence likelihood. This Resource
Endowed (RE) national profile also features 1) a below average increase in national percent
urban rate of change, but in contrast with resource sensitive countries, “RE” states exhibit 2)
higher incomes and 3) low agricultural dependence—revealing the critical influence of nonagrarian natural resource rents characterizing this cluster of states with geospatially distributed,
diverse livelihood opportunities. Defined as “the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents
(hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents,”26 such economic sector opportunities offer
non-agrarian rural livelihoods, resulting in low agricultural dependence; therefore, “…in certain
resource-rich Africa countries, urbanization is not a necessary condition for economic
growth.”27 (See Figure 5.3.)
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As a result, in these particular countries, conditions of environmental degradation may
not necessitate relocation to urban centers in search of economic well-being, avoiding
overurbanization and other associated disruptions at the municipal level. As shown in the

Figure 5.3. Natural Resource Rents Relative to National Wealth and Urbanization.28
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graphic, Equatorial Guinea is quite clearly exemplary, a major beneficiary of oil and gas
deposits. In addition, Angola, Botswana, and Cote d’Ivoire, endowed to varying extents with
valuable, non-agrarian resources and livelihood opportunities, follow this pattern of variable
interaction. As this phenomenon may explain why some countries do not fit model
expectations of urbanization amidst conditions of environmental degradation, natural resource
rents and related service sector employment deserve acknowledgement as key capacities that
further inform the EUV model.

Rural Livelihood Sustainability and Benin’s Cotton Boom-and-Bust
Using the “sustainable rural livelihoods” framework, the case of Benin and its turn-ofthe-twentieth century cotton boom-and-bust provides a particularly good illustration of these
livelihood-mobility-vulnerability dynamics. As denoted previously, Benin falls into the resource
sensitive group albeit to a lesser extent than several of the other countries; however, Benin’s
strong dependence on cotton, peaking in 2005 and sharply declining over the course of this
study, offers a prime example of rural livelihood vulnerability and limited capacity for
adaptative mobility. Disaggregating the complexity of rural livelihood sustainability, experts
recognize assets—"natural, physical, social, human, and financial capitals”—as essential to
achieving livelihood security and access to these assets as influenced by structures
(governmental and/or private sector) as well as by processes, oftentimes legally, culturally or
institutionally defined.29 In the case of the resource sensitive group, high agricultural
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dependence levels, measured as a percentage of total GDP, range from about twenty-three to
fifty-eight percent in 2016, indicating a lack of non-agrarian national assets. Similarly reflecting
a want of natural resource diversity, Benin’s agricultural dependence, heavily concentrated in
the cotton sector, hovers between a little over one-fifth to a full quarter of GDP from 2000 to
2016, reaching its height in 2006.
In the early 1990’s, cotton became “the backbone” of Benin’s economy,” providing up
to eighty percent of rural household incomes in the northern part of the state and accounting
for seventy-five percent of total exports, influencing livelihoods both directly and indirectly as
production quadrupled from 1990 to 2005.30 Although the urban growth rate from 2000-2005
bustled a little over sub-Saharan averages, reflecting the boom in Benin’s development, the
national percent urban rate of change remained just over one percent, suggesting little-to-no
permanent movement to city centers. With only three urban violence events reported during
this window of time, amounting to a very small six-year total of five urban fatalities, the urban
scale reflected no significant disruption.
By 2008, however, cotton’s share of total national exports had plummeted to forty
percent, and production had decreased to 1990 levels.31 “Cotton had become an erratic and
insecure source of living, especially in the northeastern provinces, where an 18% reduction in
per capita income resulted in an equivalent increase of the incidence of poverty.”32 A highly
attractive feature of cotton—a part of the process characterizing this asset—is that income
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generated by this powerful cash crop comes in large chunks, allowing for major capital
investments and payments on large expenditures, yet the flip side of this coin is the harsh
impact felt at a drop in price. As cotton prices on international markets fell, Benin farmers were
quickly disenchanted and massively abandoned the crop, “thereby drastically narrowing the
basis of their livelihood” while structures designed to positively influence access to this prized
national asset failed—cotton organizations faltered amidst mismanagement, and the
government did nothing.33
In the perceived absence of a sustainable cotton livelihood, rural Benin households from
2009-2012 struggled for resiliency, “coping”—defined as diversification out of necessity—
through the implementation of both on- and off-farm strategies though poor farmers were
much less able to take advantage of non-farm work due to limited capital holdings.34 On-farm
diversification of agriculture included a shift for many farmers to cashews and organic cotton,
however with a reduced yield/return on investment, and many were forced to divert fertilizers
to food crops. Interestingly, because women historically had faced barriers to accessing cotton,
women’s livelihoods already included multiple income sources, facilitating the expansion of
rural wives’ entrepreneurship, their capacity to contribute to expenditures in the areas of
education and health, and ultimately, their increased freedom and influence within the home.35
Other off-farm coping efforts included the development of other-than-cotton agricultural
organizations, formed with the knowledge gained through the cotton experience, as well as
temporary out-migration to Nigeria, carried out mostly by young males, often observed
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returning after several months’ work in agriculture or construction with a newly purchased
motorbike, a valuable new asset allowing for non-agrarian work as a motor taxi.36
A fractional increase in the national percent urban rate of change is observed from 2005
to 2009, accompanied by an expected minor bump in urban growth, but for the most part, little
adaptive movement to Benin’s urban realms is identifiable. In addition, with the exception of
two fatalities taking place during a 2007 act of violence against civilians in the wake of an attack
on President Boni’s convoy, no urban violence is observed in Benin until 2016. By 2010, the
national percent urban rate of change drops, the urban growth rate continues to fall, and gross
national income per capita takes a turn for the worse in 2014 that continues through 2017, a
trend rarely seen in a stable country.37 As the World Food Programme recognizes, over seventy
percent of the population in Benin depends on employment in the agricultural sector, which
suffers low productivity and increasing food prices, resulting in severe food insecurity.38
Movement in search of alternative income sources, however, is simply not possible for most.
Few alternative livelihood opportunities exist, and households are critically dependent on
subsistence farming to provide whatever food source they can to survive.
The case of Benin’s cotton boom-and-bust reveals significant rural livelihood
vulnerability characterizing one of the “best case scenarios” of the resource sensitive group.
Demographic change data over the course of the cotton crisis suggests a sedentary bias as
coping strategies stagnate in rural realms, and declining gross national income per capital
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confirms struggle. The stark absence of urban violence—typically a welcome sign—reflects a
lack of systemic motion and function, void of disruptive push for transformation. By contrast,
resource endowed states, enjoying diverse income sources, reflect high adaptive capacity and
strong resilience, making it possible to thrive in place without significant stress and strain
disrupting urban echelons. Critically, access to these assets via the influence of sound
structures (good governance and legitimate professional organizations) as well as strong
processes (fair land management, the rule of law and business-friendly norms) is still key to
ensuring rural livelihood sustainability, even where countries are endowed with diverse natural
resources.

Mobility as Adaptation: Stay? Go? Pick up a Weapon?
Identification of the RE and RS typologies not only highlights the dynamics of resource
diversity and rural livelihood sustainability/vulnerability, but also contextualizes the likelihood
of adaptive movement as a function of (in)capacity and agency. In circumstances where rural
livelihood is unsustainable, those capable of adaptive movement, such as untethered male
adolescents in relatively close proximity to alternative employment, may choose to relocate. As
shown in Figure 5.4, the findings of the EUV model and observations of urban violence reported
in 2016, however, suggest the likelihood of encountering urban violence in rapidly urbanizing
states is significantly higher than in states where movement to cities is low.39 While urban
violence characterizing the Resource Sensitive group outpaces the Resource Endowed at an
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average of approximately four urban violence events per million urban dwellers for the RS
group versus an average of approximately two-thirds of a single event per million for the RE
group, “mobile” states reflect an even higher urban violence event frequency averaging almost
sixteen events per million urban dwellers when Somalia and Eritrea are included, and nine and
a half events when these states are excluded.
In general, these sub-Saharan countries “on the move” largely boast above average
national percent urban rates of change, higher agricultural dependence (with a few exceptions),
higher urban growth and more moderate gross national income per capita. While
environmental factors may influence this movement to cities only partially or indirectly, the
rural livelihood sustainability framework strongly suggests adaptive movement as a means of
coping to environmental stressors and shocks may serve as an important strategy for those
capable of relocation. Thus, the findings of this analysis argue environmental degradation
should be recognized as posing a force multiplying influence upon urbanization patterns
already in play with an increased likelihood of urban violence frequency and lethality. This
cross-scale interaction, exerting force at the municipal level of governance from the bottom up,
presents substantial disruption to urban systems and challenges adaptive governance and
stability.
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Figure 5.4. Livelihood-Mobility-Vulnerability Groups.
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CHAPTER VI
URBAN FACES OF CLIMATE CHANGE
“When we speak of the ‘environment’, what we really mean is a relationship existing
between nature and the society which lives in it... It is essential to seek comprehensive solutions
which consider the interactions within natural systems themselves and with social systems. We
are faced not with two separate crises, one environmental and the other social, but rather with
one complex crisis which is both social and environmental.”
--Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, #139

This “securitization” of environmental migration refines expectations of human
response to climate exposure, recognizing the inseparable entanglement of factors that lead to
environmental vulnerability, a complex condition born of ecological, social, economic and
political influences. Moreover, this analysis evaluates human response under these conditions
in a context of both structures and agency, from the family unit to the national government,
calling attention to these circumstances in the hope of fostering strategies to prevent and/or
alleviate insecurity. While the nascent field of climate-conflict analysis has largely shifted away
from the neo-Malthusian statist perspectives that originally dominated the literature, narrow
scope at sub-state echelons and exposure-based scientific reductionism plague more recent
efforts to find consensus. In spite of highly sophisticated and data-driven methods, this limited
approach effectively throws the baby out with the bathwater, too casually dismissing statelevel and wider influences.
Rather uniquely, this study, using a Panarchy concept of nested adaptive cycles to
integrate state, urban and sub-urban scales, implements a comprehensive research design,
organizing the entanglement of factors into REMEMBER and REVOLT pathways of stability and
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disruption, measuring these influential forces over time, and geospatially distributing them.
Statistical results confirm a powerful connection shared by environmental adaptability and
urban demographic change with urban political violence, affirming the originally proposed
hypothesis. A qualitative deep dive into these dynamics provides additional context, identifying
features of governance and resource endowment as interacting mechanisms that shape human
behavior amidst these conditions of environmental impact. This final chapter consolidates
these findings, discusses their implications and considers the expected escalation of these
dynamics as the forces of climate change intensify.
Demonstrating mobility and violence are not simply “givens” vis-à-vis degrees of
environmental exposure, these consolidated findings, captured by the urban environmental
vulnerability matrix shown in Table 6.1, highlight the complexity of adaptability/vulnerability
within social-ecological systems (SESs). They also emphasize the critical value of adaptive
governance in responding to climate impact and the range of capacity that characterizes human
response resulting in a defined set of likely outcomes. This analytical framework departs from
empirical modeling strategies found in much of the climate-conflict literature frustrated by
persistently mixed results as scholars seek statistical confirmation or refutation of climate data
(typically temperature and/or precipitation) in correlation with organized armed conflict.1
Rather, this more holistic approach builds upon the quantitative work of this project,
qualitatively examining mechanisms for climate-conflict linkages and theory building.
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Down the far left column of this matrix, qualities of state level governance descend,
divided by the fifteen-year threshold of regime durability at which point institutional

Table 6.1. A Framework of Urban Environmental Vulnerability.
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consolidation is observed as aligning with a significant reduction in likelihood of urban violence
frequency and lethality. These trends in institutional consolidation and polity reflect adaptive
governance (in)capacity to stabilize and sustain the overall system. Across the top, the chart
reveals the three identified livelihood-mobility-vulnerability typologies representative of
possible sub-urban scale human response to eco-stressors—1) the resource endowed, 2) the
resource sensitive and 3) the mobile. Thus, both state-level as well as individual-level capacities
are integrated into this assessment of environmental insecurity. Finally, exemplary countries
are situated into the matrix based upon their 2016 variable characteristics, colored from green
to yellow, to orange, to dark red in accordance with EUV 2016 geostatistical projections
escalating from least to most likely to experience urban violence.
Observing these dynamics as they relate to Panarchy—the overarching analytical
framework informing this study and outlined in detail in the third chapter—the fifteen-year
threshold of regime durability can be understood as cutting through the two intertwining loops
of stability and instability over time. In the mature, well-institutionalized states of
“consolidated autocracies” or “consolidated democracies,” the stabilizing forces of system
conservation and increasing rigidity, reflective of the slow-moving forward loop of the Panarchy
cycle, are more likely to characterize adaptive governing capacity. Operating somewhere
between the “r phase” of growth and exploitation and the “K phase” of conservation, these
empowered states assert strong REMEMBER capacity from above, down to the urban scale,
where generally fewer incidents of urban violence and less lethality are reported.2 While
capacity to stymie forces of rebellion importantly ensures stability, system sustainability
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requires the flexibility to absorb disturbances. Theoretically, liberal democracy allows more
room for such adaptation, as reorganization in response to a need for change is inherent to the
system of governance. Conversely, strong autocracies risk rigidity and the inability to adapt to
new circumstances; therefore, “omega moments” of disruption butt up against a system absent
structures and processes designed for change and more vulnerable to devolution. As discussed
in chapter five, these expectations find support in lower levels of urban violence
frequency/lethality, on average, experienced by sub-Saharan consolidated democracies in
2016, as compared to consolidated autocracies.
Below the fifteen-year durability threshold, young regimes demonstrate the rapidity and
significant variation of the panarchical rear loop of instability, ranging from current crisis to
“alpha phase” periods of reorganization in the wake of more recent system turmoil and reveal
greater prevalence of REVOLT related cross-scale influences.3 Released from the conservational
rigidity of the status quo and characterized by group competition and experimentation with
new leadership, resilience in these states both shapes and is shaped by the system’s adaptive
governing capacity. Thus, young but “strong” democracies are more capable of absorbing these
dynamics than the more autocratic leaning states, though consolidation of governance is still a
work in progress. Minus well-established forces of stabilization flowing down from the national
level, the urban echelon in these younger states is more vulnerable to disruption and, by and
large, exhibits more frequent incidence of urban violence and higher levels of lethality. Young,
“weak” autocracies are additionally constrained by inadequate systemic “wiggle room” for
adjusting to disturbance and possess even less institutional capacity, limiting adaptive
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governance and resilience. Battling to maintain or recapture power, these regimes struggle to
recover from the disorder of “omega” impacts resulting in the highest reported levels of urban
violence and lethality.
As highlighted in the previous chapter, all democratic-leaning anocracies, a.k.a. poorly
institutionalized “quasi-democracies,” fall into this unconsolidated category of “young” regimes
below the fifteen-year threshold. Interestingly, this liminal space of polity and governing
longevity is more often than not characterized by diverse natural resource endowment as well
as significantly slower rates of urbanization, although it is noteworthy that the natural resource
rents per capita in these states is somewhat less impactful than those observed in the
consolidated states. As discussed in the fifth chapter, these quasi-democracies also uniformly
experience a preponderance of urban violence in 2016, although their overall violence levels
are well below the sample average. These dynamics point to complications in democratization
and/or consolidation of governance amidst resource abundance, with particularly acute tension
at the urban scale, where contestation for young regime control of socio-economic
reorganization plays out in spikes of rivalrous political protests, riots and electoral violence.
Finally, this framework of urban environmental vulnerability reveals an increasing trend
in urban violence likelihood, diagonally angling from the upper left hand corner to the lower
right, moving from panarchical stability and rigidity down and across to conditions of greater
fluidity and instability. For the most part, these projections, based upon sixteen years of data
analysis, generally align well with observed levels of 2016, further confirming the validity of the
matrix. Using this analytical framework, the remainder of this chapter will examine the
implications of these findings, recognizing the natural oscillating tendency of complex systems
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as human behaviors and biophysical disturbances provoke “non-linear, episodic change” with
potential for positive transformation or devastating destabilization.4

COLUMN 1: RESOURCES, RIGIDITY AND STABILITY
Competing theories in the literature posit a range of stable outcomes related to
resource endowment or scarcity in sub-Saharan Africa. While some point to destabilization
potential at the intersection of resource scarcity with severe economic depression and poor
governance, others argue resource abundance imposes a curse, citing “Dutch Disease,” by
which economic development is stunted in the presence of a high-value export, provoking
greed and violent competition; still others argue further that resource abundance is a hindrance
to good governance.5 This framework of urban environmental vulnerability offers explanation
for these various findings, suggesting both findings are valid.
This segment discusses these vulnerability implications of resource abundance vis-à-vis
a range of governance characteristics, revealing the availability of diverse resources more
frequently promotes regime longevity; state empowerment—with an inclination towards
autocracy; decreased movement to cities; and generally lower levels of urban violence. The
conclusions drawn related to this first column of the matrix offer partial support for resource
abundance theories, specifically in the case of oil endowment. The allure of lucrative pay-offs
in exchange for hydrocarbon resource capture is a cause for concern as these conditions most
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frequently align with empowered autocratic governance and high system rigidity that fails to
benefit lower echelons. Although these dynamics correlate with much slower rates of
urbanization and generally lower levels of urban violence, this lack of observable disruption is
less a reflection of non-agrarian rural livelihood diversity than an indicator of greatly
impoverished sub-national capacity.
Resource abundance in sectors other than hydrocarbons, on the other hand, proves less
vulnerable to “Dutch Disease” dynamics, aligning with mature, well-institutionalized
democracies and higher overall system capacity, underscoring the importance of adaptive
governance potential inherent to institutions of democracy. These examples push back against
arguments of resource abundance “cursing” good governance. However, efforts to
democratize in young states endowed with non-agrarian resources appear frustrated,
characterized by illiberal behavior and a preponderance of political violence situated in urban
centers.

State Empowerment and the Challenge of Democratization
Per the urban environmental vulnerability framework, resource endowment aligned
with slower rates of rural-to-urban demographic transformation is heavily biased toward
mature, well-institutionalized states, suggesting these conditions favor state empowerment.
Emphasizing this bias, no young, institutionalized democracies nor autocracies fall within this
category. Thus, the bulk of well-endowed states is situated in the upper left hand corner of the
matrix, ranging in regime longevity from sixteen to fifty years. EUV modeling projects these
states as least and less likely to experience urban violence, and ACLED 2016 reports confirm
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they demonstrate little to no actual urban violence with the exception of Cameroon, where
frequency of urban violence outpaces most states assessed as “more likely” at risk.
Nevertheless, Cameroon, one of the poorer and lesser endowed of this grouping of states, has
been led by President Paul Biya since 1982, enriched by oil comprising almost forty percent of
exports.6 In line with expectations of “Dutch Disease,” IMF analysis indicates this regime
longevity is empowered by state level rent-seeking and corruption, estimating an oil revenue
gap from 1977-2006 between $5.9 billion and $7 billion USD.7 As Cameroon suffers with
stagnant per capita income, inequality and an unfavorable climate for business, it is obvious the
state has failed to translate this rich natural endowment into a source of popular resiliency.
Similarly empowered by oil riches and plagued by corruption, President Teodoro Obiang
has ruled in Equatorial Guinea since October 1979, where inefficiency and inequality are again
revealed, subsistence farming is the dominant livelihood, and the hydrocarbon sector is facing
decline, calling into question the future stability of this highly autocratic regime.8 These
patterns emphasize the potential “dark side” of REMEMBER capacity. Famously demonstrating
the risk of autocratic government destabilization amidst state level misuse of resource
endowment, the history of Angola illustrates the panarchical pathway from post-independence
“omega moment” chaos, exacerbated by resource competition in a brutal decades’ long
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insurgency and civil war, to a period of unsteady reorganization and finally, the current phase of
relative stability.9 Although the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) party
continues to hold power as it has since independence in 1975, João Lourenço, who replaced
José Eduardo dos Santos in 2017 after forty years in power, has more recently enacted several
efforts to reform the system, recovering over $5 billion in looted assets.10 While this action
constitutes a good start, Angola faces the challenge of maintaining stability while dismantling
overly rigid structures of governance and ridding systemic processes of corruption, a precarious
path, before escaping the too-prevalent oil-driven resource curse-dynamics of sub-Saharan
Africa.
In contrast with these consolidated autocracies, the consolidated democracies of the
resource endowed grouping generally demonstrate the institutional capacity to avoid the
pitfalls of “Dutch Disease,” better reflecting hoped-for patterns of diverse (non-agrarian)
livelihood opportunities and in-place adaptability. Of note, the non-agrarian resources with
which these identified consolidated democracies are endowed are largely mineral-based, vice
hydrocarbon, an important distinction worth consideration and future investigation. While
these states benefit from the empowerment of resource endowment, the structures, processes
and liberal norms of democracy are more likely to disseminate this value, enhancing resilience
across scales. Expanding norms of transparency in resource governance is argued as
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particularly key.11 In this sense, the pre-existing resilience of democracy proves more capable
of managing empowerment in a way that feeds back into system resiliency. This endogeneity
reflects relatively functional adaptive governing capacity and explains the high durability of
these states without the force of authoritarianism. In Botswana, for example, where diamond
mining accounts for approximately one-quarter of GDP and about a third of government
revenue, “fiscal discipline and sound management” have helped the state transform from “one
of the poorest in the world five decades ago into a middle-income country.”12 The World
Bank’s Botswana Poverty Assessment report highlights state poverty reduction efforts, pointing
to agricultural subsidies programs that tackled the drivers of poverty affecting dimensions of
demographics, labor, and human capital; moreover, this report observes a major decrease in
the national poverty rate from 30.6% in 2002/3 to 19.4% in 2009/10, eighty-seven percent of
which occurred in rural areas where agricultural incomes rose.13
Consolidated democracies also inherently limit “cult of personality” style leadership as
electoral competition situates political contestation within the institutions of governance,
containing personalistic influence and reducing lengthy “strongman” holds on power that
heighten potential for corruption and abuse of power. Very few states, however, demonstrate

11

James Van Alstine, “Transparency in Resource Governance: The Pitfalls and Potential of ‘New
Oil’ in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Global Environmental Politics 14:1 (February 2014): 22-23.
12
CIA, “The World Factbook: Botswana,” accessed https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/countries/botswana/#economy.
13
The World Bank, “Incomes Growth in Rural Botswana Lifts Thousands out of Poverty and
Decreases Inequality,” (December 8, 2015), accessed
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/08/incomes-growth-in-ruralbotswana-lifts-thousands-out-of-poverty-and-decreasesinequality#:~:text=The%20level%20of%20inequality%20in,64.7%20percent%20to%2060.5%20p
ercent.&text=However%2C%20half%20of%20Botswana's%20population,31%20percent%20clas
sified%20as%20vulnerable.

190
this ideal nexus of consolidated democracy and resource diversity that allows for thriving in
place and decreases the likelihood of eco-oriented rapid overurbanization. Therefore,
arguments that abundance typically inhibits political and economic development find some
support, suggesting a more likely abundance-driven downward spiral of inadequate
“institutional capital” fostering “persistent poverty, human insecurity, and continued
dependence on natural resources.”14 Yet the consolidated democracies offer a roadmap to
avoiding this dilemma.
Finally, a spatial implication of these dynamics emerges characterizing the geography of
violence observed in these states. Where resource richness strengthens national governments
in a context of consolidated, durable regimes, a preponderance of rural political violence is
observed—with the exception of a slight urban inclination in South Africa. In the young,
democratic-leaning anocracies, however, a preponderance of urban violence has been well
established. Arguably, it is in the interest of state level governments to maintain stability in city
centers where seats of government are located, and commerce most often takes place. For the
same reasons, these sites serve as symbols of government and economic systems, drawing
demonstrations of frustration amidst rising grievance. This geographic balance between urban
and rural violence therefore presents urban stability vis-a-vis rural violence as a valuable
indicator of panarchical phases of rigidity, adaptability/oscillation or chaotic fluidity.
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Positive or Negative Peace?
This research concludes that, particularly under conditions of climate variability and
environmental degradation, non-agrarian resource endowment empowers the state with a
capacity to stabilize the urban scale, significantly reducing the frequency and lethality of
political violence. Polity, however, directs this empowerment in critical ways that frame this
stabilization. Furthermore, the nature of non-agrarian resources seems to influence this
empowerment. In consolidated autocracies, where oil trends as the likely endowment, this
critical source of capacity potential is conserved and effectively hoarded at the national level.
As a result, resiliency finds little benefit other than enhanced state capacity to secure itself. As
climate effects are projected to intensify, sub-national experiences of eco-stress and loss of
livelihood in the absence of shared resiliency risk escalating sentiments of greed and grievance.
Cities may remain “stable” under the threat of military/police force against civilians—affecting
a “negative urban peace” that manages to avoid or limit personal violence—but the threat of
violence in rural realms where government oversight is spread thin may rise if the cost of
rebellion becomes lower than the cost of in situ struggle.15
In the observed consolidated democracies, on the other hand, enhanced state resiliency
born of diverse resource endowment is more likely to be distributed, flowing down to lower
echelons of governance and affecting resiliency at the individual household level. This shared
power structure, the hallmark of liberal democracy, contributes toward “positive urban peace”
as people are not only more capable of living to their fullest potential in place, but also free of
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state oppression that limits potential—to include the political freedom to demonstrate and
protest. Thus, some degree of urban civil unrest can be understood as indicative of a healthy
balance of power between the uppermost echelon of the national government and the
individual level, constituting a flexible, functioning system. In accordance with EUV 2016
observations, this built-in adaptive capacity of democratic governance generally proves capable
of minimizing urban violence, on average aligning with the lowest levels of event frequency and
lethality.
Similarly, the democratic-leaning anocracies lack consolidated power at the state level
while more diverse livelihood opportunities improve capacity at the individual level. This
uneasy (im)balance of power in the no-man’s-land of adaptive reorganization wavers along with
national efforts to democratize. The temptation to seize political power through state control
of resources is high, as are frustrations with unsatisfactory political and economic development.
These dynamics suggest a resource competition between power-seeking elements of the state
and democracy-seeking desires of the populace. With less to fear of these weak state
governments, individuals are therefore more inclined to gather in urban centers to express
their grievances and engage in the political competition and contestation that will shape the
new system’s structures and processes.

COLUMN 2: INCAPACITY, REORGANIZATION AND HUMAN INSECURITY
The intersection of dynamics found in the second column of the urban environmental
vulnerability matrix presents something of a “flip-side” to those found in the first. In a context
of environmental degradation, the resource endowment characterizing the first column
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particularly enhances established governing system functionality but problematizes
reorganization efforts. The main implication of the second column is that resource sensitivity in
a context of environmental degradation intensifies scarcity, de-energizing the system such that
a sedentary status quo is likely. Thus, political power will reside wherever it is already
established. While reorganization (in the wake of destabilization) is therefore more likely to
reflect a balance of power between the government and the populace encouraging
democratization, established (autocratic) governance is more likely to go unconfronted in spite
of struggle. The relative immobility of this de-energized system may leave the urban scale less
perturbed, but the overall lack of adaptive capacity amounts to dangerous circumstances of
human insecurity as climate change intensifies.
Endorsing resource abundance theorists, who point to strong statistical evidence of
political improvements taking hold where natural resources are scarce, many of the resource
sensitive states found in the second column are typically younger and lean in the direction of
democracy.16 Largely falling short of the fifteen-year threshold of regime durability, these
states are projected by EUV modeling as more likely to experience urban violence and exhibit
slightly higher 2016 reported urban violence in line with post-destabilization residual
“reverberation” as the system reorganizes and consolidates. As the effect of climate change
has been found “especially detrimental in those countries that are dependent on agriculture
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and where food production is concentrated in few areas,” time will tell if these regimes succeed
in their processes of democratization and the maintenance thereof.17
The case of Benin, discussed in the last chapter, provides some promise. Even as the
booming cotton industry crashed in the mid-2000s, Benin’s democratic polity score
strengthened, the country’s environmental adaptability rating improved, slum percentages
declined, and from 2008 through 2015, not a single fatal urban violence event was reported.
Moreover, the “attitudinal capital” demonstrated by agrarian Benin women in rural realms,
juggling multiple sources of additional income to augment household sustainability, offers an
excellent example of this powerful human factor, individually contributing at the sub-urban
echelon but collectively enhancing overall national resiliency.18
The Gambia, Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, Togo stand out as consolidated autocracies
falling into this category. With regimes averaging over twenty-one years of longevity and
characterized by some of the lowest gross national income values in the sample, incapacity in
this category of states not only reduces the likelihood of adaptive movement and subsequent
urban disruption, but also decreases the potential for significant political contestation in the
face of well-established authoritarian governance. As a result, these states are projected by the
model as less likely to experience urban violence. Notably, however, the two urban violence
events involving fatalities in The Gambia in 2016 were both related to political protest calling
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for reform, suggesting as governing system capacity decreases, there may come a time when
popular power is relatively capable of asserting calls for change.
As a group, these resource sensitive states are likely to experience escalating human
insecurity in a context of intensifying environmental degradation, rural livelihood
(in)sustainability and incapacity for adaptive relocation. Below-average urbanization statistics
confirm many lack the capacity for relocation and/or the absence of a pull to cities in
anticipation of urban livelihood opportunities and improved quality of life. In the face of
declining overall capacity, democracy may become fragile as the benefits of adaptive
governance and potential for meaningful shared resilience diminish. At some point, without
aid, assistance and careful development of environmental policies, individual level cost-benefit
analysis may reach a tipping point, as argued by resource scarcity theorists, and struggle in
place may constitute a greater cost than fight or flight.

COLUMN 3: MOBILITY, DEMOCRACY AND VIOLENCE
Setting aside deterministic expectations of “climate mobility,” this consolidation of
findings frames environmental exposure in the wider context of “climatic, socio-economic,
cultural and political factors,” which experts increasingly recognize as fundamental to
analysis.19 Building upon the previous segment, an important implication brought to light by
the final column of the matrix is that human agency cannot be overlooked, particularly in
relation to the way governance is characterized by polity and does or does not allow for its
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exercise. Thus, framework projections of environmentally related mobility are not to be
understood as homogenous, automatic nor monocausal although, when movement does occur,
as this research project has asserted, scholarly consensus finds that internal migration is and
will be the predominant pattern with “a significant portion of internal migrants [ending] up in
major cities.”20 Observing climate mobility as a long-practiced adaptation strategy, this project
echoes assertions that “movement and migration are inherent to the highly interconnected
world we live in and …will necessarily be part of the range of responses available to those
affected by climate change.”21 Moreover, in connection with the human agency of those
affected, “attitudinal capital”—a dimension of urban vulnerability comprised of “attitudes to
risk, hazard experiences and relations between people”—vitally shapes outcomes; therefore,
deterministic expectations of urban violence associated with adaptive human movement must
be viewed as equally problematic. 22
Understanding that within social-ecological systems, adaptability is mainly a function of
individuals and groups whose behavior influences resilience, or the capacity to handle
disturbance,”23 human agency is easily recognized as vital to system function. Where individual
capacity finds more direct incorporation into the process of governance, resiliency is more likely
to be shared and the overall system benefits across scales. Where individual capacity lacks
access and influence, however, system adaptability will attenuate, and rigidity will intensify.
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Without vent, individuals are more likely to exercise agency in confrontation with the system,
threatening destabilization. Under such conditions, the functional “communication” between
scales represented by rural-to-urban adaptive mobility tips into dangerous cascading patterns
of distress migration.

Individual Empowerment and Oscillation
Turning attention to the final column of the urban environmental vulnerability
framework, revealing above average mobility dynamics, democratic and democratic-leaning
states abound, with the fifteen-year regime durability threshold importantly dividing and
defining them in terms of stability. Most states fall below this marker, where EUV model
assessments project environmentally related urban violence potential as predominantly more
and most likely to occur. Although these states exhibit relatively higher observed levels of
urban violence event frequency and lethality, the findings of this research conclude this zone of
democracy in the third column of dynamic movement and variation largely reflects the
individual empowerment and expanse of human agency attached to democratic polity and
functional adaptive governance. This significant “disruption” between scales communicates
valuable individual, household and communal processes of reorganization and adaptation,
which, according to EUV statistical analysis, includes response to conditions of environmental
vulnerability. The result is a realm of buzzing systemic oscillation between stability and
instability that is likely to involve low levels of urban violence, but on the whole, offers greater
system adaptability and durability.
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In Namibia, for example, a great deal of transformative reorganization is still playing out
as independence was only gained in 1990 and lingering conflict at the border with Angola only
more recently abated in the early 2000s. Although the country has evolved into a mature, fairly
well institutionalized democracy with an extremely low record of violence over the course of
the sixteen year study, Namibia exhibits well above average rates of urban demographic change
in 2016 and an unemployment rate over twenty-three percent—earning the state the highest
classification of REVOLT urban violence likelihood in the geostatistical analysis of this research.
Driven by rural livelihood loss amidst some of the driest environmental conditions in subSaharan Africa,24 this urbanization is confirmed to be primarily the result of adaptive rural-tourban flows.25 Surveyed Namibians report quality of life improvements such as employment
and education as reasons for their relocation;26 however, most of these internal migrants
coming from the rural north, settle in Katatura, “where the poorest live in Windhoek,”
reflecting an “urbanization of marginalization.”27 Helping to overcome this urban
environmental vulnerability, the attitudinal capital of many Namibians has eased these
challenging circumstances with positive influence from the bottom up. Leveraging individual
“grittiness” and personal connections to adapt to the high expense of urban living while in
search of non-agrarian employment, rural-urban food transfers between family members offset
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high food prices in the city for young, new urban dwellers, who, in return send remittances
back home, subsidizing struggling family farming efforts in the rural regions.28
The benefits of strong REMEMBER influences characterizing Namibian consolidated
democracy with high state level capacity, however, offer mixed results. The Namibian economic
sector, despite rich mineral endowments, 29 has demonstrated a sharp decline since 2005, and
the state is struggling to distribute capacity to lower scales.30 Yet democratic governing
structures and processes are holding steady and social readiness is improving, particularly in
the area of innovation.31 Peaceful protests, demonstrations and the occasional riot remain
generally non-violent and political violence fatalities are extremely rare countrywide, offering
proof of a strong democracy allowing for individual expression and healthy contestation.
Overall, Namibia proves transformative reorganization need not be violent, but improvements
to shared resiliency structures will be key to maintaining environmental adaptability and
national stability as climate variability is expected to increase in the coming decades.

Omega Moments and Violent Spillover
As complex systems experts argue, when systems fail to adapt to changing
circumstances, tipping points may be triggered that unleash a “qualitative switch of
behavior.”32 The levels of violence in the autocratic states of the third column suggest they

28

Frayne, Bruce, “Migration and Urban Survival Strategies in Windhoek…,” 501-503.
Indongo, et. al., “Urbanization in Namibia…,” ii.
30
Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index, “Country Index: Nambia,” https://gain.nd.edu/ourwork/country-index/.
31
Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index, “Country Index: Nambia,” https://gain.nd.edu/ourwork/country-index/.
32
Scheffran, "Complexity and Stability…," 234, 242.
29

200
may be approaching this qualitative switch or, in the case of Ethiopia and Burundi, may have
already encountered this tipping point, confronted by a multitude of adaptation challenges to
include eco-stress and strain. The highly fluid bottom right hand corner of the urban
environmental vulnerability matrix reveals a lack of governing stability amidst the highest rates
of urban demographic change in sub-Saharan Africa, further problematized by violent histories
of habitual armed conflict.33 As these states compete with armed groups and militias—the
embodiment of dissatisfaction with government—capacity to reorganize is limited, autocratic
governance allows no formal space for within-system competition and contestation, and these
states fall into endless panarchical “rear loop” behavior plagued by insurgent agents seeking
access to the process of governance.
Demonstrating a preponderance of rural violence, the implication for the urban echelon
in these states is, at best, an authoritarian-imposed negative urban peace enforced by the
threat of state violence and, at worst, violent spillover as people flee conflict in the countryside
dragging rural antagonisms into the cities. This observation furthers the argument that the
geography of conflict onset may be related to polity. Disentangling the violence potential
associated with dynamics of environmental degradation and urbanization from the historical
patterns of violence characterizing these states, however, requires considerable qualitative
investigation, an area ripe for future research.
Another area worthy of investigation relates more broadly to matrix dynamics below
the fifteen-year regime durability threshold, recognizing the destabilizing effects of radical
Islamist attacks. In particular, dynamics in Kenya and Nigeria raise alarm as these young,
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democratic states are assessed with high likelihood of urban violence, confirmed by 2016
reported event frequency and lethality and contradicting the patterns observed throughout
most of sub-Saharan Africa. Additional exploration of the relationship between environmental
vulnerability and radicalization is therefore needed as the combined power of these exogenous
forces may very well destabilize these traditionally strong African democracies with heavy
consequences for Continental stability.

CONCLUSION: URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL VULNERABILITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Environmentally related migration and urbanization is not new. For millennia, people
have adapted to changing patterns of climate that have threatened livelihoods and
sustainability. Population levels and human density, however, characterize our planet like
never before, as do modes of transportation and communication. Societies are increasingly
interconnected, consuming and sharing resources with far reaching consequences. As a result,
this complex phenomenon, driven by the global forces of climate change that are projected to
intensify, demands policy-maker and scholarly attention to facilitate adaptation and resiliency.
Anticipating the likelihood of rural-to-urban migration as a means of adaptation, this
study embraces the challenge of engaging with these dynamics, asking under what conditions
environmental impact influences movement to cities and how this adaptive behavior might
disrupt urban life? By situating the methodological and analytical approach within a Panarchy
conceptualization of socio-ecological systems, a perspective that honors national as well as
migrant security was made possible. While environmental security studies and climate-conflict
analysts increasingly focus at the sub-national level, this project recognizes the significant
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influence of state capacity as well as the influential sub-scale forces. This contribution to the
literature therefore moves away from overly simplistic models, understanding a complex
process of structuration that contextualizes environmental movement and violence likelihood
with the aim of preventing harmful outcomes where possible and devising strategies to manage
insecurity where needed.
This complexity suggests some limitation to the predictive capacity of the EUV model.
Necessary geographic estimations of population densities, extrapolations to fill gaps in data
availability, and reliance upon institutional reporting contribute to concerns about the validity
and generalizability of this analysis. Assessing group patterns of behavior more broadly based
upon average performance and proclivities also generalizes these findings qualitatively. Finally,
the in-depth look at environmentally related urbanization dynamics in 2016 restricts
perspective on the interplay of governance, resources and agency amidst environmental
degradation to a rather narrow temporal slice, although the overall research project is
undergirded by the statistical determinations of a sixteen year time-series regression.
Conducting follow-on out-of-sample verifications of the EUV model as more data becomes
available or applying this strategy to another region would help to confirm further the strength
of this approach.
Broadly, this study finds that environmental vulnerability is contributing to urbanization
in sub-Saharan Africa with increased levels of fatal urban political violence frequency and
lethality. However, regime duration/consolidation, specifically at a threshold of fifteen years,
and democratic polity reduce the likelihood of urban violence. Overall, the balance of power
characterizing the state vis-à-vis the populace as polity shifts from autocratic to democratic
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governance plays a major role in environmental adaptability and national resiliency.
Importantly, the structures, processes and norms of governance define the distribution of
capacity—sharing resiliency at all scales or conserving it for the sake of the state. Democratic
polity inherently demands a more shared structure. In addition, democratic systems
importantly encourage competition and contestation, processes critical to adapting to new
circumstances and reorganization without dismantling the entire system. Autocracies, on the
other hand, stifle these processes and risk becoming too rigid, unable to adapt, and vulnerable
to chaotic destabilization.
Thus, while state capacity is critical to affecting national environmental resilience, there
is a potential dark side to a strong state in the case of autocratic governance. Urban stability
under the threat of violence may be achieved, but a complementary preponderance of rural
violence is typical. Conversely, democratic empowerment of the people, makes room for
greater agency but is also vulnerable to individual disruptive behaviors, particularly under
conditions of greed and grievance or possibly radicalization. Quasi-democracies, especially,
struggle to share capacity or lack capacity to share, increasing vulnerability to unrest. As these
democratic anocracies lack institutional strength, tensions tend to produce violence acutely at
the municipal scale and frustrate efforts to democratize.
Ultimately, this research largely aligns with migration scholarship and the budding
literature of environmental security, recognizing the decision to relocate is made at the
individual or household level and will vary in accordance with 1) human perceptions of
environmental impact or resource scarcity, 2) the availability of resources/assets and access to
them that defines individual capacity, 3) the influences of structures and process, and finally, 4)
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the belief that the destination provides greater good than the cost of movement. The end
result is that not all will move, some will thrive, and some will struggle. The final wildcard
feature of these livelihood-mobility-vulnerability dynamics is the individual level resiliency
people possess, reflective of the human spirit with potential to transform national resiliency
from the bottom, up.
In addition to cooperation with international efforts to mitigate the harmful effects of
climate change, focused attention in geographic zones that are feeling these effects, most
intensely and most immediately, must therefore promote strong democratic leadership and
economic development, first and foremost. Illiberal or “hybrid” democracy will not suffice.
Critical to stability is the equitable distribution of the state’s natural resources. More equitable
land management, creation of alternative rural livelihoods and the provision of education and
training for these new opportunities will help to alleviate environmental vulnerability in rural
realms. At the urban scale, legal protection of workers’ rights, infrastructure improvements in
informal settlements and the steady provision of public services will help to reduce slum
conditions, human insecurity and city fragility. Finally, adaptive human movement must be
recognized as a valuable strategy. Facilitating reorganization and transformation that results in
a positive urban peace where people are free to live up to their potential will not be easy but
must be the goal.

Dona nobis pacem.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF SAMPLE COUNTRIES

1. Angola
2. Benin
3. Botswana
4. Burkina Faso
5. Burundi
6. Cameroon
7. Central African Republic
8. Chad
9. Republic of the Congo
10. Cote d’Ivoire
11. Djibouti
12. Democratic Republic of the Congo
13. Equatorial Guinea
14. Eritrea
15. Ethiopia
16. Gabon
17. The Gambia
18. Ghana
19. Guinea
20. Guinea-Bissau
21. Kenya
22. Lesotho
23. Liberia
24. Madagascar
25. Malawi
26. Mali
27. Mauritania
28. Mozambique
29. Namibia
30. Niger
31. Nigeria
32. Rwanda
33. Senegal
34. Sierra Leone
35. Somalia
36. South Africa
37. Sudan

38. Swaziland (Eswatini)
39. Tanzania
40. Togo
41. Uganda
42. Zambia
43. Zimbabwe
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APPENDIX B
ND-GAIN INDICATORS1

1

C. Chen; I. Noble; J. Hellmann; J. Coffee; M. Murillo; N. Chawla, “University of Notre Dame
Global Adaptation Index: Country Index Technical Report” (November 2015): 10-11,
https://gain.nd.edu/assets/254377/nd_gain_technical_document_2015.pdf.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED STEPS FOR CREATING ND-GAIN1

1
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C. Chen; Noble, I.; Hellmann, J.; Coffee, J.; Murillo, M.; Chawla, N., “University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index: Country
Index Technical Report,” November 2015, https://gain.nd.edu/assets/254377/nd_gain_technical_document_2015.pdf, 7.
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APPENDIX D
BY-COUNTRY REMEMBER AND REVOLT ASSESSMENTS, URBAN VIOLENCE,
FREQUENCY, AND LETHALITY

EUV-BEST 2016
REMEMBER VIOLENCE
(classes=2-8, POTENTIAL CLASS/
minus 3) COUNTRY
LEAST
2 Botswana
5 Equatorial Guinea
2 Namibia
4 Gabon
4 Cameroon
LESS
5 Djibouti
5 Mauritania
4 Swaziland
5 Togo
5 Senegal
4 Zambia
6 Angola
6 Guinea
5 Congo
5 Benin
6 Côte d'Ivoire
5 Rwanda
4 South Africa
5 Gambia, The
5 Mozambique
6 Chad
6 Niger
MORE
7 Guinea-Bissau
5 Lesotho
6 Tanzania
6 Malawi

REVOLT
(classes=3-7)

Urban Political Violence
Events/million urban
dwellers

Urban Lethality
(average
fatalities/event)

6
4
7
5
5

0.00
0.00
0.00
1.76
2.49

0
0
0
2.00
3.16

5
6
6
5
5
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
7
5
5
5
3

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.29
0.30
0.40
0.47
0.61
0.62
0.79
1.01
1.67
1.71
2.18
2.22
3.40

0
0
0
0
1.00
1.00
2.71
1.50
10.00
2.00
5.00
2.00
1.23
2.00
1.67
3.14
10.82

5
7
6
5

0.00
0.00
0.41
0.70

0
0
2.14
1.50
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5
6
7
6
7
6
7
7
6
6

7
7
7
6
8

Ghana
Madagascar
Zimbabwe
Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso
Liberia
Uganda
DRC
Kenya
Mali
Eritrea
MOST
Nigeria
Sudan
Ethiopia
CAR
Burundi
Somalia

6
5
5
6
6
5
5
5
7
6

0.74
0.94
0.98
1.02
1.20
1.34
2.26
4.02
4.46
5.73
1.62

2.00
3.25
1.20
1.67
6.17
1.00
10.10
5.96
2.02
3.03
6.00

6
6
6
6
5

3.53
9.16
10.72
30.04
116.07
128.18

6.47
4.92
5.29
3.91
1.54
4.38
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APPENDIX E
2016 VIOLENCE SUMMARY

COUNTRY
Somalia
Nigeria
Sudan
Ethiopia
Congo, DRC
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African
Rep.
South Africa
Mali
Kenya
Uganda
Mozambique
Madagascar
Niger
Burkina Faso
Angola
Ghana
Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Tanzania
Chad
Malawi
Senegal
Benin
Liberia
Zambia
Eritrea
Rwanda
Zimbabwe
Gabon
Sierra Leone
Guinea

# Total
Events

# Urban
Events
1231
584
495
413
368
313
165

771
306
120
208
131
143
31

133
104
101
97
42
40
38
35
23
20
20
17
16
12
11
10
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
3

55
60
40
54
20
21
8
11
6
7
11
2
9
7
7
2
2
3
3
2
3
2
5
3
3
2

Urban % of
Urban Events/m.
Total
dwellers
63%
128.18
52%
3.53
24%
9.16
50%
10.72
36%
4.02
46%
116.07
19%
2.49
41%
58%
40%
56%
48%
53%
21%
31%
26%
35%
55%
12%
56%
58%
64%
20%
29%
50%
50%
33%
60%
40%
100%
75%
75%
67%

30.04
1.67
5.73
4.46
2.26
2.18
0.94
3.40
1.20
0.40
0.74
0.61
0.79
0.41
2.22
0.70
0.29
0.62
1.34
0.30
1.62
1.01
0.98
1.76
1.02
0.47
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The Gambia
Togo
Lesotho
Guinea-Bissau
Swaziland
Mauritania
Djibouti
Namibia
Equatorial
Guinea
Botswana

2
2
1
0
0
0
0
0

2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

1.71
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0
0

0
0

0%
0%

0.00
0.00
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APPENDIX F
RESULTS BASED ON ALTERNATIVE DEPENDENT VARIABLE SPECIFICATION:
URBAN POPULATION IMPLEMENTED AS EXPOSURE (OFFSET) VARIABLE

N
McFadden's R squared
p-value
Y INT
(Scaled via z-scoring)
GAIN/Adaptability
DENSITY
REGIME DURABILITY
C-FRACTIONALIZATION
CFRAC2, SQUARED
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRACY, SQUARED
VIOLENCE HISTORY
URBAN GROWTH
NATL PERCENT URBAN
UNEMPLOYMENT
AGR DEPENDENCE
URBAN WATER ACCESS
UWA, SQUARED
CONNECTIVITY
GNIC (logged)
POPULATION (logged)

EUV Negative Binomial
(ALL)
630

EUV Negative Binomial
(singular specification)
630

0.6590

0.6717

1.47***

1.54***

-0.89***
0.54***
-0.51***
0.22***
0.16***
-0.08*
0.11*
0
-0.59***
0.61***
0.53***
0.18***
0.26***
0.04
0.37***
0.11(.)
1.33***

-0.92***
0.55***
-0.51***
0.25***
------0.09**
------0.02
-0.74***
0.65***
0.61***
0.14***
0.20***
-----0.24***
0.11*
1.33***

REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REM
REV
REV
REV
REV
REV
REV
CON
CON

Specification of the dependent variable using urban population as an exposure or “offset”
variable produces a modest difference in the magnitude and statistical significance of the
independent variables. While no formerly significant variables demonstrate a change of
direction and most reflect minor differences in strength of influence, notably, violence history is
not statistically significant, and connectivity, which produced insignificant results previously,
strengthens with a positive, statistically significant influence on urban violence. Violence
history previously only accounted for 3% of model influence in the mapping analysis and was
just barely statistically significant. Similarly, gross national income per capita also had little
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influence on the models presented in the paper and was on the edge of significance but drops
out in new modeling. The largest change in magnitude is demonstrated by log of population,
which becomes the most influential variable in the EUV model. This may reflect inadequacies in
this model structure as it may privilege countries with large populations simply because they
have more opportunity to experience urban violence events, the dependent variable in this
operationalization.
A second change in these regressions from the runs in the paper involves an adjustment in
the order of operations in measurement of hypothesized non-linear effects—first standardizing,
then squaring the non-linear variables, instead of the reverse. This adjustment reduces
collinearity between the standardized variable and its squared value, revealing democracy,
cultural fractionalization and urban water access as significant. As non-linear variables were
not included in map modeling, this does not impact mapping assessment.
Overall, results from this alternative data specification support the qualitative analysis,
finding democracy/polity to play a major role in urban violence likelihood, albeit a non-linear
pattern with lowest levels of polity aligning with reduced urban violence, but increasing
democratic-leaning polity failing to maintain this reduction. The increased influence of
population also comports with discussed theories of population distribution having a significant
impact on violence likelihood, as well. The emergence of connectivity as an influential and
significant factor is interesting. Originally, this variable was considered as representative of
capacity to organize violence. It is also likely that connectivity may reflect more developed,
urbanized states, whereby the likelihood of urban violence is increased by the sheer expanse of
urban territory. Qualitative research into use of social media might shed further light on the
way connectivity contributes to urban violence in future research. Finally, the strong statistical
significance of the non-linear factor cultural fractionalization endorses Fearon’s 2003 attempt
to identify problematic patterns and supports the original hypothesis in this work that
environmental push to cities might result in cultural clash as diverse groups are forced into
closer quarters.
Ultimately, only population (logged) demonstrates greater influence on the likelihood of
urban violence than environmental adaptability/vulnerability and national urban percent rate
of change. As non-linear variables were not included in map modeling, the results of this
alternative analysis do not impact the EUV 2016 geostatistical analysis and are consistent with
qualitative conclusions based on observed urban violence reporting in Chapter 5.
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